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3Abstract
What is the causal effect of exchange rates on international prices over time when the state
of the economy is continuously shifting? This thesis demonstrates that the existing reduced-
form estimates of exchange rate pass-through are biased, at the very least over the longer
term, and raises concerns over the long-standing disconnect between the average causal effect
and the dynamic causal effect. A unique methodology is then developed to quantify an
unbiased measure of exchange rate transmission at the firm-level from their observed co-
movements at the aggregate level. In this framework, exchange rate impact on the transition
path of prices from vintages to the inter-temporal optimum is determined by a compromise
between economic structure and stochastic innovations. The blueprint builds on a micro-
founded multi-country business cycle model that disciplines the structural parameters by
the data on macroeconomic fundamentals using the method of moments. The substance of
the quantitative predictions are exposited by addressing two broad research questions at the
forefront of the policy debate in international economics. Specifically, (i) “What Drives the
Terms of Trade Neutrality to Exchange Rates?"; and (ii) “Why Are Import Prices More Elastic
To Local Currency Depreciations Than Appreciations?"
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in March 1973 marked the end of the gold standard
era. Since then, exchange rates began to float against one another, although some with
greater flexibility than others. While dominant currencies such as the U.S. Dollar (USD) or
the Deutsche Mark were allowed to float freely, other currencies were either closely tied to
these anchor currencies or they were gradually abandoned altogether.
The design of the international monetary system guiding the policy makers during that
transition period was the ubiquitous Mundell-Fleming paradigm. It captured the essence
of the international economic policy domain, which later became known as the ‘impossible
trinity’ or simply ‘trilemma’. It states that the simultaneous adoption of the fixed exchange
rate regime, liberalisation of the international capital account, and an active role of the
local monetary policy are incompatible with the goal of stabilising local real output over
time. According to the model, the paramount tool when liberalising the international flows
of capital is the effectiveness of monetary policy in terms of smoothing out the local business
cycle, but only if exchange rates are allowed to float freely by absorbing external shocks.
The political appeal for such an unprecedented theoretical prediction could not have been
greater at the time. Mostly because it disowned the notion of adopting the price of gold
or other commodities as nominal anchors. It also sent a powerful message to the monetary
authorities around the world that the stability of local real output over time in an open
economy can be maintained by simply controlling the growth of monetary base in nominal
terms. Yet despite the transparency of the qualitative policy implications that are difficult
to refute to this day, the quantitative significance of the theory has become increasingly at
odds with the data due to a number of structural developments that challenge the implicit
assumptions imposed at the core of the mechanism.
One of the crucial channels through which expansionary monetary policy is deemed highly
effective in the Mundell-Fleming model is the anticipation of ensuing capital outflows that
ultimately depreciate the real value of the local currency in the short-run. In turn, the local
terms of trade are expected to deteriorate, thereby boosting the local net exports and, in
the medium-run, inducing an upward pressure on price inflation at home. However, there
are at least three long-standing empirical irregularities characterising this conventional line
of reasoning. First, Mendoza (1995) shows that the correlation between the terms of trade
and the net exports in many advanced and developing economies is mostly positive, as it is
implied by the Mundell-Fleming model, but it is generally weak. The caveat of the so-called
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Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect is the fact that in practice most terms of trade shocks are
viewed as permanent rather than transitory. Consequently, households optimising over long
periods of time are less inclined to shift their financial capital overseas in order to leverage
a contemporaneous increase in their standard of living. The positive effect on the local net
exports is therefore dampened through the balance of payments condition.
Second, the model assumes that all goods and services are internationally traded in a
perfectly integrated market structure, such that no parallel trade takes place. Indeed, Engel
(1999) shows that the CPI-based real exchange rate of the USD vis-à-vis other major cur-
rencies is mostly explained by the volatility in the relative price of tradable goods, while the
relative price of non-tradable goods and services are entirely disconnected. This implies that
the PPI- and the CPI-based real exchange rates are roughly equally as volatile as is later con-
firmed by Obstfeld & Rogoff (2001) for other major currencies. The problem is that Atkeson
& Burstein (2008) also document a stark discrepancy between the high volatility of the real
exchange rate and the low volatility of the terms of trade measured by the relative price of
manufactured goods. The pinnacle of these two findings is that they cannot be rationalised
by the home-bias of consumption towards non-tradable goods and services, but instead neces-
sitate the consideration of more sophisticated global structures of segmented product markets
famously coined ‘pricing-to-market’ by Krugman (1986).
Third, all prices are sticky in the currency units of the source country in the short-run -
a custom commonly referred to as Producer Currency Pricing (PCP). In this environment,
import prices in the currency units of the destination country would move one-to-one with
the nominal exchange rate. Combining this notion with the results of Meese & Rogoff (1983),
who show that a freely floating nominal exchange rate time series closely resembles a unit
root, implies that nominal import prices of all goods and services ought to adjust over time
almost as immediately and erratically as asset prices associated with private equity. Yet
Goldberg & Knetter (1997) among many others demonstrate that import prices of goods
and services other than energy-related commodities are sluggish to adjust in spite of large
movements in exchange rates. The rationale is simply that both export and import prices
behave in the Keynesian fashion, otherwise known as the custom of Local Currency Pricing
(LCP), dampening the expansionary impetus of the exchange rate channel.
Globalisation is a major structural shift that could not have been anticipated more than
half a century ago when the gold standard was abolished. The multilateral curtailment of the
trade barriers under the GATT and the WTO paved the way for specialisation and interna-
tional trade in not just the final goods, but also intermediate goods. Miroudot et al. (2009)
show that 56% of imported goods and 74% of imported services in OECD economies during
1995-2005 were in fact intermediate. It became cheaper for some firms to outsource labour-
intensive tasks from their domicile in advanced economies to the manufacturing plants in de-
veloping economies. In this process of international division of labour, production technologies
of consumer goods became more intertwined across the globe than ever before. In response
to these international developments, otherwise known as Global Value Chains (GVC), a large
number of other empirical motives have been put forward in the more recent years in order
to explain why the widely-observable exchange rate movements are only partially absorbed
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by international prices. The emphasis has notably shifted towards studies of firm-level data
that reveal detailed accounts of micro-founded tendencies of the exporting firms. Amiti et al.
(2014) use Belgian micro-level data and show that firms with greater market share are more
likely to export, are more open to intermediate imports, and are more likely to adopt LCP
strategies, while smaller firms are less likely to export, are more dependent on local factors
of production, and are more accustomed to PCP. Berman et al. (2012) use a rich dataset of
the French firm-level data and find that exporters with a high market share react to a local
currency depreciation by increasing significantly more their markup and by increasing less
their export volume than the firms with a small market share. The central message from the
global integration of the supply-side is that the higher is the share of imported intermediate
goods priced in foreign currency, the lower (greater) is the extent of exchange rate movements
absorbed by PCP (LCP) import prices and the greater (lower) is the effect on net exports.
And yet some monetary aspects have changed very little. According to Gopinath (2015),
some 5% of all global trade transactions were conducted directly with the U.S. in the period
of 1999-2014, but more than 20% of global imports and exports were invoiced in USD. The
fact that a vast amount of goods around the world are still traded in anchor currencies
has important policy implications, namely – which exchange rate, if any, matters? Because
even if minor currency areas decided to float de jure, the de facto international prices would
still be highly influenced by innovations in major currency areas, which could also bring
the infamous Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect to a grinding halt. Monetary policy spillovers
from major to minor currency areas are therefore particularly pronounced. On the other hand,
expansionary monetary policy in minor currency areas is only effective when there exists a
currency mismatch between intermediate imports and final exports, which leaves them more
susceptible to external innovations emanating from the major currency areas. Ultimately, this
discrepancy reinforces the notion first articulated by Calvo & Reinhart (2002) that emerging
market economies are reluctant to adopt floating exchange rate regimes and their policies are
indeed guided by rational motives. In fact, Céspedes et al. (2004) argued that an expansion
of the monetary aggregates via open market operations in emerging markets may even be
contractionary due to a pronounced currency mismatch in assets and liabilities, inducing non-
trivial balance sheet effects when servicing debt denominated in foreign currency. However,
IMF (2016) shows that the share of foreign currency denominated liabilities, otherwise known
as the ‘original sin’ due to Eichengreen & Hausmann (2005), has subsided dramatically in
many emerging market economies around the world since the East Asian crisis in the 1990s.
There are several takeaway points from this discussion: (i) if we want to understand
whether monetary policy is in fact any more effective in an open rather than a closed econ-
omy setting, we need to not only recognise a compatible configuration of external policy
instruments, but also be able to quantify the exchange rate channel; (ii) the supply-side indi-
cators associated with the import-export structure, such as the invoicing currency, openness
to intermediate imports, market concentration, average price duration, as well as other mo-
ments of the price adjustment distribution across industries, are crucial when modelling the
dynamics of international prices; and (iii) the interest rate transmission channel depicted in
the Mundell-Fleming model and the one implied by the empirical stylised facts are broadly
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aligned in a qualitative sense, but quantitatively they are dissimilar in advanced and devel-
oping economies.
The premise of this thesis is to bridge the gap between the theoretical and empirical
strands of the literature that have made valuable progress in addressing the three aspects
outlined above. The first strand refers to a number of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models that have been developed in order to conduct micro-founded business cycle
analysis in an open economy setting. The second strand is based on (Structural) Vector
Autoregressions (SVAR) that are used for the same purpose, but with a milder form of
structure and more elegance, which lacks the transparency in terms of the deep parameter
identifiability characterising the solutions of DSGEs. Yet unlike SVARs, very few DSGEs
are developed with the express purpose of measuring the elasticity of international prices to
exchange rate movements, more commonly known as exchange rate pass-through. Those that
do, such as Corsetti et al. (2008) or Choudhri & Hakura (2015), are subject to a number of
restrictions. Either the estimates are severely prone to attenuation bias, in which case they
are hardly more transparent than the reduced-form estimates obtained from single-equation
regressions, or they impose theoretically-motivated identification restrictions, but then insist
on measuring exchange rate pass-through ‘agnostically’ as it is done in the SVAR literature,
such as Shambaugh (2008) and Forbes et al. (2017). The latter is based on computing the
ratio between the cumulative impulse response functions of price inflation and exchange rate
changes, which effectively measures their co-movement rather than transmission. While the
former is susceptible to the issue of simultaneity, the latter reflects the causal effect. The
agnostic approach is also limited to estimates of pass-through that are conditional on observing
a certain counterfactual state of the economy, which makes it difficult to assess the average
causal effect that de facto formulates the core of the informed policy decision making process.
And though it is important to analyse the shock-dependence properties of exchange rate pass-
through, it does not supersede the underlying economic structure per se, since economies are
rarely exposed to a single distinct innovation at any given point in time.
This thesis makes several important contributions to the literature on estimating exchange
rate pass-through: (i) it presents a novel way to extract an unbiased causal effect of exchange
rates on international prices at the firm level from their observed co-movements at the ag-
gregate level; (ii) it resolves the dichotomy between the transmission and the co-movement
channels by treating exchange rate pass-through itself as an endogenous variable within the
system of difference equations characterising the dynamics of the economy; (iii) it simulta-
neously captures the salient features of the global import-export market structure as well as
shock-dependence, thereby distinguishing between estimates of the dynamic and the average
causal effect; and (iv) the mechanism is disciplined by the data on macroeconomic funda-
mentals using the method of moments. The methodology is then used to answer two novel
research questions that are at the forefront of the policy debate. Specifically, (i) “What Drives
the Terms of Trade Neutrality to Exchange Rates?"; and (ii) “Why Are Import Prices More
Elastic To Local Currency Depreciations Than Appreciations?"
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Chapter 2
Why Are Import Prices More Elastic
To Local Currency Depreciations
Than Appreciations?
2.1 Background
Import prices are often claimed to be sticky relative to the large movements in exchange
rates, but they tend to be more responsive to local currency depreciations than appreciations.
Several hypotheses for the origins of this asymmetry already exist, such as short-run capacity
constraints or downward price rigidities in the export industry, but they are generally difficult
to test. The nature of the data-generating process therefore remains unclear – non-linearities
documented at the border could be either traced back to the first principles of the export price
setting decisions or they could be driven by a time-varying volatility of aggregate innovations.
But whichever view we take about the source of exchange rate pass-through asymmetry, there
is no unifying modelling framework that could be used to reconcile its implications on the
bilateral terms of trade in a flexible exchange rate environment.
Even if we were to accept the view that the asymmetric causal effect of exchange rates
on international prices is at least in part driven by structural factors, it is still unclear how it
should be measured in a pragmatic business cycle model. Pioneered by Shambaugh (2008),
a growing strand of the literature, such as Choudhri & Hakura (2015) and Forbes et al.
(2017), computes the magnitude of the dynamic causal effect using (cumulative) impulse re-
sponse functions of price inflation and differenced exchange rate triggered by an arbitrary
innovation. This chapter demonstrates an astounding bias in this ‘agnostic’ measurement
of exchange rate pass-through, which arises primarily because it stands for the aggregate
price and exchange rate co-movements rather than an aggregated firm-level transmission of
exchange rate innovations. This seemingly innocuous approach is admittedly appealing for
its simplicity and general applicability in both the business cycle models (DSGE) as well as
structural vector autoregressions (SVAR). And yet, in equilibrium, it accounts for numerous
interactions among a large number of control variables that obscure the channel of exchange
rate transmission by convoluting the implicit policy function of exchange rate pass-through
with irrelevant state variables from the perspective of the price setting decisions of the individ-
ual exporters. It also implies that all estimates of exchange rate pass-through are conditional
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on observing a certain state of the economy, which makes it difficult to obtain a sensible
estimate of the average causal effect. Indeed, Forbes et al. (2017) demonstrates that arbitrary
innovations can influence not only the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through, but also its
sign. Aggregating the state-dependent dynamic causal effects using, say, a time-varying shock
decomposition can therefore lead to counterintuitive policy implications. But the practical
crux of all problems is the fact that accommodating non-linearities in the impulse response
functions generated by SVAR models presents hindering computational challenges.
This chapter demonstrates a unique method to derive an ex ante unbiased causal effect
of exchange rates on international prices directly from the first order conditions of the ex-
porters depicted in a relatively standard New-Keynesian model that can be augmented with
any non-linearity, such as occasionally binding constraints or other one-sided frictions. It can
be derived in the context of any business cycle model as long as: (i) unit costs of producing
exported varieties are correlated with the exchange rate; and (ii) the price adjustment costs
are convex à la Rotemberg (1982). The method addresses all three challenges outlined above
by treating exchange rate pass-through itself as an endogenous variable within the system of
difference equations characterising the dynamics of all macroeconomic fundamentals. There-
fore, contrary to SVAR models, the assessment of both dynamic and average causal effects
becomes a relatively simple matter even in highly non-linear settings.
But what are the supply-side factors responsible for the non-linear exchange rate trans-
mission channel? In order to abstract from the recurring structural shifts that could only be
captured by a time-varying volatility of innovations, this chapter explores the stylised facts of
the globalised export market structure during the Great Moderation period (i.e. 1982-2008),
which is well-known for its unique environment of relatively low aggregate uncertainty. The
first distinguishing feature of the data in this period is the high positive skewness of export
and consumer price inflation relative to the unit labour costs in many OECD economies.1
Secondly, large exporters in OECD economies are highly dependent on intermediate imports,
which are generally priced in the U.S. Dollar (USD), creating a strong correlation between the
exchange rate and the unit cost of producing final exported varieties.2 Exchange rate depre-
ciations are thus observationally equivalent to an aggregate decline in exporter productivity.
Similar to the conjectures of Taylor (2000), if the depreciation (appreciation) is sufficiently
large, then import-dependent exporters could shift the aggregate inflation into a state with
a higher (lower) frequency of price adjustment, since it intensifies (subsides) the ‘selection
effect’ even for firms that have successfully hedged their exposure to exchange rate risk.
Yet unlike the menu cost models, such as Golosov & Lucas (2007), Nakamura & Steins-
son (2008), or Midrigan (2011), where aggregate innovations trigger a self-selection of the
firms to adjust their prices or to keep them constant depending on idiosyncratic risk, busi-
ness cycle models are based on representative agents and they are subject to a degenerate
price adjustment distribution in equilibrium. The selection effect in business cycle models is
1The positive skewness of inflation is even greater in the period of 1960s-70s, but declines considerably in
the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis.
2Miroudot et al. (2009) estimate that in the period of 1995-2005 around 56% (74%) of total OECD imports
consisted of intermediate goods (services). Moreover, Amiti et al. (2014) establish a strong correlation between
firms choosing to export and their dependence on intermediate imports.
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therefore independent of the state of the economy, unless there was a way to approximate
state-dependence of price adjustment in reduced form. Indeed, this chapter integrates the
aforementioned downward price rigidities by introducing a non-linear price adjustment cost
function due to Varian (1975) in the context of a representative firm. The properties of these
so-called LINEX price adjustment costs extend the quadratic framework originally proposed
by Rotemberg (1982). Specifically, the name LINEX derives from their shape, resembling a
linear (exponential) functional form for price increases (decreases), allowing for asymmetric
convexity controlled by the sign and magnitude of a single structural parameter.
By no means should this framework be viewed as an exhaustive depiction of the global
export market structure surrounding the exchange rate channel. The premise of the modelling
strategy is to start from an already familiar New-Keynesian framework in the fashion of
Corsetti et al. (2008). A small number of extensions are then introduced in order to exposit a
previously unexplored channel. To that end, this chapter deliberately simplifies the modelling
of ‘pricing-to-market’ behaviour to the case of Choudhri & Hakura (2015), where low average
pass-through emanates from a constant density of exporters adopting Local Currency Pricing
(LCP), while the remaining firms subscribe to Producer Currency Pricing (PCP). The focus
throughout this chapter is on mapping the extent of downward price rigidities observed in the
data to the price setting behaviour of the firms, thereby isolating the novel higher order effects
from already well-known first order effects such as variable price mark-ups as in Atkeson &
Burstein (2008), the endogenous choice of invoicing currency as in Gopinath et al. (2010), or
the dominant currency paradigm advocated by Gopinath (2015) among others.
This chapter contributes to the broad theoretical and empirical literature analysing the
degree of exchange rate pass-through into import prices at the border as well as high-end
consumer prices. First, the theoretical model is motivated by the empirical estimates of asym-
metric exchange rate pass-through by Webber (2000), Delatte & López-Villavicencio (2012),
Ben Cheikh (2012), Bussière (2013), Kilic (2016), Caselli & Roitman (2016), Razafindrabe
(2017) and Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017). These studies generally find a greater import (and
consumer) price responsiveness to local currency depreciations than appreciations in many
advanced and developing economies depending on the methodology and the sample period.
Second, the hypotheses for the prevalence of asymmetric import price elasticity to exchange
rate movements were first proposed by Ware & Winter (1988), Froot & Klemperer (1989),
Dixit (1989) and Knetter (1994). Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017) provide a thorough literature
survey of these earlier conjectures. Third, there is a vast literature aimed at estimating the
degree of exchange rate pass-through based on an affine reduced form regression approach,
such as Goldberg & Knetter (1997), Campa & Goldberg (2005) and Burstein & Gopinath
(2014) among many others. Finally, the mechanism depicted in this chapter is influenced by
other endogenous exchange rate pass-through models such as Devereux & Yetman (2010),
Gopinath et al. (2010), and the menu cost model of Flodén & Wilander (2006).
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2.2 Non-Linear Price Adjustment Costs
Why are exporters domiciled in OECD economies more reluctant to adjust prices downwards
than in the upward direction? This observation can be extrapolated from table 2.1, which
demonstrates that the export and consumer price inflation is overwhelmingly positively skewed
in almost all of the OECD countries, while the skewness of wage inflation is generally less
pronounced with the exception of the United States.3 While the higher-order moments are
sensitive to the selection of the time period, this chapter abstracts from the recurring structural
shifts by exploring the stylised facts of the globalised export market structure during the
Great Moderation period (i.e. 1982-2008), which is well-known for its unique environment of
relatively low aggregate uncertainty. Although some of the skewness in these countries can be
attributed to the shifting monetary policy regimes towards inflation targeting, there are two
reasons to believe that nominal rigidity is the more important factor in generating downward
rigidities of export prices observed in the data.
First, wages are not subject to the same extent of skewness. In fact, they are virtually
normally distributed. Despite its decline in recent years, it is well-established that the labour
share of income, or the wage bill, still contributes the largest amount to the production costs
in advanced economies (see ILO, IMF, OECD, IBRD (2015) for G20 estimates). Downward
rigidity of export prices is therefore not an artefact of downward wage rigidities, at least
not outside of the United States. Secondly, large exporters in OECD economies are highly
dependent on intermediate imports, which are generally priced in the U.S. Dollar (USD),
creating a strong correlation between the exchange rate and the unit cost of producing final
exported varieties. Miroudot et al. (2009) estimate that in the period of 1995-2005 around
56% (74%) of total OECD imports consisted of intermediate goods (services). Moreover,
Amiti et al. (2014) establish a strong correlation between firms choosing to export and their
dependence on intermediate imports. Exchange rate depreciations are thus observationally
equivalent to an aggregate decline in exporter productivity in the short-run. The cost-push
effects across a large number of import-dependent exporters translate to a greater aggregate
export price inflation, thereby generating an even further ‘selection effect’ for firms that are
limited in their exposure to exchange rate risk.4
This chapter provides a reduced form link between the state-dependent pricing of exports
at home and asymmetric import price responsiveness to exchange rate changes in the destina-
tion economy. The link is established by setting out a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model in the open economy setting, which is augmented with real and nominal rigidity in
the form of wage and price adjustment costs. The adjustment costs enter the constraints
of rational agents, whose goal is to maximise the present discounted value of their objective
functions. The distinctive feature of the model is the choice of a non-linear functional form
3Workers and trade unions may be more reluctant to accept a wage cut than a pay rise, as opposed to the
employers, therefore the implementation of downward adjustment of wages requires more effort and resources
than an upward adjustment, which could generate positively skewed wage adjustments at the aggregate level.
4Using firm-level data on US export and import prices, Gopinath & Rigobon (2008) show that export
prices increase almost as frequently as they decrease. However, the frequency of price increases may be
partially blurred due to averaging over a number of heterogeneous sectors of goods as well as services. In fact,
Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) find a significantly greater fraction of price increases compared to decreases in
many different categories of goods in the US, which is indicative of the aforementioned selection effect.
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Table 2.1: Wage & Price Inflation in OECD Economies (1982:Q1-2008:Q1)
Consumer Inflation Rate (CPI) Export Inflation Rate (EPI) Wage Growth Rate (ULC)
std.dev. skewness std.dev. skewness std.dev. skewness
Australia 0.88% 0.72†† 3.14% 0.44 1.25% 1.04†
Austria 0.65% 0.53† 2.25% 0.08††† 0.79% -0.02††
Belgium 0.58% 0.92† - - 0.91% 0.40†
Canada 0.64% 0.80† 1.71% 0.99† 0.79% 0.43††
Denmark 0.65% 0.99† - - 1.83% 0.27
Finland 0.75% 0.94† 0.65% 4.50† 1.25% 0.16
France 0.64% 1.61† 1.44% -0.07 3.07% -0.24
Germany 0.43% 1.09† 0.50% 0.32 0.71% 0.99†
Greece 2.37% 0.40 3.58% 0.08† 2.85% 0.43†
Iceland 4.11% 2.49† - - - -
Ireland 0.83% 2.25† 2.97% -0.35† 2.24% 0.28†
Italy 0.89% 1.68† - - 1.32% 0.44††
Japan 0.60% 0.96† - - 1.19% 0.24
Luxembourg 0.67% 1.06† - - 2.33% 0.22†
Mexico 7.68% 1.69† 4.89% -0.66† - -
Netherlands 0.47% -0.74† - - 0.96% -0.07†††
New Zealand 1.34% 2.68† 3.37% 0.88† 1.52% 0.75†
Norway 0.88% 0.71† - - 2.62% 0.54†††
Portugal 1.96% 1.57† 2.85% 1.89† 1.10% 0.70†
Spain 1.00% 0.76†† - - 1.83% -5.27†
Sweden 0.99% 1.03† 1.58% 0.90† 1.37% -0.18††
Switzerland 0.63% 0.43††† - - 2.38% 0.03
United Kingdom 0.83% 1.62† 1.90% 0.94† 0.92% 0.09
United States 0.45% -0.11†† 0.97% 0.93† 0.69% 1.09†
OECD Average 0.67% 1.06† - - 0.43% 0.33
The number of †’s next to the third moment indicates a 1%, 5% and 10% p-value respectively when computing a
Jacque-Bera test statistic under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution. The sample size for all CPI series starts
in 1982:Q1 and ends in 2008:Q1. However, the data for ULC in New Zealand starts in 1989:Q1, while in Greece,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Ireland - 1995:Q2; EPI data for Canada starts in 1997:Q1, France - 1999:Q1, and Ireland
- 2000Q1. The magnitudes of positive skewness of prices are somewhat lower if the sample is extended to include the
Great Financial Crisis (i.e. 1982Q1: 2017Q1), but considerably greater when the time horizon is extended to include
the 1960s-70s. The EPI data comes from the IMF International Financial Statistics database, while CPI and ULC are
collected from OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Main Economic Indicators.
of these adjustment costs, rendering downward adjustments of wages and prices generally
more costly than in the opposite direction. Specifically, the most convenient functional form
of asymmetric adjustment costs is called LINEX due to Varian (1975), which extends the
standard quadratic adjustment cost framework:
∆(v˙t) =
κv[exp(ζv(v˙t − v˙))− ζi,v(v˙t − v˙)− 1]
ζ2v
≥ 0, (2.1)
∆′(v˙t) =
κv[exp(ζv(v˙t − v˙))− 1]
ζv
≶ 0, (2.2)
∆′′(v˙t) =κv[exp(ζv(v˙t − v˙))] ≶ 0, (2.3)
where v˙t = vt/vt−1 measures the gross growth rate of an arbitrary variable vt at date t =
0, 1, 2, ..., and the associated long-run trend is v˙ ≥ 1. The name LINEX derives from the
properties of the function, namely ∆(v˙t) rises exponentially in the case of ζv > 0 (ζv < 0)
when v˙t > 1 (v˙t < 1), but approximately linearly when v˙t < 1 (v˙t > 1). In the special case
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when ζv → 0, the adjustment costs are quadratic à la Rotemberg (1982):
lim
ζv→0
∆(v˙t) =
κv(v˙t − v˙)2
2
. (2.4)
The key distinguishing feature of LINEX adjustment costs, as opposed to time-dependent
nominal rigidity or quadratic adjustment costs, is that they can induce significant skewness
and kurtosis in the temporal distributions of macroeconomic fundamentals as it is observed
in the data. However, unlike models with fixed menu costs and heterogeneous firms, such as
Flodén & Wilander (2006), state-dependence in this framework refers to the asymmetric mag-
nitudes of upward and downward adjustments of prices and wages, rather than the frequency
with which they adjust depending on the size and the nature of innovations. Specifically, with
LINEX adjustment costs, constant returns to scale technology, and homogeneous productivity,
all prices and wages respond to all shocks in every period, but only partially if price adjust-
ment costs are strictly convex (i.e. κv ≥ 0) and more so for downward (upward) pressures
when ζv < 0 (ζv > 0). Under this reduced form mechanism, a structural innovation of any
given magnitude can induce asymmetrical pass-through into prices depending on whether the
shock is positive or negative. Although there are a number of existing applications of LINEX
adjustment costs to business cycle models in the closed economy literature, they tend to focus
on the downward rigidity of wages in the United States, such as Kim & Ruge-Murcia (2009,
2011), Abbritti & Fahr (2013), Aruoba et al. (2017), yet this seems less appropriate in the
context of other OECD economies. The primary contribution of this chapter is therefore to
demonstrate how state-dependent exchange rate pass-through can be derived and quantified
using an open economy model with LINEX adjustment costs.
2.3 Model
There are a finite number of economies in this model. Each economy comprises of three types
of interacting agents: households, firms, and central banks. There are three sectors in the
supply-side of each economy: wholesale, retail, and distribution. The latter is responsible
for transporting the goods from the upstream to the downstream markets within an econ-
omy. International shipment of goods is subject to Samuelson’s ‘iceberg costs’. Households
can only purchase goods from the local retail sector, but they supply differentiated labour
services to the distribution sector. In turn, workers and employers determine the equilibrium
real wages through a stylised process of collective bargaining. In addition, households sell a
proportion of their perfectly divisible consumption basket to the firms abroad, which is then
used as an intermediate input in the local wholesale industry. Households smooth their life-
time consumption in response to country-specific shocks by trading bonds. As is usual, the
adjustment costs of wages and prices induce persistence of output and inflation in response
to internal and external shocks, but they are gradually stabilised by the local central banks
that are independently committed to an autonomous Taylor rule.
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2.3.1 Import-Export Wholesalers
Consider a world evolving over discrete time t = 0, 1, 2..., that consists of n = {1, 2, ..., N}
number of economies populated by a continuum of monopolistically-competitive wholesalers
indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]. All economies are open to trade with the rest of the world and all
wholesale varieties are internationally traded, but they are split into two categories indexed
by φ ∈ {−pi, pi}. A fraction χin(pi) ∈ (0, 1) of the firms domiciled in economy i ∈ n sells
their variety in all n destinations and sets the price for their manufactured output at the
factory door (PCP), while the remaining proportion χin(−pi) ∈ (0, 1) set prices at the docks
of each destination (LCP), such that
∑
φ χin(φ) = 1. All wholesalers import commodities
from the destination economy that are used as intermediate inputs in producing the final
manufactured goods. This relationship is captured by the linear import-export production
technology: yin,t(ω, φ) = zi,tmin,t(ω, φ)/ξi. In this simplified setup, the term min,t(ω, φ)
denotes the stock of intermediate imports used in the production of manufactured output
yin,t(ω, φ).5 Homogeneous exporter productivity follows a stationary autoregressive process
zi,t = z
ρi,z
i,t−1 exp(σi,zi,z,t), where ρi,z ∈ (0, 1), σi,z > 0 and i,z,t ∼ iid(0, 1).
The real unit costs of producing final wholesale varieties are homogeneous across all firms
within the φ market segment. Namely, mcin,t(φ) = ξiQin,t(φ)/zi,t, where ξi ∈ [0, 1] mea-
sures the intermediate import intensity, Qin,t(pi) = min {qni,t;n = 1, 2, ..., N}, Qin,t(−pi) =
min {qjn,t; j = 1, 2, ..., N}, and qni,t is the bilateral real exchange. Specifically, a rise in
qni,t = 1/qin,t implies an i’th currency depreciation against the n’th currency in real terms,
and a rise in the price of imported commodities in the i’th economy. The rationale behind the
unit cost invoicing function Qin,t(φ) is based on two empirical stylised facts. First, Chen et al.
(2010) demonstrate that exchange rates of major commodity exporters have strong predictive
power in forecasting movements in global commodity prices, which provides a motive for in-
complete pass-through via cost-push shocks. Imposing a causal link between unit costs and
exchange rates is therefore rather innocuous and common in the literature, such as Monacelli
(2013) for example. Second, Amiti et al. (2014) and Chung (2016) show that intermediate im-
port intensity is correlated with exporters choice to invoice profits in the currency units of the
destination economy. Hence, Qin,t(pi) depends on the value of the i’th currency (i.e. source)
relative to the rest of the world, while Qin,t(−pi) depends on the value of the n’th currency
(i.e. destination) relative to the rest of the world. Specifically, LCP firms take into the ac-
count the most favourable bilateral real exchange rate, because wholesalers choose to import
commodities from the most competitive foreign location in order to maximise the price-cost
margin. It implicitly assumes that when the LCP firms sell goods to the n’th economy, their
intermediate imports are shipped directly to the destination economy and assembled into final
goods thereafter as though they never cross the domestic borders.
5Intermediate imports are treated as equity owned by foreign households, who trade a fraction of their
consumption bundle as bonds in Arrow-Debreu markets. This mechanism is analogous to the intra-national
roundabout structure depicted in Nakamura & Steinsson (2010), except the production function in this context
is linear in intermediate goods. If capital and labour were introduced using a Cobb-Douglas production
function, then a local currency depreciation would have the tendency to lower the demand for imported inputs
while at the same time increasing the demand for labour and capital, resulting in a counterfactually strong
negative correlation between unit costs and exchange rate. Alternatively, a more elaborate framework could
establish complementarity in intermediate imports using a CES technology with IES<1.
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In each period, the wholesale goods are produced and then either costlessly stored in a
warehouse, or they are shipped to all other N − 1 destinations. If they are shipped abroad,
then the firms incur iceberg costs equivalent to a fixed proportion τin − 1 ∈ (0, 1) of their
total revenue generated abroad as in Samuelson (1954).6 Suppose that international arbitrage
forces are near-perfectly efficient in terms of mitigating international price discrimination at
the border. Each variety will therefore be priced according to an ‘equilibrium’ condition
expressed in real terms that allows for a negligible amount of parallel trade in the short-run:
pin,t(ω, φ) = τinqin,tδin,t(ω, φ)pii,t(ω, φ), (2.5)
where pin,t(ω, φ) = Pin,t(ω, φ)/Pn,t stands for the relative price of variety ω originating from
the i’th economy and sold in the n’th economy, while Pn,t is the consumer price index in the
n’th economy. Similar to Monacelli (2005), the term δin,t(ω, φ) represents the endogenous
dispersion of price mark-ups across borders whenever product markets are imperfectly inte-
grated. By construction, δin,t(ω, pi) = 1 at all times, but δin,t(ω,−pi) 6= 1 in the short-run,
since prices set in local currency terms respond not only to domestic innovations, but also to
the ones characterising the destination economy, which gives rise to incomplete pass-through.7
When the goods arrive at the border of the n’th economy during that same period, they
are aggregated into bundles of goods according to their origin using the Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) technology due to Dixit & Stiglitz (1977):
yin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)
1−1/εdω

1/(1−1/ε)
, (2.6)
where parameter ε > 1 stands for the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) between
different wholesale varieties. The aggregate price of imports is therefore equal to a weighted
average of all the wholesale import prices:
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)
1−εdω

1/(1−ε)
, (2.7)
such that the density of firm types χin(φ) determines the average import price responsiveness
6By definition τii = τnn = 1, but τni = τin = τ ≥ 1, such that only international transportation of goods
are subject to iceberg costs. It is also implicitly assumed that direct shipment of goods is always the least
expensive route, namely τni ≤ τnjτji ≡ τ2 for all i, j ∈ n, such that the ‘triangular equation’ holds.
7Quantitative trade models have long neglected the peculiarities of international market segmentation that
generate substantial deviations from the law of one price even after accounting for the geographical dimension.
For instance, Engel & Rogers (1996) examine the price dispersion of a large number of consumer goods in large
cities of the U.S. and Canada. They find that price dispersion measured in USD is higher for two cities located
across the border than two equidistant cities in the same country. The symptoms of imperfect product market
integration are particularly noticeable in the pharmaceutical or the automobile industries, where Vogler et al.
(2016) and Saridakis & Baltas (2016) among many others document stark discrepancies between international
prices of cars and cancer drugs. In theory, this dictates ‘free lunch’ opportunities, or parallel trade, whereby
arbitrageurs could make profits by shipping goods across borders. Yet in practice, differences in patent rights
and insurance policies across borders – something that is rarely considered in macroeconomic models – mitigate
these prospects, thus resulting in a distorted general equilibrium.
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to exchange rate innovations. When χin(pi) → 0 (χin(pi) → 1), product markets become less
(more) integrated and import prices are more (less) stable relative to the exchange rate.
2.3.2 Sticky Prices
Suppose all import-export wholesalers are characterised by rational expectations. Suppose
further that every time they adjust prices, they incur price adjustment costs denoted by
∆in,t(ω, φ) ∈ [0, 1), which adopt LINEX functional form as described in equations (2.1) -
(2.3). Parameters κi,p ≥ 0 and −∞ < ζi,p < ∞ control their average convexity as well as
their pivot. On average, the greater is the difference between the optimal price and the local
long-run trend of inflation p˙n ≥ 1, the greater are the price adjustment costs. Firms therefore
have the incentive to adjust their prices gradually and continuously, except when ζi,p < 0
(ζi,p > 0), then upward (downward) adjustments are less expensive and will generally be
more sizeable. Firms choose the nominal price Pin,t(ω, φ) to maximise the present discounted
value of profit dividends subject to their demand schedule:
max
{Pin,t(ω,φ)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,t,t+1
{
N∑
n=1
[(1−∆in,t (ω, φ)) pin,t(ω, φ)−mcin,t(φ)] yin,t(ω, φ)
}
s.t. yin,t(ω, φ) = yin,t
[
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
]−ε
,
where E[λi,t,t+1] stands for the stochastic discount factor in the source country.8
In the symmetric equilibrium, all φ-type firms set identical prices due to their homogeneous
productivity. The first-order condition with respect to the nominal export price Pii,t(ω, φ)
evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium thus gives rise to a non-linear relationship between
the export prices and the unit costs of production:
pii,t(φ) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
, (2.8)
Φii,t(φ) = 1−∆ii,t(φ) +
∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1
]
, (2.9)
where Φii,t(φ) captures the asymmetric price stickiness, p˙i,t = Pi,t/Pi,t−1 is the gross rate of
consumer price inflation, while p˙ii,t(φ) = Pii,t(φ)/Pii,t−1(φ) = p˙i,t(pii,t(φ)/pii,t−1(φ)) denotes
export price inflation. In the long-run, Φii(φ) = 1, because p˙ii = p˙i. However, as long as
ζi,p < 0, the magnitude of Φii,t(φ) will be larger whenever p˙ii,t(φ) < p˙i compared to when
p˙ii,t(φ) > p˙i, which generates positively skewed import, export, and consumer price inflation.
Now that we have characterised the optimal time path of export prices in the symmet-
ric equilibrium, computing their elasticity to exchange rate innovations should be relatively
straightforward. Yet a growing strand of the literature pioneered by Shambaugh (2008) close
their systems of difference equations and then compute the ratio of cumulative impulse re-
sponse functions of price inflation and differenced exchange rate triggered by an arbitrary
8Following Kim & Ruge-Murcia (2009, 2011), price adjustment is viewed as an unproductive activity, since
it does not generate any value-added. As such, price adjustment costs are deducted from the total revenue
generated in each destination individually.
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innovation. The problem with such an ‘agnostic’ approach is that it is highly susceptible to
the way in which the system is closed, because it measures aggregate co-movements between
prices and exchange rates. In particular, different assumptions behind the determination of
exchange rate dynamics will produce different dynamic causal effect, because the implicit
policy function of exchange rate pass-through depends on numerous state variables that are
irrelevant from the perspective of individual exporters. Because we know for a fact that all
firms in the monopolistically-competitive market structure are infinitesimally ‘small’, they
always take the exchange rate innovations as given, but the aggregate co-movement approach
treats international prices and exchange rates as though the relationship between the two is
endogenous in both directions. It therefore makes an astounding difference whether exchange
rate pass-through is computed as an aggregate co-movement between prices and exchange
rates or aggregated firm-level transmission of exchange rate innovations. The discussion now
turns to the derivation of a micro-founded mechanism of exchange rate transmission directly
from the first order conditions of the exporters portrayed in equations (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9).9
Lemma 1. If 1 < ε < ∞, ξi(φ) > 0, κi,p > 0, ζi,p < 0, and import-export wholesalers are
monopolistically-competitive, then the causal effect of a unilateral i’th currency depreciation
on the i’th economy export price index is more sizeable than for an exact opposite appreciation:
erptii,t =
∂ ln pii,t
∂ ln qni,t
=
∑
φ
sii,t(φ)
1 + Γii,t(φ)
, (2.10)
where
Γii,t(φ) = Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
]
, (2.11)
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− ε)∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1) , (2.12)
sii,t(φ) =
pii,t(φ)yii,t(φ)
pii,tyii,t
= χii(φ)
[
pii,t(φ)
pii,t
]1−ε
. (2.13)
Proof. Suppose q˙ni,t = qni,t/qni,t−1 > 1, then because Qii,t(φ) = min{qni,t;n = 1, ..., N}
and mcii,t = ξi(φ)Qii,t(φ)/zii,t, it follows that ∂ lnmcii,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t = 1. In turn, ob-
serve that ∂ ln Φii,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t = erptii,t(φ)Γii,t(φ) and erptii,t(φ) = ∂ lnmcii,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t−
∂ ln Φii,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t = 1/(1 + Γii,t(φ)). Finally, the aggregate export price pass-through is
given by erptii,t =
∑
φ sii,t(φ)erptii,t(φ) =
∑
φ sii,t(φ)/(1 + Γii,t(φ)). Consequently, as long
as ζi,p < 0, erptii,t will be greater (lower) when q˙ni,t > 1 (q˙ni,t < 1), since the magnitude of
Ξii,t(φ) and Γii,t(φ) will be larger (smaller). See appendix A.1 for algebraic details.
9When import-export wholesalers are monopolistically-competitive, they do not exert enough market
power to shift the dynamics of the consumer price index. For this reason, exchange rate pass-through derived
in real or nominal terms is observationally equivalent. However, it is more convenient to showcase the results
in real terms, since the model is solved for a general case in which price levels are indeterminate due to
the long-run trend of inflation pursued by the central banks. Moreover, all innovations in this model are
generated in a perfectly unanticipated manner. Exchange rate pass-through presented henceforth therefore
treats all forward-looking variables as orthogonal to contemporaneous exchange rate movements.
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The conceptual rationale for the non-linear exchange rate transmission channel goes back
to the idea that exchange rate depreciations are observationally equivalent to an aggregate
decline in import-dependent exporter productivity. If the depreciation (appreciation) is suffi-
ciently large, then import-dependent exporters could shift the aggregate inflation into a state
with a higher (lower) frequency of price adjustment, since it intensifies (subsides) the selection
effect even for firms that have successfully hedged their exposure to exchange rate risk. The
shift in the selection effect is approximated by the pivot in the LINEX price adjustment cost
function, which allows export prices to be more flexible upwards than downwards.10
Lemma 2. Import prices in the n’th economy are more elastic to unilateral n’th currency
depreciations than appreciations as long as 1 < ε < ∞, ξi(φ) > 0, κi,p > 0, ζi,p < 0, and
import-export wholesalers are monopolistically-competitive:
erptin,t =
∂ ln pin,t
∂ ln qin,t
=
sin,t(−pi)
1 + Γin,t(−pi) +
sin,t(pi)Γii,t(pi)
1 + Γii,t(pi)
. (2.14)
Proof. Observe that erptin,t(pi) = 1 − erptii,t(pi) = Γii,t(pi)/(1 + Γii,t(pi)) and erptin,t(−pi) =
1/(1 + Γin,t(−pi)). When ζi,p < 0 and q˙in,t > 1, Γii,t(pi) decreases by less (Γin,t(−pi) increases
by more) than it increases (decreases) when q˙in,t < 1, such that erptin,t(pi) and erptin,t(−pi)
are more responsive to q˙in,t > 1 than q˙in,t < 1. Moreover, sin,t(pi) = 1−sin,t(−pi) decreases (in-
creases) when q˙in,t > 1 (q˙in,t < 1), therefore erptin,t =
∑
φ sin,t(φ)erptin,t(φ) = sin,t(−pi)/(1+
Γin,t(−pi)) + sin,t(pi)Γii,t(pi)/(1 + Γii,t(pi)) is higher (lower) for q˙in,t > 1 (q˙in,t < 1).
There are two opposing forces at play in the transmission mechanism: a direct currency
conversion effect and an indirect cost-push effect. The latter applies to both PCP and LCP
firms, while the former applies only to the PCP firms.11 When the destination currency de-
preciates, the direct effect is the upward pressure on the PCP import prices in the destination
economy due to a change in the relative price of the currencies. The indirect effect is the
decrease (increase) in the costs of intermediate imports in the source (destination) economy,
which leads to a modest decrease (sharp increase) in the PCP (LCP) import prices in the
destination economy. The inflationary effects of the destination currency depreciation are
thus exacerbated by the downward rigidity of PCP export prices, since the direct effect gen-
erally dominates the indirect effect. Conversely, when the destination currency appreciates,
the PCP import prices in the destination economy decrease due to a change in the relative
price of the currencies. However, the costs of intermediate imports in the source (destination)
economy increase (decrease). Because the PCP export prices are more flexible upwards than
downwards, the fall in the destination economy import prices will be smaller compared to
the magnitude by which they tend to rise, since destination currency appreciations lead to a
pronounced increase (moderate decrease) in the PCP (LCP) import prices.
10An alternative approach is to impose a short-run capacity constraint as originally conjectured by Knetter
(1994). For example, y˙ii,t = min {yii,t(φ)/yii,t−1(φ), y¯ii}, where y¯ii > 0 is a constant. However, only in high-
frequency ‘fire sale’ settings’ would it be plausible to assume that an unexpected favourable demand shock
transformed the pricing schedule exponentially into auction, which links the prices to the remaining stock
endogenously. But it is much less plausible in business cycle frequency when firms are subject to menu costs.
11While there exists only one first order condition for PCP exporters in the source country, the LCP
exporters set prices for all n destinations – each characterised by an analogous first order condition to the one
depicted in equations (2.8) and (2.9). For this reason, the direct effect is subsumed in the wedge prevailing
between international prices in the short-run. See equation (2.5).
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The fundamental difference between the present mechanism and those presented in Amiti
et al. (2014) or Burstein & Gopinath (2014) is that non-linearities induced by LINEX price
adjustment costs generally produce a stochastic steady state of pass-through into import prices
that is shifted upwards (downwards) for LCP (PCP) exports relative to the deterministic
steady state, creating an additional motive for ‘incompleteness’. As a result, if sin,t(pi) was
close to unity, the classical Mundell-Fleming predictions would hold ex ante, but the ex post
relationship would be influenced by the fat tails of the distribution associated with the export
price inflation. The most interesting prediction of the non-linear model is therefore that it
has the capacity to statistically reject the ‘complete’ pass-through hypothesis even if it were
explicitly embedded into the model via a counterfactually high share of PCP imports.
The quantitative predictions of exchange rate pass-through in this environment are ob-
tained by establishing a general equilibrium in a closed model. But before moving onto the
remaining parts of the model, the last segment of this section draws your attention to the
simplifying assumptions that nest already familiar corner solutions.
Proposition 1. When monopolistically-competitive exporters are autonomous to intermediate
imports, such that ξi(φ) → 0, or equivalently prices in the source economy are perfectly rigid
in the short-run, such that κi,p → ∞, export prices are neutral to exchange rates and import
prices move one-to-one with the pi-type market share in the destination economy:
lim
ξi(φ)→0 ∀φ
erptii,t = lim
κi,p→∞
erptii,t = 0, (2.15)
lim
ξi(φ)→0∀φ
erptin,t = lim
κi,p→∞
erptin,t = sin,t(pi). (2.16)
Proof. When ξi(φ) → 0, the model approaches the analytical construct of the endowment
economy, where ∂ lnmcin,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t = 0 for φ = {pi,−pi}, while κi,p → ∞ gives rise to
Γii,t(φ)→∞ for φ = {pi,−pi} and Γin,t(−pi)→∞. Both imply erptii,t(φ) = 0 for φ = {pi,−pi}
and erptii,t =
∑
φ sii,t(φ)erptii,t(φ) = 0. Consequently, erptin,t(pi) = 1 − erptii,t(pi) ≡ 1 and
erptin,t(−pi) = 0, such that erptin,t =
∑
φ sin,t(φ)erptin,t(φ) = sin,t(pi).
Proposition 2. When export prices are perfectly flexible, but wholesale production technology
is import-dependent, such that κi,p → 0 and ξi(φ) > 0, export prices fully absorb the exchange
rate movements, while import prices move one-to-one with the −pi-type market share.
lim
κi,p→0
erptii,t = 1, (2.17)
lim
κi,p→0
erptin,t = sin,t(−pi). (2.18)
Proof. Perfectly flexible prices imply Γii,t(φ) → 0 for φ = {pi,−pi} and Γin,t(−pi) → 0.
Consequently erptii,t(φ) = ∂ lnmcii,t(φ)/∂ ln qni,t = 1 for φ = {pi,−pi} and erptin,t(−pi) =
∂ lnmcin,t(−pi)/∂ ln qin,t = 1. Therefore, erptii,t =
∑
φ sii,t(φ)erptii,t(φ) = 1 and erptin,t =∑
φ sin,t(φ)erptin,t(φ) = sin,t(−pi).
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To summarise, perfect price flexibility (rigidity) leads to exchange rate pass-through into
import prices driven primarily by LCP (PCP) market share.12 The remaining parts of the
modelling section set out the demand side of the economy and close the general equilibrium
model by characterising the notions of aggregate income and the trade balance.
2.3.3 Consumer Prices
Once the imported goods are sorted into country-specific bundles, they are merged into an
aggregate bundle of tradable goods using the standard CES technology:
xi,t =
[
N∑
n=1
α
1/η
ni y
1−1/η
ni,t
]1/(1−1/η)
, (2.19)
such that η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the locally-produced and imported
goods, and parameter αii = 1−
∑N−i
n=1 αni ∈ (0, 1) measures the i’th economy home-bias. The
price of the tradable goods bundle is set as a trade-weighted average of all the import prices:
pi,x,t =
[
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
]1/(1−η)
. (2.20)
The household consumption bundle consists of tradable and non-tradable goods that are
assembled in the downstream market by a competitive retailer using Cobb-Douglas technology:
ci,t = (ai,thi,t)
αix1−αii,t . (2.21)
Labour services are non-tradable, because labour is perfectly mobile within, but not across
borders. The term hi,t ∈ (0, 1) stands for the hours spent in the labour force by i’th economy
households relative to the total endowment of time. Similar to García-Cicco et al. (2010),
labour productivity follows a random walk with a drift, such that ai,t = γiai,t−1 exp(σi,ai,a,t),
where σi,a > 0 and i,a,t ∼ iid(0, 1). The drift γi > 1 determines the long-run trend of labour
productivity driving the perpetual growth rate of the real hourly wage denoted by wi,t.
The retail price index is then set as a weighted average of prices of tradable and non-
tradable goods, where the weights correspond to their share in the final consumption basket:
pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
. (2.22)
The prices of non-traded goods in this model are highly stylised for two reasons. First,
Engel (1999) shows that the real exchange rate volatility in most advanced economies can be
accounted for by the movements in relative prices of tradable goods, while the relative price of
12This result is supported by the empirical evidence presented in Berman et al. (2012). But more generally,
exchange rate pass-through into PCP (LCP) import prices is increasing (decreasing) in the slope of the Phillips
curve. Up to the first-order, Ascari & Rossi (2012) show that the slope of the Phillips curve in a Rotemberg
(1982) style pricing model is given by (ε − 1)/κi,p, which is approximately equal to 0.05-0.2 in the OECD
economies, depending on the sample period and the empirical methodology. Hence, in order to obtain a
sufficiently flat Phillips curve, the average convexity of the price adjustment costs κi,p is typically calibrated
to a relatively large magnitude, while ε > 1 remains relatively low.
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non-tradable goods are largely disconnected. Second, Atkeson & Burstein (2008) argue that
non-traded goods and services, such as those associated with transportation and distribution
of manufactured imports, are mostly labour-intensive, such that their output is proportional
to the labour input. The production costs of non-traded goods thus consist primarily of the
wage bill wi,thi,t, which mostly depends on the aggregate productivity growth and is largely
orthogonal to exchange rate movements in the short-run.13
Lemma 3. When the aggregate consumption bundle consists of tradable and non-tradable
goods and only a fraction of tradable goods are imported, such that such that αi ∈ (0, 1) and
αii ∈ (0, 1), the exchange rate elasticity of consumer prices is bounded between zero and unity:
erpti,t =
∂ ln pi,t
∂ ln qni,t
= (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terptni,t ∈ (0, 1). (2.23)
Proof. Let sni = (pni,tyni,t)/(pi,x,txi,t) = αni[pni,t/pi,x,t]1−η ∈ [0, 1] measure the trade weight
of the source country n in destination i. The prices of non-tradable goods are not directly
related to exchange rates by construction, such that ∂ lnwi,t/∂ ln qni,t = 0. By contrast,
equation (2.20) expresses the prices of tradable goods as a trade-weighted average of domestic
export and import prices, such that ∂ ln pi,x,t/∂ ln qni,t =
∑N
n=1 sni,terptni,t. The exchange
rate elasticity of consumer prices is thus proportional to the elasticity of tradable goods
prices, namely ∂ ln pi,t/∂ ln qni,t = (1−αi)∂ ln pi,x,t/∂ ln qni,t = (1−αi)
∑N
n=1 sni,terptni,t.
2.3.4 Wage Bargaining
The skewness of the retail price inflation at the end of the pricing chain can also be linked to
the skewness of wage inflation, since a large proportion of production costs in the supply-side
comprise of the wage bill. In order to determine how much of the skewness associated with
the consumer price index is attributable to the LINEX price adjustment costs, it is important
to incorporate and control for the imperfections in the labour market. Not least because all
of the non-traded goods in this model are produced by competitive firms characterised by
labour-intensive technology, thereby attributing all of the market power over price setting
decisions to the exporting firms once the terms of the labour contracts are set.
Consider a unit mass of rational households indexed by ω populating the i’th economy.
Their preferences are homothetic and additively separable:
ui,t = log
(
ci,t − ϑici,t−1
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
h1+ϕii,t , (2.24)
such that households derive utility from the habit-adjusted stock of an infinitely-divisible
retail good ci,t(ω) and disutility from the hours of labour hi,t(ω) ∈ (0, 1). Parameter ψi > 0
controls the disutility of labour, ϕi ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply, and
ϑi ∈ (0, 1) governs the strength of additive consumption habits. Each household supplies
13See Burstein et al. (2003) and Campa & Goldberg (2010) for a thorough literature survey and empirical
estimates of the relative size of the distribution sector in OECD economies.
29
an imperfectly substitutable service to a competitive labour packer, who aggregates them
according to the following CES technology:
hi,t =
 1∫
0
hi,t(ω)
1−1/εdω
1/(1−1/ε) . (2.25)
Because labour services are imperfectly substitutable, workers can exploit the labour demand
schedule for their service when bargaining over wages with the employers.
The dynamic stochastic utility maximisation problem solved by a rational household can
then be stated as follows:
max
{ci,t(ω),wi,t(ω),bi,t+1(ω)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
}
,
s.t. hi,t(ω) = hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ε
,
s.t. ci,t(ω) + λi,t,t+1Et[bi,t+1(ω)] = bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t(·))wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + di,t(ω),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter of time preference. The first constraint is the demand
schedule for each variety of labour services, which households take as given. The second con-
straint summarises an indefinite sequence of budget restrictions facing the households, where
bi,t(ω) is the portfolio of bonds, and di,t(ω) =
∑
φ Πi,t(ω, φ) +
∑
φMi,t(ω, φ) is the exoge-
nously given stock of wealth acquired from the ownership of the firms, such that Πi,t(ω, φ) =∑N
n=1 Πin,t(ω, φ) are the profit dividends, while the term Mi,t(ω, φ) =
∑N
n=1 qin,tmni,t(ω, φ)
measures the total sales of commodities to foreign producers.
There exists a contingent claim for any state of nature among households in any given
economy, allowing them to diversify the risk arising from idiosyncratic income shocks. But
the risk arising from country-specific shocks is offset only partially by trading commodities
and bonds with households and firms abroad in incomplete financial markets. In this highly
stylised asset pricing framework, the price of the one-period bond in real terms is equivalent
to the stochastic discount factor λi,t,t+1, which is inversely related to the risk-free rate of
return, while the relative price of commodities is simply equal to the real exchange rate. The
portfolio choice is not modelled explicitly, since there are no constraints imposed on either
liquidity or the collateral, such that supply of equity is perfectly price-elastic.
The wage bargaining outcome is state-dependent, since the negotiated change in the real
wage prompts wage bargaining costs incurred by the households. They appear as ∆i,w,t(ω)
in the budget constraint and they are deducted from the total labour income, since collective
bargaining requires effort and resources. This includes hiring lobbyists and trade unions that
negotiate the terms of the labour contracts with the employers on behalf of the workers, yet
the process itself does not produce any value-added.
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The first-order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium are given by:
wi,t =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mrsi,t
Θi,t
, (2.26)
Θi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ε− 1
]
, (2.27)
w˙i,t =
wi,t
wi,t−1
, (2.28)
mrsi,t = − ui,h,t
ui,c,t
, (2.29)
ui,h,t = − ψihϕii,t, (2.30)
ui,c,t =βEt
[
ui,c,t+1
λi,t,t+1
]
, (2.31)
ui,c,t = Ψi,t − ϑiβ Et [Ψi,t+1] , (2.32)
Ψi,t =
1
ci,t − ϑici,t−1 . (2.33)
As long as 1 < ε < ∞, the aggregate real hourly wage rate is set above the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labour denoted by mrsi,t, where the term ui,h,t =
∂ui,t/∂hi,t is the marginal disutility of labour and ui,c,t = ∂ui,t/∂ci,t is the marginal utility of
consumption. However, in the short-run, mrsi,t and Θi,t are positively correlated, such that
an increase in the former leads to a less than one-to-one increase in the later, causing a lagged
response of real wages to innovations. Moreover, if wages are downwardly rigid, such that
ζi,w < 0, then Θi,t tends to rise disproportionally less than it falls.
2.3.5 General Equilibrium
The presence of a unit root in the stochastic labour productivity process constrains the ratio-
nal expectations solution of the model to the balanced growth path narrative, which involves
de-trending all of the stock variables by labour productivity (e.g. v˜i,t = vi,t/ai,t for an ar-
bitrary variable vi,t). The above transformation induces stationarity in the market clearing
condition for goods and services, where the total output yi,t equals the sum of total consump-
tion expenditure, the local trade balance, and short-run externalities:
y˜i,t = c˜i,t + n˜xi,t + ∆i,w,tw˜i,thi,t +
∑
φ
N∑
n=1
∆in,t(φ)pin,t(φ)y˜in,t(φ), (2.34)
n˜xi,t =
N−i∑
n=1
pin,tqni,ty˜in,t − pni,ty˜ni,t. (2.35)
Price adjustment and wage bargaining costs impose additional restrictions on the total in-
come in the short-run, since a small proportion of resources is used Pareto-inefficiently in
order to implement the adjustment of macroeconomic fundamentals that are consistent with
the rational expectations equilibrium. Furthermore, the persistence of output and inflation
induced by real and nominal rigidity justifies local central banks to intervene in the bonds
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markets in order to stabilise economic activity using a Taylor rule:
ri,t = (ri,t−1)ρi,r(r∗i,t)
1−ρi,r , (2.36)
r∗i,t =
γip˙i
β
(
p˙i,t
p˙i
)νi,p ( y˜i,t
y˜i
)νi,y
exp(σi,ri,r,t), (2.37)
where σi,r > 0, ρi,r ∈ (0, 1), i,r,t ∼ iid(0, 1), νi,p > 0, νi,y > 0, and ri,t = Et [p˙i,t+1/λi,t,t+1].
Conventional monetary policy conduct combined with liberalised flows of financial capital
across borders implies that the bilateral exchange rate is freely floating and determined by
the perfect consumption risk sharing relationship:
qni,t = µni
(
u˜n,c,t
u˜i,c,t
)
eni,t, (2.38)
such that µni = 1/µin > 0, eni,t = e
ρe
ni,t−1 exp(σee,t), ρe ∈ (0, 1), σe > 0 and e,t ∼ iid(0, 1).
Central banks commit to a monetary policy rule that is implicitly based on symmetrical
preferences, therefore any skewness of the policy rate is directly attributable to the non-
linearities in the labour and product markets. Moreover, the term eni,t is a stationary and
stochastic process of exchange rate noise, capturing all of the exchange rate dynamics that are
not associated with innovations in the macroeconomic fundamentals. Somewhat in the fashion
of Bacchetta & van Wincoop (2017), the relative price of currency in real terms is determined
by both macroeconomic fundamentals as well as stochastic noise, such that exchange rates are
disconnected from the fundamentals and mostly driven by forces determined outside of the
model. Incorporating exchange rate noise explicitly is motivated by the lack of persistence and
volatility of exchange rates typically encountered in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models for advanced economies even if financial markets are complete. This result has been
originally pointed out by Backus & Smith (1993). It should be emphasised that the novelty
of the framework lies in the way it analyses the consequences, rather than the determinants,
of exchange rate volatility. A more rigorous treatment of the exchange rate dynamics goes
beyond the scope of this chapter.
2.4 Non-Linear Model Summary
In the end, there are three factors contributing to the incompleteness of exchange rate pass-
through into consumer prices. First, the presence of non-traded distribution services (i.e.
αi ∈ (0, 1)), the prices of which are disconnected from exchange rates, thereby insulating
consumer prices from innovations in the currency markets. Second, the presence of home-bias
(i.e. αii ∈ (0, 1)), which reflects the fact that only a fraction of final goods
∑N−i
n=1 αni ∈ (0, 1)
are imported from abroad, while the majority are produced locally and priced in producer
currency units. Third, a fraction sni(−pi) of the import prices are set in local currency units,
which further stabilises the prices of tradable goods at the border.
The setup of the model closely follows the approach of Corsetti et al. (2008), except the
supply-side in this framework incorporates intermediate imports, somewhat in the fashion of
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Monacelli (2013) and Amiti et al. (2014), and the optimal price setting condition is char-
acterised by non-linear price adjustment costs. However, unlike Corsetti et al. (2008), the
magnitude of exchange rate pass-through in this multi-country model need not be deter-
mined through means of indirect inference. Instead, the theoretical measurement of exchange
rate pass-through sketched out above can be simulated along with the system of difference
equations characterising the dynamics of the macroeconomic fundamentals. Because of its
top-down structure, the dynamic measure of exchange rate pass-through itself does not in-
fluence the evolution of the economy around the balanced growth path, but random shifts in
the state variables facing the exporters can influence the optimal exchange rate pass-through
endogenously. In order to infer meaningful policy implications from the simulations of the
model that follow, the structural parameters of the model ought to be disciplined by the data.
This allows the model-implied quantitative predictions to be compared to those reported in
the empirical literature. The following chapter is dedicated to mapping the standard and
non-standard parameters of the business cycle model to the key moments characterising the
persistence, volatility, and higher-order moments of inflation and exchange rates observed in
the data of United States and United Kingdom.
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Chapter 3
Estimating Non-Linear US-UK
Exchange Rate Pass-Through
3.1 Motivation
The continuous nature of LINEX price adjustment costs is appealing for its compatibility with
the higher-order perturbation methods used to solve rational expectations models. Indeed, the
numerical solution to the non-linear model presented in the previous chapter is obtained using
a second order perturbation of the policy function as in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2004), but
the state-space is pruned using the Andreasen et al. (2018) method. Even in highly non-linear
settings, perturbation and pruning ensures locally-stable dynamics of all the control variables
around their accurately specified balanced growth paths when drawing transitory innovations
from Gaussian distributions. However, due to their large and restrictive dimensions, multi-
country models are generally more challenging to estimate than models in the closed economy
setting. There are only a handful of studies, most notably Lubik & Schorfheide (2005),
Adolfson et al. (2007), and García-Cicco et al. (2010), using full information methods that
are based on the Bayesian evaluation of the likelihood function. In particular, they are
applied to medium-large scale two-country models that are linearised around the steady state,
which enhances the speed of the numerical computations, since it renders the policy function
compatible with the Kalman Filter. On the other hand, estimation of non-linear multi-country
models is even more challenging, since the evaluation of the pruned state-space commands the
use of the Particle Filter due to Fernández-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramírez (2007) or alternative
techniques, which are generally highly computationally-demanding and mostly applied to
small scale models in the closed economy setting.
This chapter implements a less computationally-demanding alternative – Simulated Method
of Moments (SMM) due to Duffie & Singleton (1993) and Ruge-Murcia (2012). SMM is a
partial information methodology, which is not based on the principle of maximising the like-
lihood function. Instead, it makes an educated guess as to what the magnitude of the model
parameters may be by targeting a finite number of selected moments associated with the
control variables that have an observable real-world counterpart. As a result, it circumvents
the issue of stochastic singularity and abstracts from any ad hoc shocks that would otherwise
need to be added into a likelihood-based model in order to establish effective parameter iden-
tification. It also does not impose non-standard prior distributions on the initialised values of
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the parameters, while the ‘posterior’ densities are characterised by the conventional properties
of a normal distribution from which standard inference can be drawn. The latter point can
be viewed as both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, the estimation algo-
rithm is more flexible and immune to any preconceptions. On the other hand, the results are
more susceptible to model misspecification. In order to preserve the accuracy of the solution
and to ensure saddle-path stability, the model parameters are thus disciplined by imposing
lower- and upper-bounds on the estimates that discard theoretically incredible values from
the objective function, which ultimately amounts to ‘bounded SMM’.
3.2 Methodology
Suppose that θ is a g1 × 1 vector of unknown parameters. Suppose further that a sample
of T > 0 observations of economic data, {$t}, is available to estimate the model, where
$t is stationary and ergodic. Similarly, there exists a synthetic counterpart of the observed
data, namely {$ι(θ)}, obtained by simulating the model for a given draw of random shocks.
Assuming that the length of simulated series is ςT , where ς > 0 is an integer, the distance be-
tween the observed and simulated moments computed based on time averages can be denoted
by a g2 × 1 vector:
M(θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
m($t)− 1
ςT
ςT∑
ι=1
m($ι(θ)). (3.1)
The SMM estimator can then be defined as:
θˆ = argmin
¯
θ<θ<θ¯
M(θ)′S−1M(θ), (3.2)
where
S = lim
T→∞
Var
[
1√
T
T∑
t=1
m($t)
]
(3.3)
is a g1 × g2 positive-definite optimal weighting matrix obtained using the Newey-West esti-
mator with a Bartlett kernel, while
¯
θ and θ¯ are the lower- and upper-bounds that discard
the economically implausible outcomes. The weighting matrix S ensures the efficiency of θˆ
by putting the most weight on the most accurately measured moments and simultaneously
discounting the least accurately measured moments. Moreover, if J = E[∂m($ι(θ))/∂θ] is a
g1×g2 Jacobian matrix of full column rank, then the SMM estimator is generally identified, so
long as the necessary condition for the degrees of freedom g2 ≥ g1 holds, and it asymptotically
follows a truncated-normal distribution:
√
T (θˆ − θ0)→ N(0, (1 + 1/ς)(J′S−1J)−1), (3.4)
In theory, when ς →∞, the variance-covariance matrix of SMM becomes fully efficient and
converges to the one obtained using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as in Aguiar &
Gopinath (2007). However, unlike GMM, SMM does not require closed form solutions to the
theoretical moments associated with each control variable (i.e. E[m(ωι(θ))]) when minimising
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the distance between the observed and simulated moments. The law of large numbers ensures
that SMM is able to approximate the theoretical moments accurately at a fraction of the
duration it takes to implement the alternative. Furthermore, both methods deliver unbiased
estimators of θ, but GMM tends to converge more rapidly and deliver more precise estimates
in the context of small models or linear endowment economies, but in larger models solved
using a higher-order perturbation, the computation of theoretical moments can be particularly
arduous. Ruge-Murcia (2012) originally proposed using the values for ς in the range from 5
to 20 due to the associated increase in computational burden. In practice, the choice of ς
depends on the frequency and the length of the time series at hand, but for quarterly data
and T > 100, I find that the marginal gains in terms of precision beyond ς = 20 are generally
negligible compared to the marginal cost in terms of the computational speed, especially when
the chosen weighting matrix S is optimal.
3.2.1 Data
The model is estimated using quarterly data for United Kingdom (UK) and United States
(US). The UK is chosen as a robust representation of the higher-order stylised facts in OECD
economies displayed in table 2.1 during 1982:Q1 and ends in 2008:Q1. The Great Moderation
period is used by the most relevant literature on exchange rate pass-through asymmetry.
Moreover, Great Moderation period is known to be characterised by a unique environment
of low aggregate uncertainty, which helps distinguishing structural non-linearities from the
artefacts of potentially time-varying distributions of exogenous innovations.1 The time series
used for both countries include the level of real exchange rate, the quarterly nominal interest
rate, as well as the following list of first-differenced series: per capita consumption, unit labour
costs, average hours of labour, and the consumer price index.2 The vector of moments around
which parameters are estimated includes the variance-covariance matrix and the first-order
autocorrelation for all eleven time series. It also includes the skewness of the first-differenced
unit labour costs and the consumer price index, such that the total number of moments used
to evaluate the SMM objective function (i.e. g2) is equal to 80.
3.2.2 Identification
Similar to GMM or a Maximum-Likelihood technique, SMM is sensitive to model misspecifi-
cation, which is why it is useful to impose some natural limits on the individual elements of
1The UK officially operated under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from 1990:Q3 to 1992:Q3, which
allowed the Pound-Sterling to fluctuate within ±6% bands against other ERM currencies. However, unoffi-
cially, the UK shadowed the Deutsch Mark from as early as 1987. While it contradicts the flexible exchange
rate regime explicitly imposed by the model, the estimations were also carried out using a shorter sample size
from 1992 onwards. Although parameter estimates do in fact differ, the key qualitative predictions of exchange
rate pass-through remain unchanged, therefore the results discussed below will ignore this particular caveat.
2From the perspective of the model, the level of real exchange rate is stationary, while it is difficult to
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the actual time series of the GBP/USD exchange rate. As a result,
the deterministic and stochastic trends of the real exchange rate in the actual data are removed using a one-
sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a standard factor of 1600. In the empirical applications, consumption and
wages grow at a rate γi in the long-run, price inflation rises along with the target p˙i, whereas hours of labour,
nominal interest rates and the real exchange rate remain constant.
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θ that then follow truncated-normal distributions. The rule of thumb for statistical signifi-
cance is henceforth focused on the one-sided p-values relative to the bounds. Furthermore, a
fraction of the model parameters are pre-calibrated, because some of the model parameters
are only weakly identified and data outside of the model can provide more information about
their magnitudes (see table 3.1, panel (i)). This reduces the length of the vector θ to g1 = 30.
All of the varieties of goods in this model are imperfectly substitutable, but those traded
within borders are more substitutable than those traded across borders: 1 < η < ε < ∞.
Based on UNCTAD (2015) estimates of the average global CIF (cost, insurance and freight)
relative to FOB (free on board) price levels, the parameter driving the magnitude of iceberg
costs is chosen to be 10% of the total revenue (i.e. τij = τji = τ = 1.1). The calibration of
the remaining business cycle parameters in this framework is mainly based on the previous
literature such as Smets & Wouters (2007) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2012). In this model,
the share of distribution services αi = αj = α corresponds to the labour share of income, which
is roughly 2/3 of aggregate consumption bundle, but it is close to the estimates provided in
Burstein et al. (2003). The values of import penetration ratios αji, αij , ξi, ξj are taken from
Campa & Goldberg (2010). Most notably, the US is a relatively larger, yet less open economy
compared to the UK, which is reflected in a lower import intensity of final goods in the US
(25%) than in the UK (34%). Similarly, the share of imported intermediate goods in the UK
is equal to αii(1 − α)ξi = 0.2, which is greater than in the US (i.e. αjj(1 − α)ξj = 0.08).
Due to the homogeneity of unit costs of production and the convexity of the price adjustment
costs, the PCP and LCP price setting in the source country is ex post identical, which is why
χii(pi) = χjj(pi) = 1. Moreover, in order to save space, the notation henceforth expends pi,
such that χij(pi) = χij and χij(−pi) = 1− χij .
3.2.3 Estimation Results
Panel (ii) in table 3.1 summarises the initialised parameter values, the lower- and upper-
bounds as well as the point estimates. First, the parameters controlling the superficial con-
sumption habits, the density of PCP exporters, and the persistence of the innovations are all
bounded between zero and unity. They are initialised to the magnitude of one half, which is
analogous to imposing a ‘beta prior’ in the Bayesian maximum-likelihood methods. Second,
analogous to the ‘inverse gamma prior’, the magnitudes of shocks other than the exchange
rate noise are initialised to relatively low values, but they are capped at relatively large values.
Third, in order to ensure that the Blanchard & Kahn (1980) conditions hold, νi,y is bounded
between zero and unity, while the Taylor principle requires νi,p to be larger than unity. Fourth,
the average convexities of the adjustment costs are bounded between 0 and 100, which allows
the slope of the Phillips curve to fluctuate anywhere from 0.05 to infinity. Finally, the values of
ζi,p and ζi,w are initialised at zero and they are bounded up to ±1000, which closely resembles
a flat prior. Following the reasoning of Aruoba et al. (2017), imposing the bounds on ζi,p and
ζi,w are important in terms of preserving the accuracy of the approximation associated with
the second-order perturbation of the policy function. Mostly because unusually large values of
these parameters are not necessary in order to generate sufficient skewness of inflation, while
at the same time the approximation errors are generally proportional to their magnitudes.
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Most of the parameter estimates turn out to be identified in a sense that they are asymmet-
rical across countries, as one would reasonably expect, and they diverge from their initialised
values considerably. The average convexity associated with the price adjustment costs κi,p
(wage adjustment costs κi,w) are low (high) in the UK, while the opposite is true for the the
US. In spite of the differences in the slope of the Phillips curve (i.e. 0.251 in the UK and
0.065 in the US), the degree of price stickiness remains quantitatively comparable with the
time-dependent nominal rigidity framework such as Lubik & Schorfheide (2005). The Phillips
curve is significantly steeper in the UK compared to the US, partly due the implicit trade-off
in the SMM objective function, which requires sufficient volatility of inflation, synonymous
with a low magnitude of κi,p, in order to generate sufficiently large skewness. Contrary to
previous studies, the degree of price adjustment cost asymmetry ζi,p is found to be highly
pervasive in the UK, indicating that higher-order moments of inflation are non-trivial, espe-
cially the downward rigidity of price inflation. Despite a negative and insignificant estimated
value of ζi,w in the UK, wage inflation turns out to be hardly skewed at all, which provides
concrete evidence that the skewness of British price inflation is not an artefact of the labour
market imperfections, but rather attributable to the asymmetric nominal rigidity.
The exact opposite turns out to be the case in the US, where the real wage is downwardly
rigid, but prices adjust more symmetrically to either directions. This finding is in-line with the
results in the related literature associated with LINEX adjustment costs, such as Kim & Ruge-
Murcia (2009, 2011), Abbritti & Fahr (2013) and Aruoba et al. (2017). Hence ζi,p > 0 in the
US, since high positive skewness of wage inflation in the US due to ζi,w < 0 would otherwise
induce counterfactually high positive skewness of price inflation. In other words, consumer
prices are a function of wages through the distribution sector, while wages are related to
prices only indirectly through output and consumption. The spillover of wage skewness into
prices is thus much more pronounced than the other way around, which is why the estimate
of ζi,w < 0 in the is UK insignificant, albeit sizeable, and overshadowed by the high wage
stickiness. The results are not displayed for the special case when wages are perfectly flexible
(i.e. κi,w = 0), but ζi,p in that case turn out to be negative and non-trivial for both UK and
US. It is therefore important to control for asymmetric wage rigidity, otherwise the model
may over-predict the extent of downward price rigidity, thus exaggerating the incompleteness
and asymmetry of exchange rate pass-through into import prices.
The crucial parameter in terms of capturing the average magnitude of exchange rate pass-
through into import prices is the density of PCP exporters χji. Only 2% of all US imports
from the UK turn out to be invoiced in GBP, compared to 37% in the UK from the US. This
finding is generally in-line with the stylised fact that most US imports are priced in USD as
advocated by Gopinath & Rigobon (2008) and Gopinath (2015) among others. That said,
unlike in the linear model of Choudhri & Hakura (2015), the density of PCP exporters and
their market share is not one and the same in this non-linear model due to the influence of
relative prices (see equation (2.13)). Yet the market share of PCP imports in the US (UK)
turns out to be only 18% (5%) with a standard deviation of 1.6% (0.6%), therefore exchange
rate pass-through remains relatively low in the long-run.
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Table 3.1: Calibrated & Estimated Parameters
(i) Calibrated Parameters
Structural Country-Specific
UK US
β 0.995 γi 1.005 1.00524
η 6 p˙i 1.00625 1.005
ε 6 qji 0.61 1/0.61
h 0.3 αji 0.34 0.25
τ 1.1 ξi 0.88 0.48
α 2/3
(ii) Estimated Parameters
Parameter Initialised Value Lower Bound Upper Bound Point Estimate
θ θ0
¯
θ θ¯ θˆ
UK US UK US UK US UK US
ϑi 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 0.44 0.52
ϕi 0.1 0.1 1 1 10 10 0.64 2.02
χji 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 0.37 0.02
κi,p 40 40 0 0 100 100 19.90 76.80
ζi,p 0 0 -1000 -300 1000 300 -172.00 105.00
κi,w 10 10 0 0 100 100 58.80 13.20
ζi,w 0 0 -300 -1000 300 1000 -200.00∗ -387.00
νi,p 1.5 1.5 1 1 5 5 1.34∗ 1.32
νi,y 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 0.75∗∗ 0.39
ρi,r 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 0.77 0.85
ρi,z 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 0.40∗∗ 0.49∗∗
ρe 0.5 - 0 - 1 - 0.60 -
σi,a 0.005 0.005 0 0 0.0125 0.0125 0.00203 0.00496
σi,r 0.005 0.005 0 0 0.0125 0.0125 0.00167 0.00282
σi,z 0.005 0.005 0 0 0.0125 0.0125 0.00556∗∗ 0.00672∗∗
σe 0.050 - 0 - 0.0750 - 0.0130 -
The asterisk in the subscript ∗ (superscript ∗) next to the point estimate indicates that parameter estimate
is not different from the lower (upper) bound with a 95% level of confidence. All other parameters are
significantly different from zero as well as the bounds at > 1% level. The SMM algorithm is implemented
using Dynare 4.5.4 and Matlab 2017a. The objective function is minimised conditional on the bounds
imposed on the vector of parameters using the Sequential Quadratic Programming algorithm.
The Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1/ϕi is relatively high in the UK, but not the US,
which implies that the hours of labour in the UK are more responsive to changes in the real
wage, yet wages are on average stickier in the UK (i.e. higher κi,w) than the US. Further-
more, significant values of parameter ϑi reflect the importance of superficial consumption
habits in terms of generating sufficiently persistent dynamics of consumption and inflation.
Interestingly, the estimates of ρe = 0.6 and σe = 0.013 are relatively modest compared to
the persistence and volatility of residuals of the first-order autoregressive process for the
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filtered GBP/USD real exchange rate (i.e. ACF(1)=0.87 and
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RMSE=0.0376). This implies that the exogenous exchange rate shocks are only partly at-
tributable to the overall volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate in the model,
while the choice of invoicing currency, imported intermediate imports, and non-linear price
adjustment costs drive the remaining part of exchange rate dynamics. This is the main reason
why exchange rate pass-through based on aggregate co-movement of prices and exchange rates
is astoundingly biased compared to the aggregated firm-level transmission of exchange rate
innovations. Analogous to the GMM estimates of Aguiar & Gopinath (2007) and Bayesian
estimates of García-Cicco et al. (2010) in emerging markets, the SMM results present evidence
that permanent labour productivity shocks are more sizeable than the transitory shocks dur-
ing the Great Moderation period (i.e. unlike σi,a, σi,z is not statistically significant in both
the UK and US). They also contribute a greater proportion to the volatility of macroeconomic
fundamentals as a whole compared to the monetary policy shocks.
Table 3.2: Observed and Simulated Moments
(i) United States
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis ACF(1)
data model data model data model data model
c˙j,t 0.51% 0.52% 0.03 -0.74 3.21 3.59 0.19 0.25
w˙j,t 0.65% 0.52% 0.78 0.93 6.17 4.35 -0.13 0.22
h˙j,t 0.26% 0.27% 0.44 -0.99 2.76 8.12 -0.10 -0.24
p˙j,t 0.45% 0.88% -0.11 0.03 4.24 3.72 0.22 -0.04
rj,t 0.59% 0.29% 0.15 0.16 3.01 3.52 0.98 0.65
(ii) United Kingdom
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis ACF(1)
data model data model data model data model
c˙i,t 0.77% 0.43% 0.35 -0.78 2.73 5.91 0.43 0.28
w˙i,t 0.92% 0.17% 0.09 -0.33 2.41 3.91 0.32 0.54
h˙i,t 0.41% 0.30% -0.27 -0.65 4.11 6.47 0.12 0.20
p˙i,t 0.82% 1.23% 1.63 1.88 7.29 9.23 -0.01 0.30
ri,t 0.78% 0.56% 0.65 0.85 2.32 5.43 0.98 0.76
(iii) GBP/USD Real Exchange Rate
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis ACF(1)
data model data model data model data model
q˙ji,t 3.87% 2.47% -0.103 0.00 8.01 3.34 0.86 0.71
The observed moments are based on quarterly time series during 1982:Q1-2008:Q1.
Alongside are the model-implied counterparts generated by the Monte Carlo simulations
of the using 4000 observations. The exchange rate persistence is measured for the level
of the series, not the first-difference.
The fit of the second- and higher-order moments associated with consumer price inflation,
wage inflation, and exchange rates in the UK and the US is quite remarkable (see table 3.2).
The close resemblance of the model to the data established by SMM mirrors the stylised facts
established in table 2.1. The extent of exchange rate pass-through asymmetry can therefore
be deduced from the model without the caution about how the model is closed. And yet
the moments of other variables do not fit so well, owing to the fact that the model does
not incorporate public expenditure or financial frictions, which have the tendency to amplify
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productivity shocks and enhance the volatility of consumption and real wages. One cause
for concern from the non-linear general equilibrium perspective is the fat tails of the labour
hours. They are less concerning in Abbritti & Fahr (2013) due to their application to the
US data including the 1970s. By contrast, in the Great Moderation period explored in this
chapter, they seem to evolve in a relatively stable and normally distributed fashion. The
mismatch of hours suggests that the stylised model presented above could benefit from the
introduction of search and matching frictions or Nash bargaining as in Abbritti & Fahr (2013),
since they could enrich the fit of the model with the positive skewness of unemployment at
the extensive margin, positive skewness of wages and less skewed level of employment at the
intensive margin.3 However, for the sake of clarity and parsimony, the model is kept as simple
as possible, which inevitably leaves some room for generalisations and extensions in the future
applications. In summary, the main purpose of estimating the model is to fit the moments
of wage and price inflation in the UK and the US. Having established a reasonably close fit
of these moments, the next section uses the values of estimated parameters in order to assess
how they influence the incompleteness and asymmetry of exchange rate pass-through.
3.3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
3.3.1 Average Causal Effect
What is the quantitative significance of the downward price rigidities on exchange rate pass-
through into import prices? Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the period-by-period realisations of pass-
through into US and UK import prices against the depreciations and the appreciations of the
USD/GBP and GBP/USD exchange rate respectively. Panel (i) of figure 3.1 demonstrates
that, on average, USD depreciations against the GBP lead to greater exchange rate pass-
through (24.8%) than appreciations (14.3%). Moreover, the null hypotheses of zero and
full pass-through are strongly rejected for USD depreciations (see the p-values denoted by
pLCP and pPCP above each subplot in panel (i)), while zero pass-through hypothesis is more
difficult to reject for appreciations - broadly consistent with the empirical findings in Brun-
Aguerre et al. (2017). As expected, the average exchange rate pass-through is higher for PCP
imports (58.9%) than LCP imports (11.6%), therefore the low pass-through into aggregate
import prices in this model stems from a low market share of PCP imports in the US (18%).
However, due to the downward price rigidities, the PCP (LCP) import prices in the US are
around 18% (10%) more responsive to USD depreciations compared to appreciations.
There are two opposing forces at play in the transition mechanism: a direct currency
conversion effect and an indirect cost-push effect. The indirect effect applies to both PCP and
LCP firms, while the direct effect applies only to the PCP firms. When the USD depreciates,
the direct effect is the upward pressure on the PCP import prices in the US due to a change in
the relative price of the currencies. The indirect effect is the decrease (increase) in the costs of
intermediate imports in the UK, which leads to a modest decrease (sharp increase) in the PCP
(LCP) import prices in the US. The inflationary pressure of the USD depreciation are thus
3See Olmedo (2014) for more stylised facts about non-linearities in the labour market – it contains a
thorough literature survey on the skewness of unemployment rate in the advanced economies.
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exacerbated by the downward rigidity of UK export prices, since the direct effect generally
dominates the indirect effect. Conversely, when the USD appreciates, the PCP import prices
in the US decrease due to a change in the relative price of the currencies. However, the costs
of intermediate imports in the UK increase (decrease). Because the UK export prices are more
flexible upwards than downwards, the fall in the US import prices will be smaller compared
to the magnitude by which they tend to rise.
Contrary to Amiti et al. (2014) or Burstein & Gopinath (2014), where intermediate imports
lead to an incomplete and symmetric exchange rate pass-through, the model with LINEX
price adjustment costs can account for over 10% of asymmetry and around 80% of exchange
rate pass-through incompleteness. Most interestingly, the partial responsiveness of import
prices prevails even if product markets were fully integrated at the border, or equivalently, if
arbitrage forces at the docks were perfectly efficient. Specifically, the average exchange rate
pass-through into PCP is only 59% compared to 89% in the steady state. This result is chiefly
attributable to the relatively low average convexity of price adjustment costs and pervasive
downward price rigidity. To elaborate, the average US import price response to an exchange
rate change is imperfect due to the fat-tailed distribution of inflation in the UK export prices.
Whenever exchange rate movements are large, the indirect cost-push effect has the tendency
to overshoot the direct currency conversion effect, which can lead to a negative magnitude of
pass-through into PCP import prices in the short-run. According to Krugman (1986), variable
price mark-ups and pricing-to-market is the main underlying reason why import price levels
did not fall as much as anticipated in the 1980s in spite of a pro-longed episode of USD
appreciation. In the light of the present framework, the other plausible contributing factor
may be the rising commodity prices in the local currency terms of other OECD economies
combined with a greater selection effect associated with firms choosing to adjust prices more
frequently in response to higher aggregate inflation at the time.
By contrast, the outcome for the import prices in the United Kingdom is to a large extent
consistent with the conventional wisdom of Engel (2000). On average, exchange rate pass-
through into PCP import prices is complete, while LCP import prices are largely orthogonal
to transitory exchange rate movements. Due to an overwhelmingly large market share of
LCP imports (94.5%), the average pass-through into aggregate import prices at the border
is virtually zero. There are three reasons why the the qualitative outcomes for the US and
UK are non-identical. First, the US is less open to intermediate imports than the UK, which
dampens the cost-push effects associated with the exchange rate and commodity price co-
movements. Second, export price inflation is less volatile in the US compared to the UK,
resulting in a greater slope of the Phillips curve in the UK compared to the US (i.e. greater
average convexity of price adjustment costs in the US). Third, the high positive skewness
of wage growth and symmetric distribution of inflation observed in the US during the great
moderation period can only be replicated by establishing a mild degree of upward price rigidity.
As a result, UK import prices are counterfactually unrelated to the relative value of the GBP.
However, both the US and the UK are engaged in many trade partnerships with other OECD
economies, most of which exhibit high positive skewness of price inflation (see table 2.1). If
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other economies were to be incorporated into the model, the effective exchange rate pass-
through into UK import prices would be qualitatively similar to that of the US.
3.3.2 Dynamic Causal Effect
How persistent is the exchange rate pass-through asymmetry? Figure 3.3 plots the impulse
response functions of the endogenously determined exchange rate pass-through to a positive
and negative shock associated with an exogenous process of exchange rate noise. The size of
the shock is two standard deviations. A positive (negative) shock +e,t (
−
e,t) implies a USD
depreciation (appreciation) relative to GBP in real terms, which moves the real USD/GBP
exchange rate relative to the long-run steady state by around 3-4%, the influence of which
takes around 16 quarters to fully dissipate (see subplot (vii)). Because of the non-linear price
adjustment costs characterising the UK export prices, subplots (i)-(iii) demonstrate that the
USD depreciation (GBP appreciation) leads to a greater pass-through of cost-push effects into
LCP import prices than an equivalent USD appreciation (GBP depreciation), in which case
they are more pronounced for PCP import prices (see subplots (v),(vi),(viii) and (ix)).
In this simple model, the price mark-ups are held fixed at all times, which therefore directly
translates the cost-push effects into movements of prices and exchange rate pass-through (see
equation 2.14).4 A USD depreciation (GBP appreciation) leads to a fall in PCP pass-through
in the short-run due to the price stickiness (see subplots (vi) and (viii)) and it gradually reaches
its peak (equal to unity) at quarter 3. By contrast, LCP pass-through reaches its maximum
immediately after the shock occurs, since prices are relatively flexible in the upward direction.
Conversely, when USD appreciates (GBP depreciates) PCP pass-through falls by even more
in the short-run, on account that export prices in GBP rise disproportionately. The latter
effect comes from the rise in the costs of intermediate imports, thereby insulating US import
prices in USD until quarter 4 when pass-through reaches its maximum of around 90%. A
similar pattern is followed by LCP import price pass-through, but the maximum at quarter
4 is around 15%.
By construction, exchange rate pass-through into aggregate import prices is a weighted
average of exchange rate pass-through into the PCP and LCP import prices, where the weight
corresponds to the market share of each type of imports (see equation 2.14). Upon USD depre-
ciation (appreciation) the market share of PCP imports falls (rises), thereby attaching more
weight to the high (low) short-run pass-through from the LCP (PCP) imports. That said, the
exchange rate pass-through asymmetry is generally short-lived and is partially inverted in the
medium-run. Specifically, USD depreciations lead to high and immediate pass-through, while
USD appreciations lead to low short-run pass-through and it takes longer to reach its maxi-
mum, but in the medium-run, pass-through is indeed marginally higher for appreciations than
depreciations. In the long-run, when all of the short-run effects from transitory innovations
dissipate, exchange rate pass-through from either depreciations or appreciations is identical
and equal to the value of the steady state - asymmetry dissipates completely.
4More specifically, the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution is time-invariant, which implies that price
mark-ups can drift over time due to price stickiness only. Indeed, an interesting extension not pursued in this
chapter for the sake of simplicity and transparency would be to allow for elasticity of substitution to fluctuate
in order to see how much of the non-linearities transpire into prices in that context.
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Figure 3.3: Exogenous Exchange Rate Shock
Each subplot displays generalised impulse response functions following an exogenous shock to the autoregressive
process of exchange rate noise equal to two standard deviations. Subplots (i) through (iv) are expressed as an
absolute change over time relative to the steady state (scaled by 100), since the variables themselves are measured
in percentage points. Subplot (v) - (ix) are expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state. The
impulse responses are computed as conditional forecasts over 116 periods, where the initial 100 burn-in periods
are dropped. The conditional forecast results are affected by structural shocks other than the one impulse in
period 101. In order to average over the effect of these random draws, the exercise is replicated 500 times.
3.3.3 Terms of Trade
Based on the quantitative predictions of the import and the export price responsiveness to the
exchange rate changes, it is possible to draw some novel quantitative implications associated
with the US terms of trade. Let Tji,t = pii,t/pji,t denote the bilateral terms of trade between
economies i and j, which measures the ratio of i’th economy export prices to the i’th economy
import prices of j’th economy goods. The conventional wisdom suggests that the local terms
of trade improve following a local currency appreciation, allowing the domestic households to
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consume more of the imported goods for every unit of exported goods. It can be shown that
this will be true if and only if the exchange rate pass-through into import prices is strictly
greater than into export prices. Specifically, if and only if ∂ lnTji,t/∂ ln qji,t = erptii,t −
erptji,t < 0, the terms of trade in the i’th economy improve following its currency appreciation,
but they deteriorate following a depreciation.
In the Mundell-Fleming environment, where prices are sticky in producer currency units
and the import penetration ratio of intermediate goods is negligible, this condition always
holds, because the unit costs of producing an exported good are independent of the exchange
rate (i.e. erptji,t = 1, erptii,t = 0 – see proposition 1), thus ∂ lnTji,t/∂ ln qji,t = −1. This
implies that the relative price of tradable goods move one-to-one with the relative prices of
consumer goods, where the latter encompass both tradable and non-tradable goods. However,
Atkeson & Burstein (2008) document that the U.S. terms of trade are considerably more stable
than the real exchange rate. In turn, the most common way to solve this puzzle in dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models is to impose a 100% share of LCP imports, in which
case the the above condition is always violated and the terms of trade are constant over time
(i.e. erptii,t = erptji,t = 0 and ∂ lnTji,t/∂ ln qji,t = 0).
Similar to Choudhri & Hakura (2015), the average terms of trade elasticity in this model
is chiefly controlled by a non-degenerate density of LCP and PCP imports measured on the
unit interval (i.e. χji ∈ [0, 1]). The higher is the magnitude of χji, the closer is the terms
of trade elasticity to unity and vice versa. However, unlike in Choudhri & Hakura (2015), in
this framework, the market share of each import type is endogenous (see equation 2.13) and it
responds to the structural innovations due to income and substitution effects associated with
the exchange rate changes. As a result, the terms of trade elasticity to exchange rate is time-
varying and state-dependent (see figure 3.4). In particular, the US export prices are mostly
inelastic to exchange rates (i.e. erptii,t is close to zero), while the import price elasticity in
the steady state closely follows the magnitude of the market share associated with the PCP
imports (equal to around 18% in the US).
Contrary to the Mundell-Fleming paradigm, on average only around 16.6% of the move-
ments in the USD/GBP exchange rate are reflected in the US terms of trade. However, the
unique finding in this chapter is that the terms of trade elasticity of the exchange rate is
strongly negatively correlated with the exchange rate itself (-0.63), such that regardless of the
size of the USD depreciation, it leads to an overall deterioration in the US terms of trade.
However, small USD appreciations imply little to no movement in the US terms of trade,
while large and persistent appreciations have the capacity to somewhat reverse the US com-
parative disadvantage into a comparative advantage. The rationale for this result is exactly
the same as before, where downward export price rigidity in the UK creates a tendency for
the British exporters to over-react to persistent GBP depreciations against the USD – not
only impeding, but negating the pro-competitive effects of the exchange rate channel. The
notorious US current account deficit can therefore only be justified by the developments in
the private and public sector savings and not the foreign exchange market. If anything, large
movements in the USD – regardless of up or down – boost the competitiveness of the US
firms, because other OECD economies are subject to more severe structural non-linearities.
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Figure 3.4: Exchange Rate Pass-Through into U.S. Terms of Trade
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
How sensitive are the quantitative results presented above to the changes in the structural
parameters, even those that are estimated using the SMM? Table 3.3 presents the results
from a number of simulations with the express purpose of checking the robustness of the
results presented in the previous sections. The focus in this section is on the magnitude of
exchange rate pass-through into US import and consumer prices. The sensitivity analysis is
presented for the six most relevant parameters summarising the degree of downward price
rigidity, average convexity of price adjustment costs, intermediate and final import intensity,
iceberg costs, as well as the density of PCP and LCP imports.
First, in the special case when adjustment costs associated with UK export prices are
quadratic (i.e. ζj,p → 0), the null hypothesis of symmetric exchange rate pass-through into
US import and consumer prices cannot be rejected (see the first column in section (i) of table
3.3). However, as the downward rigidity of UK export prices becomes more pronounced, the
pass-through into US import and consumer prices following USD appreciations (depreciations)
approaches zero (remains unchanged). Conversely, increase in the average convexity of the
UK price adjustment costs shrinks the extent of pass-through asymmetry for both import and
consumer prices (see section (ii) of table 3.3).
If the UK was autonomous to intermediate imports (i.e. ξj → 0), then proposition 1 proves
that the only source of incompleteness and time-variability in exchange rate pass-through into
import prices stems from the market share of PCP imports. This is because pass-through into
PCP (LCP) import prices would be equal to unity (zero) at all times (see the first column in
section (iii) of table 3.3 and equation 2.14). However, as soon as ξj > 0, Γjj,t(pi) and Γji,t(−pi)
are no longer equal to zero, such that cost-push effects associated with exchange rate and
commodity price co-movement lead to incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Interestingly,
as UK intermediate import intensity increases, US import prices become somewhat more
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Table 3.3: Exchange Rate Pass-Through Robustness in the United States
(i) Downward Price Rigidity of UK Exports
ζj,p = 0.00 ζj,p = −100.00 ζj,p = −200.00 ζj,p = −300.00
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 24.43% 25.47% 24.81% 19.33% 24.76% 12.16% 25.12% 3.16%
erpti,t 2.34% 2.59% 2.36% 2.18% 2.36% 1.71% 2.37% 1.10%
(ii) UK Export Price Stickiness
κj,p = 10.00 κj,p = 20.00 κj,p = 30.00 κj,p = 40.00
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 32.56% -5.36% 24.75% 14.37% 22.45% 18.07% 21.40% 19.40%
erpti,t 2.82% 0.55% 2.35% 1.85% 2.22% 2.09% 2.16% 2.18%
(iii) Intermediate Import Intensity in the UK
ξj = 0.00 ξj = 0.20 ξj = 0.40 ξj = 0.60
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 16.77% 18.98% 24.77% 11.27% 24.52% 12.83% 24.63% 13.70%
erpti,t 2.78% 3.15% 3.36% 2.06% 2.80% 1.97% 2.53% 1.90%
(iv) Density of PCP imports in the US
χji = 0.00 χji = 0.05 χji = 0.1 χji = 0.15
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 16.61% 6.59% 37.99% 26.77% 52.29% 40.07% 61.24% 48.10%
erpti,t 1.80% 1.33% 3.27% 2.70% 4.31% 3.66% 5.00% 4.28%
(v) Import Intensity of Final Goods in the US
αji = 0.00 αji = 0.15 αji = 0.30 αji = 0.45
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 16.76% 6.02% 22.96% 12.39% 25.44% 15.02% 27.00% 16.74%
erpti,t 0.54% 0.75% 1.77% 1.48% 2.60% 2.00% 3.16% 2.39%
(vi) Iceberg Costs
τ = 1.00 τ = 1.10 τ = 1.20 τ = 1.30
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
erptji,t 25.30% 14.81% 24.80% 14.28% 24.32% 13.81% 23.88% 13.36%
erpti,t 2.42% 1.88% 2.36% 1.84% 2.30% 1.81% 2.25% 1.78%
All panels display a hypothetical magnitude of exchange rate pass-through into US import
prices and consumer prices following depreciations (+) and appreciations (–) of the USD/GBP
exchange rate when the value of a given parameter changes. The remaining parameters are held
constant at their default values. The results are based on 4000 observations of synthetic data
generated by the model, where it is implicitly assumed that i = US and j = UK.
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elastic to exchange rate changes, but more so for appreciations, thereby diminishing pass-
through asymmetry.
Similar to Choudhri & Hakura (2015), exchange rate pass-through into US import prices
is increasing in the density of PCP imports in the US (i.e. χji). However, the relationship
in this framework is non-linear, since in addition to this density, the relative prices of both
PCP and LCP imports also influence the weight on pass-through from each type of import
(see equation 2.13). Moreover, increase in the density of PCP imports enhances the exchange
rate pass-through asymmetry, since more weight is attached to the dynamics of PCP import
prices that are more volatile and subject to greater non-linearities by construction.
As expected, exchange rate pass-through into US consumer prices is increasing in the
US import intensity of final goods (see see section (v) of table 3.3 and equation 2.23). The
unexpected result is that exchange rate pass-through into US import prices is also increasing
in the import intensity of final goods. Hence, a rise in αji leads to an increase in the market
share of the PCP firms through changes in the steady state of the relative prices. The
rationale is simply that greater consumption expenditure on imported goods in any given
economy is associated with greater market power of the foreign firms and their tendency
to choose the invoicing currency of their domicile. Finally, an increase in the iceberg costs
leads to marginally lower and less asymmetric exchange rate pass-through into US import
and consumer prices, but their overall influence is quantitatively negligible.
3.3.5 Alternative Reduced Form Estimates
Now that we have established all of the micro-founded properties of the model-implied ex-
change rate pass-through, the next natural question is – how biased are the alternative reduced
form estimates? This section explores two methodologies that are widely-applied in the liter-
ature, namely: (i) the ratio of cumulative impulse response functions of nominal import price
inflation and the first-differenced nominal exchange rate triggered by exchange rate noise as
in Shambaugh (2008), Choudhri & Hakura (2015), and Forbes et al. (2017); and (ii) the cu-
mulative dynamic multipliers generated by a non-linear error correction model, pioneered by
Shin et al. (2014) and Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017).
First, consider the cumulative impulse response approach à la Shambaugh (2008), hence-
forth CIRF. Recall that the numerical solution to the model is obtained for real prices and
real exchange rates. Because all firms are infinitely ‘small’ in this model, it does not matter
if the closed-form solution to exchange rate pass-through is derived endogenously in real or
nominal terms. However, computing the ratio of cumulative impulse response functions of the
real import price inflation and the real exchange rate change would introduce an inconsistency
associated with extraneous indirect income effects, because the deflators of these two variables
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are not identical.5 And yet even after carefully mitigating these effects from the impulse re-
sponse functions, the quantitative predictions of exchange rate pass-through in their reduced
form bear very little resemblance to the micro-founded estimates presented above. In spite of
the fact that both approaches represent the same exact data generating process, the policy
implications that immediately follow are poles apart.
For instance, figure 3.5 displays the CIRF estimates of exchange rate pass-through, all
of which are virtually zero in the long-run for PCP, LCP, and aggregate import prices. On
the other hand, the model predicts a 28% (8%) pass-through in the steady state into US
(UK) import prices at the aggregate level. Although both methods predict a gradually dis-
sipating exchange rate pass-through asymmetry, it is considerably more persistent and more
pronounced in the case of CIRF. Both methods predict import prices to be more responsive to
local currency depreciations than appreciations, but the CIRF estimate over-shoots the micro-
founded estimate by more than 60% in the case of depreciations (i.e. CIRF elasticity is 0.62,
while the model-implied elasticity of 0.38). These results suggest that indirect income effects
prevail even after carefully dissecting the price and exchange rate series from the mechanics of
the model. The presumption that the same exact veil of ‘smallness’ applies to the CIRF esti-
mates as it does in the case of the micro-founded measurement is thus misguided, because the
co-movement of macroeconomic fundamentals in equilibrium drives their generalised impulse
response functions. Yet they are irrelevant to the optimal behaviour of individual exporters,
since they have no market power over the influence of aggregate developments and it would
not influence their optimal exchange rate pass-through.
Second, consider the non-linear error correction model as in Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017),
henceforth NECM, who show that in many advanced and developing economies around the
world import prices are more responsive to local currency depreciations than appreciations,
including the US and the UK.6 Another property of the NECM is that it typically gives rise
to a greater exchange rate pass-through in the long-run than in the short-run, purporting that
nominal rigidity ought to delay the onset of exchange rate impact on international prices. In
order to compare the theoretical predictions of the model presented above to the empirical
5In particular, real price pji,t = Pji,t/Pi,t is the real import price of source country j in destination i,
while qji,t = Qji,tPj,t/Pi,t is the real exchange rate. The ratio of cumulative import price inflation and the
nominal exchange rate change is therefore computed as
G(Pji, Qji) =
∑H
h=1[p˙ji,h − p˙i,h]∑H
h=1[q˙ji,h − p˙j,h + p˙i,h]
,
where h = 1, 2, ..., H is the length of the impulse response function, G(·) is an H × 1 vector, while p˙ji,h, p˙i,h,
q˙ji,h, and p˙j,h are model-implied generalised impulse response functions.
6Error correction models in general are among the most popular reduced form methodologies in terms
of estimating exchange rate pass-through. Thanks to the contributions of Campa & Goldberg (2005) and
Burstein & Gopinath (2014) among many others, valuable progress has been made in terms of quantifying
the speed and the extent of exchange rate shock transmission into international prices. Moreover, the seminal
contribution of Shin et al. (2014) demonstrated that error correction models can indeed serve an important
additional purpose without abandoning their appeal attributed to the computational simplicity. In particular,
they can be used to assess the exponential adjustment of a co-integrating relationship towards an asymmetric
long-run equilibrium by estimating a univariate regression function by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The
specification of NECM used in this chapter is exactly the same as in Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017), who provide
all of the remaining technical details related to the implementation. Suffice it to say that it is based on nominal
prices of imports and exports as well as the bilateral nominal exchange rate.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Impulse Response Estimates of Exchange Rate Pass-
Through
Each subplot displays the ratio of cumulative generalised impulse response functions of import price inflation and
first-differenced nominal exchange rate following an exogenous shock to the autoregressive process of exchange rate
noise equal to two standard deviations. The magnitude of pass-through is expressed as an elasticity bounded between
zero and unity. The impulse responses are computed as conditional forecasts over 116 periods, where the initial 100
burn-in periods are dropped. The conditional forecast results are affected by structural shocks other than the one
impulse in period 101. In order to average over the effect of these random draws, the exercise is replicated 500 times.
rationale à la Brun-Aguerre et al. (2017), this chapter adopts an indirect inference approach
originally proposed by Corsetti et al. (2008). The idea is to take the model-implied data and
to extract the synthetic magnitude of exchange rate pass-through using NECM – exactly as
it is done in the context of actual data on macroeconomic fundamentals.
The model-implied NECM results presented in figure 3.6 are qualitatively similar to the
empirical studies in a number of ways, one of which is that exchange rate pass-through is
monotonically increasing over the projected horizon – it also takes time for it to fully unfold.
It should be emphasised, however, that this finding has very little theoretical basis from the
perspective of the true, and in this case known, data generating process, such that the tran-
sition path generated by the NECM acts as though it is a mere mechanical property of the
methodology. Even if we were to take the aforementioned argument of nominal rigidity at face
value, New-Keynesian models are notorious for their missing persistence of inflation to mon-
etary innovations – one would not expect as much persistence of exchange rate pass-through
as suggested by the low rate of decay in the transition path. On the other hand, NECM does
detect a statistically significant albeit mild disparity between import price responsiveness to
local currency depreciations and appreciations in the US, but not in the UK, much like the
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Figure 3.6: Non-Linear Error Correction Model Estimates of Exchange Rate
Pass-Through
The subplots display cumulative dynamic multipliers measuring the transition path of the elasticity of US (UK) import
prices to USD/GBP (GBP/USD) exchange rate that is triggered by an exogenous change in the latter. The confidence
intervals are bootstrapped using 2000 replications of the coefficient estimates.
micro-founded estimates and unlike CIRF. NECM also matches the stylised fact established
by the business cycle model that exchange rate pass-through asymmetry is generally short-
lived. However, in spite of the fact that the model embeds a number of structural factors that
insulate import prices from large exchange rate movements in the steady state, the NECM
predicts complete exchange rate pass-through for distant projected horizons, unlike CIRF and
unlike the micro-founded estimates. A similar observation is made by Corsetti et al. (2008) in
a calibrated and linearised two-country model with a number of properties distorting the pur-
chasing power parity and the law of one price. The dichotomy between the true, and in this
case known, data generating process and the NECM estimates of exchange rate pass-through
implies that the policy implications derived from the latter can be remarkably misleading.
The synopsis of this section is not to advocate the applications of business cycle models as
be-all and end-all in the context of measuring exchange rate pass-through per se. If anything,
it claims that the reduced form measurements of exchange rate pass-through applied to the
aggregate data on prices can be just as misleading as the the business cycle model estimates
whenever the latter are postulated on the basis of uninformed presumptions about the struc-
ture of the economy. With that in mind, if we were to ever pin down the truly unbiased
estimate of pass-through, it would almost certainly come from a simple structural model that
is based entirely on detailed firm-level data of prices and mark-ups. The problem is that
such data are still scarcely available even in OECD economies, not to mention the emerging
markets, despite the growing initiative of the literature towards this direction. And so in
the imperfect information environment such as the status quo, this chapter presents the case
in favour of using business cycle models that assimilate the salient features of the globalised
export market structure as a tool to transcend the interim administrative challenges and to
extract more signal and less noise about the exchange rate transmission channel.
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3.4 Non-Linear Estimation Summary
This chapter estimates the micro-founded measurement of exchange rate pass-through derived
directly from the first order conditions of import-dependent exporters in the context of a multi-
country business cycle model. When the non-linearities are driven by non-trivial higher-order
moments of inflation in OECD economies, the estimated business cycle model predicts that US
import prices are on average 10% more responsive to USD depreciations than appreciations.
The central idea behind this result is that exchange rate depreciations are treated analogously
as an aggregate decline in exporter productivity in the short-run. The cost-push effects across
a large number of import-dependent exporters translate to a greater aggregate export price
inflation, thereby generating an even further ‘selection effect’ for firms that are limited in
their exposure to exchange rate risk. The shifts in the selection effect are approximated by
the pivot in the LINEX price adjustment cost function in a representative firm framework.
More specifically, the estimated model predicts that US import prices at the border absorb
24.8% (14.3%) of USD depreciations (appreciations), while the UK import prices are mostly
orthogonal to GBP fluctuations. This finding is based on the high share of LCP imports in the
US, a significant positive skewness of UK export price inflation, and a vastly greater openness
to intermediate imports in the UK compared to the US. In the absence of non-linear price
adjustment costs, exchange rate pass-through into import prices becomes symmetric, which
implies that intermediate imports are a necessary, but not a sufficient property of the model
in terms of generating asymmetric pass-through. The reduced form measurement of exchange
rate pass-through advocated by Shambaugh (2008) delivers qualitatively similar results, but
the quantitative predictions are shown to be poles apart. In particular, the reduced form
measure is biased upwards by more than 60% upon impact and it generates a much more
persistent exchange rate pass-through asymmetry relative to the micro-founded measurement.
Contrary to the Mundell-Fleming paradigm, the model-implied US terms of trade absorb an
average of only 16.6% of the real exchange rate fluctuations. But when monetary authorities
are equally averse to inflationary and deflationary pressures, a strong USD would not improve
the US terms of trade by as much as they would deteriorate when the USD weakens - a
direct consequence of the positively skewed export price inflation in the UK. The notorious
US current account deficit can therefore only be justified by the developments in the private
and public sector savings and not the foreign exchange market. If anything, large movements
in the USD – regardless of up or down – boost the competitiveness of the US firms, because
other OECD economies are subject to more severe structural non-linearities.
There are a multitude of possible extensions to the mechanism presented so far. First,
the model imposes CES production technology and assumes that each firm is infinitesimally
small. Consequently, absent of nominal rigidity, the price mark-ups would be counter-factually
constant over time. Second, both UK and US are treated as equally important, but one
would expect the US to exert dominance over small open economies, such as the UK. The
next chapter therefore generalises the globalised export market structure presented so far and
examines how dynamic strategic complementarities among multi-national exporters influence
the channel of exchange rate transmission.
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Chapter 4
What Drives the Terms of Trade
Neutrality to Exchange Rates?
4.1 Background
Small objects in the close vicinity of enormous objects behave in peculiar ways. The preces-
sion of Mercury’s perihelion around the Sun illustrates how a close proximity of two objects
with an immensely dissimilar mass consistently violate the Newton’s laws of universal grav-
itation. And yet the principal force of gravity driving the global patterns of commerce is
most widely encapsulated by the mere geographical dimension according to the ubiquitous
notion of Samuelson’s ‘iceberg costs’. It simply quantifies the distance between the origin of
the shipment and the destination in which the merchandise is ultimately exchanged. But it
disregards the unorthodox influence on the terms of trade that the hegemonic power seized by
any one of those regions might entail, such as the widely-observable circulation of select-few
currencies around the world as a customary medium of exchange. Indeed, a growing strand
of the literature, most notably Boz et al. (2017), point out that the geographic interpretation
of the gravity laws is consistently defied around the world whenever the U.S. Dollar (USD)
weakens – it leads to a global intensification of trade flows (measured in gross trade volumes)
as though fewer shipments are ‘sunk’ along the way. At the same time, the U.S. economy
remains practically neutral to the pronounced turbulence in the foreign exchange markets
revolving around the trajectory of the USD.
This chapter explores the structural and stochastic factors surrounding the globalised
export market structure that warp the terms of trade over time. The multi-country busi-
ness cycle model presented in this chapter moves away from the classical Mundell-Fleming
paradigm by distinguishing between minor and major currency areas. Close attention is paid
to the innovations emanating from the major currency areas that spill-over to the minor cur-
rency areas, all of which are freely floating against one another. The model emphasises that
a global trade flow intensification due to a weakening of the major currency is unlikely to
boost all countries identically in a flexible exchange rate environment. That channel crucially
depends on country-specific structural factors, such as exporter reliance on intermediate im-
ports, import and export price stickiness, as well as the shares of invoicing currency in which
international prices are sticky. Although the choice of invoicing currency is weakly correlated
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with the intermediate import intensity, nominal price stickiness and strategic complemen-
tarities among exporters are formally shown to materialise in unprecedented terms of trade
developments over time. Specifically, rigid (flexible) prices in minor currency areas imply that
a good proxy for the exchange rate pass-through into their terms of trade is their total share of
imports (exports) invoiced in USD. Strategic complementarities among exporters competing
for those shares therefore transpire into a time-varying exchange rate pass-through into the
terms of trade driven by a number of innovations, such as transitory distortions to labour
productivity, exchange rate noise, or monetary policy surprises.
The net exchange rate effect on the prices of imports and exports in any given economy
constitutes the terms of trade transmission channel. It determines whether local monetary
policy measures are more effective in terms of influencing domestic output and inflation in
an open economy rather than a closed economy. Yet predicting the movements in the terms
of trade induced by innovations in major or minor currency areas requires a thorough un-
derstanding of what structural factors drive some exporter mark-ups to absorb more of the
exchange rate volatility than others. Throughout the years, a lot of empirical analysis has
been conducted in terms of quantifying the exchange rate pass-through into import prices,
emphasising the role of international price discrimination, otherwise known as ‘pricing-to-
market’.1 But globalisation has increasingly shifted the emphasis towards studying exchange
rate pass-through into export prices, too.2 Global Value Chains (GVC), characterising the
nexus of widespread import-export industries around the world, have opened up the debate
about the transmission of cost-push effects into the export prices of manufactured goods. The
latter are chiefly associated with the global cost of imported commodities, which Chen et al.
(2010) find to be strongly influenced by the developments in the USD market. The dramatic
shift in the import content from the end of the GATT era to the present times implies that it
is paramount to track the movements of the terms of trade as a whole rather than focusing on
import prices alone. It also points to the fact that both pricing-to-market and intermediate
imports play an equally important role in the transmission of exchange rate innovations.
Another important dimension of the terms of trade channel is the exporters choice of
invoicing currency. According to Gopinath (2015), some 5% of all global trade transactions
were conducted directly with the U.S. in the period of 1999-2014, but more than 20% of
global imports and exports were invoiced in USD.3 The fact that a vast amount of goods
around the world are traded in very few currencies has important implications for the terms
of trade transmission channel, namely – which exchange rate, if any, matters? Because even
if minor currency areas decided to float de jure, the de facto international prices would still
be highly influenced by innovations in major currency areas, which could bring the infamous
Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect to a grinding halt.
A lot of progress has been made in recent years in terms of assimilating these salient
features into empirically-motivated theoretical models that replicate the properties of the
1Goldberg & Knetter (1997) and Burstein & Gopinath (2014) provide excellent literature surveys of the
earlier and the more recent empirical work respectively.
2Miroudot et al. (2009) estimate that in the period of 1995-2005 around 56% (74%) of total OECD imports
consisted of intermediate goods (services).
3Does it also mean that all merchandise invoiced in USD is also priced in USD? Friberg & Wilander (2008)
show that in practice that usually is the case using the survey data of Swedish exporters.
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terms of trade observed in the data. Much of the work builds on the quantitative trade
model pioneered by Melitz (2003), where differences in firm-level productivity within any
nation lead to a self-selection of the firms into the exporting industry. Atkeson & Burstein
(2008) demonstrate that enhancing such models with oligopolistic competition is remarkably
fruitful when modelling the stark discrepancy between the high volatility of the real exchange
rate and the low volatility of the terms of trade observed in the U.S. data. Yet U.S. is a
large and a relatively closed economy. By contrast, in a small open economy of Belgium,
Amiti et al. (2014) show that openness to intermediate imports at the firm-level strongly
correlates with the strategic flexibility and the average magnitude of price mark-ups as well
as the tendency to invoice profits in the currency units of the destination market. Although
quantitative trade models are perfectly suited to study the effects of sudden shifts upon
opening up to international competition on the domestic ‘creative destruction’ and inter-
sectoral factor reallocation, they are ill-suited to study the dynamic properties of the terms of
trade in the context of aggregate uncertainty. With the exception of Gopinath et al. (2010)
and several others, who study the endogenous choice of invoicing currency in a dynamic
context, most quantitative trade models are static and they are missing the notion of short-
run nominal price stickiness. But this chapter formally shows that even conditional on the
choice of invoicing currency and intermediate import intensity, nominal price stickiness has
important policy implications for the terms of trade channel. Specifically, if commodities are
overwhelmingly priced in the USD, but international prices of manufactured goods around
the world are rigid (flexible), then the minor currency areas with a higher share of imports
(exports) invoiced in USD gain a greater comparative advantage against one another whenever
USD depreciates.
In order to capture all three paramount dimensions of the globalised export market struc-
ture simultaneously, namely pricing-to-market, intermediate import intensity, and heteroge-
neous invoicing currency strategies, but also to demonstrate the qualitative and quantitative
significance of the nominal price stickiness in such a context, this chapter develops a novel
multi-country business cycle framework. Much like the two-country model of Choudhri &
Hakura (2015), there is a continuum of firms segmented into constant densities of exporters
who choose to price their goods at the factory door (PCP) or at the docks of each destination
(LCP). Alas, the multi-country modelling framework presented in this chapter also allows for
goods originating from minor currency areas to be priced in major currency units (DCP). The
market shares of each market segment are time-varying due to strategic complementarities
embedded into the Bertrand-competitive market structure borrowed from Atkeson & Burstein
(2008). All firms depend on imported commodities that are exclusively priced in major cur-
rency units, but each market segment is subject to a varying intermediate import intensity.
Every time prices of manufactured goods adjust, exporters are subject to industry-specific
price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982), incentivising gradual transition of interna-
tional prices from vintages to the inter-temporal optimum. Cost-push shocks emanating from
innovations in the major currency area thus have heterogeneous impact across different types
of exporters due to peculiarities such as import-dependence, currency denomination, and
strategic complementarities.
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The closest to the present approach is the dominant currency paradigm developed by Casas
et al. (2016), henceforth CDGG. Indeed, there are many superficial similarities between both
approaches, but the seemingly subtle technical differences introduced in this chapter unravel
an ample of new insights about the terms of trade channel. First, CDGG establish three
regions: home, dominant, and the rest of the world, where home can influence neither the
dominant region nor other small open economies. And yet if we want to study the international
strategic complementarities prevalent among multi-national exporters, there needs to be an
endogenous feedback mechanism between the price setters at home and abroad irrespective
of domicile. The present approach therefore adopts a more general setting, where the world
consists of a finite number of major and minor currency areas, such that innovations emanating
from the major currency areas contaminate other minor currency areas, while transitory
shocks in the minor currency areas spill-over from one to the other without feeding into the
major currency areas.
Second, and more importantly, CDGG derive a time-invariant exchange rate pass-through
into international prices irrespective of the nature of innovations distorting the global econ-
omy. This result comes from a combination of three modelling choices, namely Kimball (1995)
preferences, Calvo (1983) nominal price rigidity, and denomination of all intermediate input
costs in home currency units. In the end, the endogenous strategic complementarity is missing,
since the price mark-ups evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium solely depend on a constant
elasticity of substitution and an exogenous density of exporters choosing to invoice profits in
foreign currency units. But constant price mark-ups contradict the findings of Amiti et al.
(2018), who document strong evidence in favour of non-trivial strategic complementarities
among exporters domiciled in the small open economy of Belgium. Indeed, these admittedly
restrictive modelling choices are guided by analytical tractability and elegance, but they come
at a cost of creating a dichotomy between the theoretical framework, predicting a constant
average causal effect on international prices upon exchange rate impact, and the empirical
evidence, documenting a state-dependent and a dynamic causal effect. In particular, Sham-
baugh (2008) and Forbes et al. (2017) use structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models and
find that not only the magnitude, but even the sign of exchange rate pass-through depends
on the nature of innovations to the macroeconomic fundamentals.
Although this chapter places itself in parallel with the policy implications procured by
SVAR models, it presents a meaningful refinement of the tools that are used to reach these
conclusions. Specifically, SVAR models measure exchange rate pass-through in reduced form
by computing the ratio between cumulative impulse response functions to price inflation and
exchange rate changes conditional on triggering some exogenous innovation to the system of
difference equations. However, impulse response functions embody the properties of price
and exchange rate co-movement, rather than exchange rate transmission into prices, which
obscures the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through by accounting for a number of indirect
(general equilibrium) effects. The latter are not necessarily relevant to the price setting deci-
sion of the firm and they are highly susceptible to abstract methodological specificities, such as
the shock sign restrictions in SVAR models or how the model is closed in a general equilibrium
setting. Instead, this chapter demonstrates a simple way how to derive a closed form solution
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to exchange rate pass-through into the terms of trade directly from the first order conditions
of the exporters, which responds to a multitude of state variables and stochastic innovations
in a top-down fashion without influencing the evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals. It
provides a useful analytical tool that resolves the seemingly perplex disconnect between the
average causal effect and the dynamic causal effect in a controlled structural environment
without the use of external instruments advocated by Stock & Watson (2018). Most dis-
tinctly, it demonstrates the importance of strategic complementarities in a globalised export
market structure for the conduct of monetary policy in a flexible exchange rate environment.
4.2 Model
There are three types of interacting agents in this multi-country model: firms, households,
and central banks. The world economy is divided into major and minor currency areas.4
Households supply labour to the firms and consume their final output, while firms hire workers
and produce goods so as to clear the factor and product markets in all destinations. Central
banks in each location are autonomous and commit to independent interest rate rules aimed
at stabilising the local rate of consumer price inflation and the output gap by intervening in
local bond markets. All currencies are therefore de facto freely floating against one another.5
The model is presented in a general form with the introduction of several unconventional
features, though a number of familiar corner solutions are exposited along the way, nesting
well-established results in international macroeconomics.
4.2.1 Globalised Export Market Structure
Consider a world evolving over discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, ..., which consists of a finite number
of interacting economies denoted by n = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each economy is populated by a
continuum of manufacturers indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]. They import intermediate commodities
from abroad and produce manufactured goods that are internationally-traded in imperfectly-
competitive and segmented markets. The import-export manufacturers are categorised into
different types indexed by φ = {pi, `, $}. Each φ-type from the source economy i ∈ n captures
χin(φ) density of the product market in every destination n, such that
∑
φ χin(φ) = 1. The
pi-type firms price their final goods at the factory door in producer currency units (PCP), the
`-type goods are priced at the docks of each destination in local currency units (LCP), while
the $-type firms set prices in major currency units pertaining to locations k = {1, 2, ...,K} ∈ n,
which exert dominance over the remaining N −K minor currencies (DCP).6
4Major currency dominates the global economy via its widespread use as the invoicing currency by multi-
national exporters. This adaptation of the world is an intermediate case between the conventional small open
economy approach, which takes the world variables as given without any feedback mechanism, and a two-
country country approach, where both countries are equally important. This extension is particularly useful
when modelling an endogenous feedback mechanism among trade partners in minor currency areas, while at
the same time capturing top-down monetary policy spillovers from the major currency areas.
5An interesting extension that is not considered in this chapter is one where minor currency areas recognise
the hegemonic power of the major currency areas and manage their currencies in response to external shocks.
6The density of each type of firms is a time-invariant parameter in the short-run. This assumption follows
the empirical findings of Gopinath (2015), who shows that the annual share of imports and exports invoiced
in foreign currency to be relatively stable over time in many advanced developing economies.
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The production technology of each manufacturer is linear: yin,t(ω, φ) = zi,tmin,t(ω, φ)/ξi(φ),
wheremin,t(ω, φ) denotes the stock of imported intermediate commodities used in the produc-
tion of manufactured output yin,t(ω, φ), such that ξi(φ) controls the φ-type import intensity.7
All manufacturers domiciled in the source country are subject to homogeneous productivity,
which follows a stationary autoregressive process zi,t = z
ρi,z
i,t−1 exp(σi,zi,z,t), where ρi,z ∈ (0, 1),
σi,z > 0, and i,z,t ∼ iid(0, 1). All intermediate imports in all countries are priced in the k’th
major currency units, but if they are shipped abroad, then a fixed proportion di − 1 ∈ (0, 1)
of the commodity is sunk in the process, thereby imposing iceberg costs à la Samuelson
(1954).8 Therefore, the unit costs of each exported final good in real terms are equal to
mci,t(−$) = ξi(−$)diqki,t/zi,t and mci,t($) = ξi($)di/zi,t, where −$ ∈ {pi, `}, and qki,t is the
major real exchange, such that a rise in qki,t = 1/qik,t implies an i’th currency depreciation
against the k’th currency in real terms, and a rise in commodity prices for all i 6= k.9
When the final goods are shipped to the remaining N − 1 economies, the equilibrium
import price in destination n is determined by the i’th factory export price, the bilateral
exchange rate, the shipping costs, as well as international product market integration:
pin,t(ω, φ) = dnqin,tδin,t(ω, φ)pii,t(ω, φ), (4.1)
where pin,t(ω, φ) = Pin,t(ω, φ)/Pn,t stands for the real price of variety ω originating from the
i’th economy and sold in the n’th economy, while Pn,t is the consumer price index in the n’th
economy. The term δin,t(ω, φ) stands for the endogenously determined deviations from the
law of one price, which give rise to parallel trade in the short-run due to the peculiarities
over the choice of invoicing currency. By definition, the combined market density of pi-type
firms is perfectly integrated, such that
∫ χin(pi)
0 δin,t(ω, pi)dω = χin(pi). Conversely, the $-type
segment of the market is perfectly disintegrated, such that
∫ χin($)
0 δin,t(ω, $)dω = χin($)qki,t.
However,
∫ χin(`)
0 δin,t(ω, `)dω is distinct for its persistent movements due to the `-type price
mark-up flexibility that absorbs exchange rate fluctuations and stabilises their market share.
4.2.2 Terms of Trade
When the manufactured goods arrive at the border of the destination market during that
same period, they are sold to the competitive collectors operating in the local distribution
sector. The collectors in economy n aggregate all varieties of manufactured goods from each
location i according to the CES technology due to Dixit & Stiglitz (1977):
yin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)
1−1/ζdω

1/(1−1/ζ)
, (4.2)
7Linear technology is a simple way of introducing a positive correlation between the unit costs of production
and the relative value of the local currency against the major currency. A more elaborate framework should
include capital and labour in a CES framework with elasticity of substitution bounded between zero and unity.
8By construction, iceberg costs apply only to shipments across borders, but it is equally costly to transport
commodities and manufactured goods to their destination from any source country.
9It is well-known that most of the commodities are priced in very few currency units, especially the U.S.
Dollar (USD). See Chen et al. (2010) for a more rigorous empirical motive behind this assumption.
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where parameter ζ > 1 stands for the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between dif-
ferent varieties ω within sector φ, and equivalently, between different φ-types. The producer
price index is equal to the unit costs of the collector given by a weighted average of prices
associated with all manufactured goods sold in the destination market:
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)
1−ζdω

1/(1−ζ)
. (4.3)
The homogeneous productivity in the manufacturing sector ensures that there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in which all ω firms within φ market segment set identical prices.
Both the export price index pnn,t and the import price index pin,t can then be used to assess
the relationship between exchange rates and the net flows of goods and services. The latter
primarily depend on the terms of trade:
Tin,t =
pnn,t
pin,t
, (4.4)
which measure the amount of imports the n’th economy can purchase for every unit of exports
it produces. A rise in the value of Tij,t therefore constitutes an improvement in the terms
of trade of the j’th destination relative to the source country i ∈ n 6= j. Observe that the
terms of trade in this simple framework are independent of shipping costs, since both import
and export prices are linearly related to dn by construction. Similarly, the terms of trade
will improve (deteriorate) following a local currency appreciation (depreciation), but only if
import prices are more elastic to exchange rate changes than export prices. The extent to
which they move depends on the import-dependence of the export production technology (i.e.
ξi(φ)), the market density of firm types (i.e. χin(φ), χnn(φ)), and the import-export price
elasticity of demand (i.e. ζ). Before we turn to the general case in which international prices
are sticky in the short-run, consider the simplest possible narrative in which the demand for
exports is perfectly price-elastic, such that ζ → ∞. It nullifies the price mark-ups, insulates
the terms of trade from strategic complementarities, and draws attention to the influence of
the intermediate import intensity as well as the choice of invoicing currency.
Lemma 4. In a symmetric equilibrium, where ξi(φ) > 0 and ζ → ∞, the bilateral terms of
trade between minor currency areas j, i 6= k are neutral to bilateral exchange rate innovations
if they originate from the source country, but not if they stem from the destination country:
lim
ζ→∞
τij,t = lim
ζ→∞
∂ lnTij,t
∂ ln qij,t
=
{
−sjj,t(−$) ∵ ln qij,t − ln qij,t−1 6= 0|j 6=i,k
0 ∵ ln qij,t − ln qij,t−1 6= 0|i 6=j,k
. (4.5)
Proof. Let sij,t(φ) = (pij,t(φ)yij,t(φ))/(pij,tyij,t) = χij(φ) [pij,t(φ)/pij,t]1−ζ ∈ [0, 1], ptmij,t(φ) =
∂ ln δij,t(φ)/∂ ln qij,t, erptii,t(φ) = ∂ ln pii,t(φ)/∂ ln qji,t, and erptij,t(φ) = ∂ ln pij,t(φ)/∂ ln qij,t.
First, suppose exchange rate innovations stem from the destination economy j 6= i, k. Then
erptii,t(φ) = 0∀φ, erptjj,t($) = 0, and erptjj,t(−$) = 1, since ∂ lnmci,t(−$)/∂ ln qki,t = 1,
∂ lnmcj,t(−$)/∂ ln qkj,t = 1, but ∂ lnmci,t(φ)/∂ ln qji,t = 0 ∀φ, ∂ lnmcj,t(φ)/∂ ln qij,t = 0 ∀φ.
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Second, price mark-ups of all φ-types are constant and equal to zero, such that ptmij,t(−$) = 0
and ptmij,t($) = 1. Because erptij,t(φ) = 1−ptmij,t(φ)−erptii,t(φ) = 1∀φ, it implies erptij,t =∑
φ sij,t(φ)erptij,t(φ) = 1, while erptjj,t =
∑
φ sjj,t(φ)erptjj,t(φ) = sjj,t($). Consequently,
τij,t = ∂ lnTij,t/∂ ln qij,t = erptjj,t − erptij,t = sjj,t($)− 1 = −sjj,t(−$). Analogously, if minor
exchange rate innovations stem from the source i 6= j, k, then erptjj,t(φ) = 0∀φ, erptii,t($) =
0, and erptii,t(−$) = 1. Because ptmij,t($) = 1 and erptij,t(φ) = 1− ptmij,t(φ)− erptii,t(φ) =
0 ∀φ, it implies erptij,t =
∑
φ sij,t(φ)erptij,t(φ) = 0 and erptjj,t =
∑
φ sjj,t(φ)erptjj,t(φ) = 0.
Therefore, τij,t = erptjj,t − erptij,t = 0.
In generic terms, minor exchange rate innovations emanating from the destination economy
are fully absorbed by the import prices. Alas, the shift in the destination export prices stems
from only the PCP and LCP firms, while DCP prices remain fixed. The terms of trade
are thus non-neutral to exchange rates as long as the market share of DCP exporters is
non-negligible. Conversely, when the minor exchange rate innovations stem from the source
economy, then neither the export nor import prices of DCP firms fluctuate, while the PCP
and LCP export prices in the source economy absorb the exchange rate innovations fully.
Yet the exchange rate innovation from the source country is not transmitted into the import
prices of the destination economy, because a weakening of the source currency relative to the
major currency is simultaneously a weakening against all other minor currencies. Therefore,
the cost-push effects in the source economy exactly outweigh the currency conversion effects
in the destination economy. Lemma 4 brings us to a powerful policy implication – unless
the bilateral exchange rate innovation is triggered unilaterally, all bilateral terms of trade
movements between minor currency areas are ultimately attributable to sticky prices and
strategic complementarities, rather than the choice of invoicing currency or the iceberg costs,
but only if exporter technology is linear in intermediate imports and if symmetrical trade
barriers are reciprocated multilaterally.10 It also shows that the empirical regularity known
as the ‘terms of trade puzzle’ can be resolved without pricing-to-market.11
When the world economy is subject to innovations in the k’th major currency area, the
movements in the major exchange rates exert a direct influence on the global fluctuations of
commodity prices. Therefore the unit costs of producing exported manufactured goods in all
minor currency areas are particularly sensitive to innovations in qkj,t(= qki,tqij,t), compared
to qij,t. Unless exporters choose to invoice their profits in major currency units, a perfectly
price-elastic demand for exports implies that they are unable to maintain prices constant when
facing major currency innovations. DCP is in some sense synonymous to price stickiness, but
more generally it is accompanied by subtleties clarified in section 4.2.4.
10The caveat of these predictions is simply that a more sophisticated production technology would give rise
to more general outcomes nuanced by deep structural parameters. But the starting point of this debate is
in-line with the empirical results of Boz et al. (2017), who demonstrate that minor currency fluctuations exert
negligible influence on bilateral trade flows.
11The conventional wisdom embedded in the Mundell-Fleming paradigm is the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler
effect, which implicitly assumes the terms of trade to move one-to-one with the real exchange rate. But
Atkeson & Burstein (2008) among many others exposed a robust quantitative disconnect between the U.S
terms of trade and the fluctuations of the USD. While they demonstrate that the primary attribute behind
resolving this puzzle is pricing-to-market in a major currency area, such as the U.S., this chapter shows a
viable alternative for other minor currency areas. In practice, they are almost surely not mutually exclusive.
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Lemma 5. When the demand for import-dependent exports is perfectly price-elastic, such that
ξi(φ) ∈ (0, 1) and ζ →∞, the terms of trade elasticity to the major exchange rate innovations
is equal to the additive inverse of the $-type export market share in the destination economy:
lim
ζ→∞
τkij,t = lim
ζ→∞
∂ lnTij,t
∂ ln qkj,t
= −sjj,t($) ≤ 0. (4.6)
Proof. ζ →∞ implies ptmkij,t(−$) = 0 and ptmkij,t($) = 1. Because erptkii,t($) = erptkjj,t($) = 0
and erptkii,t(−$) = erptkjj,t(−$) = 1, it follows that erptkij,t(φ) = ptmkij,t(φ) + erptkii,t(φ) =
1∀φ. Consequently, erptkjj,t =
∑
φ sjj,t(φ)erpt
k
jj,t(φ) = sjj,t(−$) = 1− sjj,t($), but erptkij,t =∑
φ sij,t(φ)erpt
k
ij,t(φ) =
∑
φ sij,t(φ) = 1. Therefore, τ
k
ij,t = erpt
k
jj,t − erptkij,t = −sjj,t($).
When the major currency area depreciates unilaterally (i.e. orthogonally to the bilateral
real exchange rates of all possible pairs of minor economies), both qkj,t and qki,t decrease,
while qij,t remains in-tact. In this case, lemma 5 proves that the terms of trade between
minor currency areas i and j improve even though their bilateral exchange rate has not
changed. The terms of trade improve because import prices of all goods and export prices
of PCP and LCP goods absorb the movements in the major exchange rate through the cost-
push effects of global commodity prices. At the same time, firms domiciled in the destination
economy that choose to invoice their profits in major currency units are immune to these
innovations, thereby keeping their prices fixed. Because import prices absorb more of the
major currency innovations than the export prices, the difference being exactly the export
market share of DCP firms, the terms of trade must improve. Another way of putting it is
that a major currency depreciation is observationally equivalent to a boost in the import-
dependent exporter productivity in all minor currency areas, which leads to a surge in global
trade flows akin to the stylised facts established by Boz et al. (2017).
Lemma 6. When import-dependent exports are perfect substitutes, such that ξi(φ) ∈ (0, 1)
and ζ →∞, the terms of trade of major currency areas are neutral to their exchange rates:
lim
ζ→∞
τik,t = lim
ζ→∞
∂ lnTik,t
∂ ln qik,t
= 0. (4.7)
Proof. Constant mark-ups imply ptmki,t(φ) = 0∀φ, ptmik,t(−$) = 0, and ptmik,t($) = 1.
Irrespective of where the innovation emanates from, erptkk,t(φ) = 0 ∀φ, erptkii,t($) = 0, and
erptkii,t(−$) = 1. Consequently, erptik,t(φ) = 1− ptmik,t(φ)− erptkii,t(φ) = 0∀φ, erptki,t(φ) =
1 − ptmki,t(φ) − erptkk,t(φ) = 1 ∀φ, erptik,t =
∑
φ ski,t(φ)erptki,t(φ) = 0, and erpt
k
kk,t =∑
φ sii,t(φ)erpt
k
ii,t(φ) = 0. Therefore, τ
k
ik,t = ∂ lnTik,t/∂ ln qik,t = erpt
k
kk,t − erptik,t = 0.
But erptki,t =
∑
φ ski,t(φ)erptki,t(φ) = 1 and erpt
k
ii,t =
∑
φ sii,t(φ)erpt
k
ii,t(φ) = sii,t(−$) =
1− sii,t($). Thus, τkki,t = erptkii,t − erptki,t = −sii,t($) ≤ 0.
Ultimately, a major currency weakening leads to a collective improvement in the terms
of trade among all minor currency areas as well as against the major currency area. On the
other hand, the terms of trade in the major currency area remain neutral to all exchange rate
innovations. The higher is the share of exports invoiced in major currency units, namely the
closer are sjj,t($) and sii,t($) to unity, the greater is the improvement in the terms of trade
of minor currency areas. But there is no reason why the forces of gravity should be equally
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strong in both directions across the minor-minor borders. Using lemma 5, it can be shown
that the difference in the terms of trade elasticities between two minor locations is given by
limζ→∞(τkij,t−τkji,t) = sii,t($)−sjj,t($). If this difference is positive (i.e. sii,t($) > sjj,t($)), then
a major currency weakening leads to a greater improvement in the terms of trade of location
i relative to location j, thus boosting the bilateral competitiveness of the j’th exports relative
to the ones originating from the i’th location. Hence, when tradable varieties are perfectly
substitutable (i.e. ζ →∞), a country with a lower (higher) share of $-type exports experiences
a trade surplus (deficit) following a major currency depreciation. Intuitively, the lower is the
market share of $-type firms, the more sensitive are the export prices to major exchange
rate fluctuations (i.e. cost-push effects are more pronounced). Conversely, the location with
a higher share of $-type firms exercises more stable export prices due to a less pronounced
currency mismatch, thus smoothing the international flows of goods and services.
The policy implications presented in lemmas 4 – 6 open up new channels in the already
established literature on two-country models with perfectly segmented international product
markets, such as Lubik & Schorfheide (2005), Adolfson et al. (2007), Corsetti et al. (2008),
or De Walque et al. (2017). In particular, most of the New Keynesian open economy mod-
els are a special case of the more general framework presented in this chapter, since they
attribute all of the export market power to LCP firms, which leads to insensitive terms of
trade to both minor and major exchange rates. Somewhat in the fashion of Choudhri &
Hakura (2015), who analyse a two-country model with both PCP and LCP firms, the present
framework successfully replicates the muted responsiveness of the terms of trade to exchange
rate movements in the major currency areas. However, unlike most open economy models, it
predicts excess sensitivity of minor currency areas to the movements in the major exchange
rate due to the adoption of DCP strategies. Moreover, the degree to which the terms of trade
respond to minor exchange rate fluctuations also depends on where the innovation originates
from. It is worth reemphasising that the conventional wisdom prevails only in the special case
when exporters in each location produce manufactured goods independently from intermedi-
ate imports. In that counterfactual scenario, exchange rate pass-through into import prices
would be symmetric for all currency types: limξi(φ)→0 erpt
k
ij,t = erptij,t. And yet it would
still respond to innovations endogenously if tradable varieties were imperfectly substitutable,
since the market share and thus the price mark-up of `-type firms would be time-varying.
To summarise, the heterogeneity in the choice of invoicing currency and intermediate im-
port intensity can generate novel and unprecedented predictions in the global export market
structure. Specifically, major currency depreciations (appreciations) intensify (abate) rest-
of-the-world trade flows and lead to global trade imbalances. However, most of the results
presented so far examine a set of corner solutions - perfect competition or autonomous pro-
duction of exports - neither one of which is a fully accurate depiction of the export market
structure in the light of Yeaple (2013), who documents widespread Global Value Chains (GVC)
dominated by large-scale multi-national firms. Without explicitly modelling the intermediate
case of imperfect competition (i.e. 1 < ζ < ∞) and import-dependent technology of exports
(i.e. ξi(φ) > 0), not much can be said about the dynamics of the export price mark-ups,
which has come under scrutiny in recent years due to Atkeson & Burstein (2008), Berman
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et al. (2012), and Amiti et al. (2018) among others. The goal of the remaining parts of the
chapter is therefore to generalise the stylised properties proposed so far by introducing short-
run price stickiness and a time-varying elasticity of substitution between exported goods. The
combination of these properties will generate persistence of export prices and strategic com-
plementarities among different φ-types, which play an important role in terms of assessing
the qualitative implications of the net flows of goods and services.
4.2.3 Imported Inflation
Once all of the imported manufactured goods are sorted into CES bundles by origin, they
are stored in the warehouse of retail goods, where they are merged into a CES bundle of
locally-produced and imported manufactured goods:
xi,t =
[
N∑
n=1
α
1/η
ni y
1−1/η
ni,t
]1/(1−1/η)
, (4.8)
such that η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign manufactured
goods, and parameter αii = 1−
∑N−i
n=1 αni ∈ (0, 1) measures the i’th economy home-bias. The
weighted average of all international price indices pertaining to the i’th economy measures
the aggregate producer price index:
pi,x,t =
[
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
]1/(1−η)
(4.9)
The relationship between the tradable goods and non-tradable goods in the final basket
of consumer goods is established by a Cobb-Douglas production technology of a competitive
retailer, who distributes the goods to the households:
ci,t = (ai,thi,t)
αix1−αii,t , (4.10)
where hi,t ∈ (0, 1) are the aggregate hours that are spent in the labour force relative to
the total endowment of time of the i’th economy households, while αi ∈ (0, 1) controls the
share of non-tradable goods in the basket of consumer goods.12 Labour productivity is a
unit root process with a drift ai,t = γiai,t−1 exp(σi,ai,a,t), where γi > 1 measures the gross
deterministic trend of the real hourly wage rate, while σi,a > 0 and i,a,t ∼ iid(0, 1). It follows
that the consumer price index is a function of the variable costs facing the retailer, namely
the aggregate producer price index and the effective real wage:
pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
. (4.11)
The salient features of the global export market structure developed in the previous section
are thus reflected in pi,x,t. By contrast, the prices of non-traded goods are henceforth depicted
12See Burstein et al. (2003) and Campa & Goldberg (2010) for a thorough literature survey and empirical
estimates of the relative size of the distribution sector in G7 and OECD economies respectively.
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most parsimoniously for two reasons. First, Engel (1999) shows that real exchange rate
volatility in most advanced economies can be accounted for by the movements in relative prices
of tradable goods, while the relative price of non-tradable goods are largely disconnected.
Second, Atkeson & Burstein (2008) argue that non-traded goods and services, such as those
associated with transportation and distribution of manufactured imports, are mostly labour-
intensive, such that their output is proportional to the labour input. It follows that the
production costs of non-traded goods consist primarily of the wage bill wi,thi,t, which in
turn mostly depends on the long-run labour productivity growth and is largely orthogonal
to exchange rate movements in the short-run. Although the role of non-traded goods and
services in determining exchange rate volatility is limited, they enter the framework as one of
the primary insulators of consumer prices from large movements in exchange rates.
Lemma 7. Major exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices is proportional to the sum
of trade-weighted import price elasticities from all locations:
erptki,t =
∂ ln pi,t
∂ ln qki,t
= (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terpt
k
ni,t. (4.12)
Proof. Let sni = (pni,tyni,t)/(pi,x,txi,t) = αni[pni,t/pi,x,t]1−η ∈ [0, 1] measure the trade weight
of the source country n in destination i. The prices of non-tradable goods are not directly
related to exchange rates by construction, such that ∂ lnwi,t/∂ ln qki,t = 0. By contrast,
equation (4.9) expresses the prices of tradable goods as a trade-weighted average of domestic
export and import prices, such that ∂ ln pi,x,t/∂ ln qki,t =
∑N
n=1 sni,terpt
k
ni,t, which is non-
trivially positive as long as innovations stem from the k’th major currency area. The exchange
rate elasticity of consumer prices is thus proportional to the elasticity of tradable goods prices,
namely ∂ ln pi,t/∂ ln qki,t = (1− αi)∂ ln pi,x,t/∂ ln qki,t = (1− αi)
∑N
n=1 sni,terpt
k
ni,t.
In essence, when the k’th economy exerts dominance over the remaining N −k currencies,
the magnitude of imported inflation in minor economies will be particularly sensitive to the
movements in the major exchange rate. However, exchange rate pass-through into consumer
prices is dampened by the trade weights (i.e. home bias), which measure the intensity of
international commerce between location i and n, and the presence of non-traded goods, whose
prices are ex ante orthogonal to the exchange rates. Moreover, if the majority of imports are
priced in the local currency terms, then the minor exchange rate acts as a shock absorbing
mechanism, in which case the magnitude of imported inflation from other minor locations is
effectively zero. Analogous conclusions are drawn for the case of exchange rate pass-through
following i’th currency innovation: erpti,t = (1 − αi)
∑N
n=1 sni,terptni,t. Although export
prices in all j 6= i, k locations remain fixed despite movements in the i’th ( 6= k’th) currency,
the import prices from all minor economies respond, since q˙ji,t = qji,t/qji,t−1 deviates from
unity in the short-run. On the other hand, export prices in economy i respond as though it
is a shock to the value of the major currency, since it implies movements in qki,t and the unit
costs of producing an exported good fluctuate accordingly.
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The theoretical concept of exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices goes hand-in-
hand with both the structural and the stochastic properties of the macroeconomic develop-
ments. Lemma 7 shows that the model encompasses both of these elements by resorting to the
salient features of the global export market structure. Specifically, each individual producer of
manufactured goods ω is assumed to be infinitesimally ‘small’, such that it can only influence
the price of its manufactured good within the sector φ. However, the non-degenerate market
density of χin(φ) ensures that the φ-segment of the market as a whole is not infinitesimally
‘small’, in principal allowing for strategic complementarities between different φ-types. If ex-
porters populating the same segment of the market indeed recognised their collective market
power, then the framework would implicitly adopt an oligopolistic market structure, thereby
generating additional layers of transmission.
And yet if we were to close the model and then plot the impulse response functions
of import, export, or consumer price inflation against the exchange rate triggered by an
exogenous innovation in the foreign exchange market – it would almost certainly give us a
different magnitude of exchange rate pass-through.13 At the very least, it would be biased
in the long-run, because all impulse response functions characterising a saddle-path stable
solution gradually decay to zero, while the market shares, along which the terms of trade
elasticity is centred, are characterised by a well-defined and non-degenerate steady state. The
idea is that the two approaches – the formal and the reduced-form – ultimately measure two
vaguely related concepts: transmission and co-movement, the difference between which has
nothing to do with strategic complementarity. Instead, impulse response functions of prices
and exchange rates are tainted by model-specific properties controlling their aggregate co-
movements. But these co-movements are irrelevant to the optimal exchange rate pass-through
of the individual exporters, because they do not exert sufficient market power to take into
the account their influence on aggregate prices. The next section formally characterises the
exchange rate transmission channel that abstracts from the notion of aggregate co-movements.
4.2.4 Sticky Prices & Strategic Complementarity
Suppose all import-export manufacturers in each economy are characterised by rational ex-
pectations. Suppose further that every time they adjust prices relative to the local long-run
trend of inflation p˙n ≥ 1, the firms incur quadratic price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg
(1982). The size of the price adjustment costs depend on φ, since it is an indicator assign-
ing the invoicing currency in which prices are sticky. Following Kim & Ruge-Murcia (2009),
price adjustment is viewed as an unproductive activity that does not produce any value-added,
thus price adjustment costs are deducted from the total revenue. Yet unlike in closed economy
models, price adjustment costs are deducted only from the revenue of the invoiced currency,
13The approach of measuring exchange rate pass-through agnostically by merely inspecting the impulse
response functions of price inflation and exchange rates was pioneered by Shambaugh (2008) and later adopted
by Choudhri & Hakura (2015), Casas et al. (2016), and Forbes et al. (2017) among countless others. It’s appeal
stems from the fact that the agnostic exchange rate pass-through is simple to measure and its magnitude is
conditional on observing a certain state of the economy, thereby establishing a dichotomy between the long-
standing emphasis on the importance of economic structure versus the seemingly shock-dependent nature of
the data generating process.
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while the imperfect arbitrage forces characterising the wedge in equation (4.1) reflect the in-
ternalised adjustment costs of the remaining international prices that are ultimately shared
between the producers and the consumers in equilibrium.
The oligopolistically-competitive φ-type import-export manufacturer domiciled in the i’th
economy chooses the nominal price Pin,t(ω, φ) to maximise the expected present discounted
value of the real future profit dividends generated in the n’th destination:
max
{Pin,t(ω,φ)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,t,t+1
{
N∑
n=1
(1−∆in,t (ω, φ)) pin,t (ω, φ) yin,t (ω, φ)−mci,t (φ) yin,t (ω, φ)
}
s.t. ∆in,t(ω, φ) =
κi(φ)(p˙in,t (ω, φ)− p˙n)2
2
,
s.t. yin,t(ω, φ) = yin,t
[
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
]−ζ
,
s.t. yin,t = αin,txn,t
[
pin,t
pn,x,t
]−η
,
where λi,t,t+1 stands for the stochastic discount factor, κi(φ) ≥ 0 measures the convex-
ity of the quadratic price adjustment costs, while p˙in,t (ω, φ) = Pin,t (ω, φ) /Pin,t−1 (ω, φ) =
p˙n,t(pin,t (ω, φ) /pin,t−1 (ω, φ)) denotes the gross rate of import price inflation. Manufacturers
are subject to two types of demand constraints: firm-specific (i.e. yin,t(ω, φ)) and country-
specific (i.e. yin,t). This implies that each φ-type is not infinitesimally ‘small’, unlike each
individual firm ω, controlling just their individual prices. Instead, each χin(φ) density as a
whole is sufficiently ‘large’ to influence the country-wide import price indices. However, they
are still sufficiently ‘small’ at the aggregate level, since they take the aggregate producer price
index and the consumer price index as given. Incorporating the second demand constraint
is the distinguishing feature of the Bertrand-competitive market structure as in Atkeson &
Burstein (2008), which gives rise to non-trivial and endogenous market shares for all φ-types.
The first order condition of the φ-type firms evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium is
summarised by the following set of equations:
pin,t(φ) =
Θin,t(φ)mci,t(φ)
Φin,t(φ)
, (4.13)
Θin,t(φ) =
εin,t(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1 , (4.14)
εin,t(φ) = ζ(1− sin,t(φ)) + ηsin,t(φ), (4.15)
Φin,t(φ) = 1−∆in,t(φ) +
∆′in,t(φ)p˙in,t(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
yin,t+1(φ)
yin,t(φ)
∆′in,t+1(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1
p˙2in,t+1(φ)
p˙n,t+1
]
.
(4.16)
The optimal real price pin,t(φ) depends on the unit costs of producing an exported good
mci,t(φ), the variable price mark-up Θin,t(φ), and Φin,t(φ), which denotes the persistence
induced by the presence of price adjustment costs. Under the plausible assumption of η < ζ,
which implies that the varieties of goods are more substitutable within each sector than across
nations, a major currency appreciation vis-à-vis the i’th currency (i.e. a rise in qki,t) pushes up
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the unit costs of producing exported goods in location i, thereby increasing the import prices
of all φ-types in all n foreign destinations. Although a rise in the import prices shrinks the
i’th economy import penetration in the foreign markets (i.e. sin for all n 6= i), the extent to
which it shrinks the φ-type market share abroad sin,t(φ) depends on the increase in the φ-type
elasticity of substitution εin,t(φ), since the latter effect leads to a decrease in the price mark-up
Θin,t(φ) and an incomplete pass-through into import prices. The novel part of the exchange
rate channel depicted in this model is therefore the presence of strategic complementarities
among all φ-types, which arise because adjustments of the sector-wide market shares are a
zero-sum game, since
∑
φ sin,t(φ) = 1 holds at all times by construction.
Lemma 8. If κi(φ) > 0 and 1 < η < ζ <∞, then the major exchange rate pass-through into
export prices is endogenous to the price stickiness and strategic complementarities:
erptkii,t(φ) =
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
=
Γii,mc,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ sii,t(−φ)erptkii,t(−φ)
1 + Γii,∆,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ sii,t(−φ)
, (4.17)
Γii,Θ,t(φ) =
(ζ − 1)(ζ − η)
εii,t(φ)− 1
sii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)
, (4.18)
Γii,∆,t(φ) = Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
(
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
)]
, (4.19)
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− εii,t(φ))∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1) , (4.20)
where Γii,∆,t(φ) and Γii,Θ,t(φ) stand for the φ-type price stickiness and strategic complemen-
tarity components respectively, while Γii,mc,t(−$) = 1 and Γii,mc,t($) = 0.
Proof. See appendix B.1.
The presence of sticky prices and strategic complementarities complicates the determina-
tion of the period-by-period exchange rate pass-through into export, import, and consumer
prices. In the static price setting depicted in lemmas 4 – 6, the only source of pass-through
time variability stems from a random draw of innovations to productivity and exchange rates.
By contrast, when prices are set dynamically, the persistence of pass-through is driven by
the convexity of price adjustment costs and the time variability stems from the top-down
influence of numerous aggregate variables. Lemma 8 proves that a closed-form solution to
the transition and the balanced growth paths of optimal exchange rate pass-through for each
φ-type can be obtained directly from the first order condition displayed in equations (4.13) –
(4.16). The pretence that individual firms are too ‘small’ to influence the aggregate variables,
while φ-type density as a whole can only influence the sectoral import prices, separates the
transmission channel from the indirect income effects.
In order to further disentangle the exchange rate transmission channel into export and
import prices by country, by sector, and over-time, the general equilibrium model must firstly
be closed and subsequently equations (4.17) – (4.20) must be simulated along with all other
difference equations characterising the dynamics of the macroeconomic fundamentals. While
the aggregate fundamentals influence the optimal exchange rate pass-through in equilibrium,
69
there is no feedback mechanism the other way around. This implies that all time varia-
tion in pass-through is endogenous to the state of the economy in the short-run, but the
shock-dependence patterns do not supersede economic structure in the long-run when the
distortionary remnants of transitory innovations fade away. Because it is particularly difficult
to dissect the ex ante influence of strategic complementarities analytically when η < ζ, it
is paramount to abstract from the indirect general equilibrium effects when generating im-
pulse response functions of macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate pass-through.
Specifically, the agnostic measures of pass-through, such as the ratio of cumulative impulse
response functions to prices and exchange rates triggered by an exogenous innovation as in
Shambaugh (2008), are convoluted by extraneous model-specific co-movements. On the other
hand, impulse response functions to erptkii,t uncover the unbiased channel of exchange rate
transmission in a controlled general equilibrium environment.
Before we close and simulate the model, consider the corner solution in which all interna-
tional prices are perfectly rigid in the short-run. This simplified narrative sits on the opposite
side of the spectrum to the scenario of perfectly price-elastic demand for exports that is scru-
tinised in lemmas 4 – 6. These extreme settings are indeed important to contemplate in that
they highlight the limits to the domain of the terms of trade elasticity with respect to the
major currency innovations – it is always bounded by their interval conditional on the deep
structural parameters.
Lemma 9. If international prices of minor currency areas are perfectly rigid in their invoiced
currencies, such that κi(φ), κj(φ) → ∞∀φ ∈ {pi, `, $}, then the share of imports invoiced in
major currency units determines the terms of trade elasticity to major currency innovations:
lim
κi(φ), κj(φ)→∞∀φ
τkij,t = lim
κi(φ), κj(φ)→∞∀φ
∂ lnTij
∂ ln qkj
= −sij,t($) ≤ 0. (4.21)
Proof. A fall (rise) in qkj,t implies a fall (rise) in qki,t, while qij,t remains in-tact. Thus
erptkii,t(−$), erptkjj,t(−$) ∈ (0, 1) as long as κi(−$), κn(−$) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
erptkii,t($) = erpt
k
jj,t($) = 0 irrespective of κi($), κn($). The `-type firms price-to-market,
since `-type import prices in local currency terms respond analogously to export prices,
such that erptkij,t(`), erpt
k
ii,t(`) ∈ (0, 1), while ptmkij,t(`) = erptkii,t(`) ∈ (0, 1) − erptkij,t(`)
moves persistently in order to clear the market. The pi-type firms keep their price mark-ups
fixed by construction, such that erptkii,t(pi) = erpt
k
ij,t(pi) ∈ (0, 1), resulting in ptmkij,t(pi) = 0.
The $-type import prices absorb the major currency innovations fully, since erptkij,t($) =
ptmkij,t($) + erpt
k
ii,t($) = 1. Because erpt
k
ij,t =
∑
φ sij,t(φ)erpt
k
ij,t(φ), it follows that erpt
k
ij,t =
sij,t($) + sij,t(`)ptmij,t(`) +
∑
−$ sij,t(−$)erptii,t(−$). Observe that limκi(φ)→∞ Γii,∆,t(φ) =
∞∀φ, thus limκi(`)→∞ ptmij,t(`) = 0, and more generally limκn(φ)→∞ erptnn,t(φ) = 0∀φ.
Therefore limκi(φ), κj(φ)→∞∀φ τ
k
ij,t = limκi(φ), κj(φ)→∞∀φ[erpt
k
jj,t − erptkij,t] = −sij,t($).
To elaborate, when export prices are perfectly rigid, the major exchange rate pass-through
into export prices in minor currency areas is equal to zero as though exporters are autonomous
to intermediate imports. The only difference is that the cost-push effects are internalised
by the profit margins, thus generating foregone profits relative to the inter-temporal op-
timum. Unless the firm chooses to invoice profits in major currency units, those losses
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will be proportional to the size of the major currency innovations and the difference be-
tween inter-sectoral and inter-national elasticities of substitution. Hence, when the latter
difference is infinitesimally small, the elasticity of substitution is constant over time, since
lim ζ→η εin,t(φ) = ε, thereby switching off the strategic complementarities across sectors, such
that limζ→η Γii,Θ,t(φ) = 0. If prices are perfectly rigid and the elasticity of substitution is
constant over time, then the price mark-ups are constant over time and there is no room for
pricing-to-market to smooth out transitory fluctuations in profits. Irrespective of whether
price mark-ups adjust, the perfect disintegration of the product market for goods invoiced
in major currency units implies that the DCP import prices in minor currencies absorb all
movements in the major exchange rate, while PCP and LCP import prices remain constant.
Lemma 10. If all international prices are perfectly rigid in their invoiced currencies, such that
κi(φ), κk(φ)→∞∀φ ∈ {pi, `, $}, then the share of imports invoiced in producer currency units
determines the major economy’s terms of trade elasticity to its own currency innovations:
lim
κi(φ), κk(φ)→∞∀φ
τik,t = lim
κi(φ), κk(φ)→∞∀φ
∂ lnTik
∂ ln qik
= −sik,t(pi) ≤ 0. (4.22)
Proof. Perfect price rigidity implies Γii,∆,t(φ) → ∞∀φ, therefore erptkii,t(φ) = 0 ∀φ and
erptik,t(`) = 0, such that ptmik,t(pi) = 0 and ptmik,t(−pi) = 1. It follows that erptik,t =∑
φ sik,t(φ)erptik,t(φ) =
∑
φ sik,t(φ)[1 − ptmik,t(φ) − erptkii,t(φ)] = sik,t(pi). Then because
erptkk,t(φ) = 0 ∀φ, we have τik,t = ∂ lnTik/∂ ln qik = erptkk,t − erptik,t = −sik,t(pi). By
the same token, ptmki,t(pi) = 0 and ptmki,t(`) = 1, thus erptki,t = ski,t(pi) and erptkii,t = 0.
Consequently, τki,t = ∂ lnTik/∂ ln qik = erptkii,t − erptki,t = −ski,t(pi) ≤ 0.
The major-minor terms of trade respond only by as much as there are firms pricing their
exports at the factory door relative to the size of the destination market. Unlike in lemma 4,
where prices are perfectly flexible, the origin of innovations is irrelevant for their comparative
advantage. But heterogeneities prevail between minor-minor and major-minor terms of trade
elasticities. Specifically, in the classical Mundell-Fleming paradigm, where all firms price their
goods at the factory door, such that sin,t(pi) = 1∀ i ∈ n, the distinction between major and
minor is redundant, since the terms of trade always move one-to-one with the bilateral ex-
change rate due to the absence of hegemonic power seized by any one region. It delivers the
full intensity of the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect, making expansionary monetary policy
in open economies highly effective by boosting net exports. And yet in the globalised export
market structure in which the share of PCP imports in major currency areas is negligible,
lemma 10 proves that minor (major) currency areas are unable to boost their comparative
advantage against the major (minor) currency areas. The only way for them to gain any
comparative advantage against other minor currency areas when international prices are per-
fectly rigid in the short-run is to import more final goods invoiced in major currency units
(see lemma 9).
71
4.2.5 Sticky Wages
Suppose each economy i ∈ n is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households
indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]. All households are characterised by rational expectations, but they
develop habits over the consumption of goods and services. In each time period, households
derive utility from the consumption of habit-adjusted stock of final goods and disutility from
the hours spent in the labour force:
ui,t = ln
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi , (4.23)
where ϑi ∈ [0, 1) measures the intensity of consumption habits, ϕi ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labour, and ψi stands for the relative disutility of labour. Each household provides
a unique service to a competitive trade union, which aggregates these services and outsources
workers to the retailer according to the following CES technology:
hi,t =
 1∫
0
hi,t(ω)
1−1/ζdω
1/(1−1/ζ) . (4.24)
Due to the imperfect substitutability of each service captured by the elasticity of substitution
ζ > 1, households negotiate over their hourly wages with the trade unions and the employers.
However, the adjustments of wages in response to innovations occur gradually, because it
takes time and resources to reach an agreement through the process of collective bargaining.
Specifically, every time wages adjust, households incur one-off quadratic costs proportional to
the total wage bill denoted by ∆i,w,t(ω).
Formally, households in each economy i ∈ n maximise their lifetime utility subject to an
indefinite sequence of budget constraints and the demand for their labour service:
max
{ci,t(ω),wi,t(ω),bi,t+1(ω)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti ln
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
s.t. ci,t(ω) + λi,t,t+1Et[bi,t+1(ω)] = bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t)wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + vi,t(ω),
s.t. hi,t(ω) = hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ζ
,
s.t. ∆i,w,t(ω) =
κi,w(w˙i,t(ω)− γi)
2
.
Parameter βi ∈ (0, 1) denotes time preference, w˙i,t = (wi,t/wi,t−1) stands for the gross growth
rate of the real hourly wage rate, κi,w ≥ 0 measures the convexity of the wage adjustment costs,
bi,t is the stock of country-specific bonds, and vi,t = Πi,t +Mi,t is the exogenously given stock
of wealth acquired from the ownership of the firms and the sales of commodities to foreign
producers, such that Πi,t =
∑N
n=1
∑
φ Πin,t(φ), while the term Mi,t =
∑N
n=1 qkn,t
∑
φmni,t(φ)
measures the total sales of commodities abroad.
The competitive market structure for commodities ensures that even if the country-specific
bonds are in a zero net supply in the long-run, the trade surplus in the final goods can be
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sustained by a persistent trade deficit in the intermediate goods. It also imposes strong bal-
ance sheet effects that are often observed in emerging markets along the lines of the ‘original
sin’ described in Eichengreen & Hausmann (2005). In particular, a major currency appre-
ciation causes the value of equity to contract and the value of liabilities to expand in all
minor economies. However, more generally, long-run trade imbalances are determined by
the differences in the home-bias across different economies and the heterogeneities in the
import penetration ratios. They can be financed by either borrowing from abroad in local
currency terms or selling commodities in major currency units, thereby introducing a highly
pro-cyclical stock of private debt at the national level. This proposition places itself in parallel
with Benigno & Thoenissen (2008), who presented a compelling resolution to the notorious
‘consumption correlation puzzle’ portrayed by Backus & Smith (1993). It concerns the weak,
if not negative, correlation in OECD economies between aggregate real consumption and the
value of the local currency in real terms, while the opposite turns out to be true in many real
business cycle models that impose perfect capital mobility and complete global financial mar-
ket structures. Yet an imperfect international financial market structure in minor currency
areas has become a less innocuous framework in recent times in the light of IMF (2016), who
document a substantially diminished currency mismatch of liabilities.
The first order conditions of the households evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium are
summarised as follows:
wi,t =
(
ζ
ζ − 1
)
mrsi,t
Ψi,t
, (4.25)
Ψi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ζ − 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ζ − 1
]
, (4.26)
1 =βiEt
[
ui,c,t+1
λi,t,t+1ui,c,t
]
, (4.27)
mrsi,t = − ui,h,t
ui,c,t
, (4.28)
ui,h,t = − ψihϕii,t, (4.29)
ui,c,t =
1
ci,t − ϑici,t−1 − βiϑiEt
[
1
ci,t+1 − ϑici,t
]
. (4.30)
On average, wages are set above the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour mrsi,t, where the term ui,h,t = ∂ui,t/∂hi,t is the marginal disutility of labour and
ui,c,t = ∂ui,t/∂ci,t is the marginal utility of consumption. However, mrsi,t fluctuates by more
and also more rapidly in response to innovations in the macroeconomic fundamentals, since
wage inflation is characterised by persistent movements due to Ψi,t, which differs from unity
in the short-run. Specifically, mrsi,t and Ψi,t are positively correlated, such that an increase
in the former leads to a less than one-to-one increase in the later, causing a lagged response
of real wages to innovations. The Euler equation for the stock of bonds defines the stochastic
discount factor λi,t,t+1, which is a reciprocal of the gross risk-free rate of return in real terms.
The introduction of additive habits is motivated by the seminal contribution of Constantinides
(1990), who demonstrates that they lower the inter-temporal substitutability of consumption
73
and lower the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, ergo resolving the well-known ‘equity
premium and risk-free rate puzzles’.
4.2.6 Monetary Policy
The perpetual growth of labour productivity represented by the deterministic trend in the
retail production technology deems the entire system of difference equations characterising the
world economy inherently unstable. In order to represent such an environment in a stationary
system of difference equations, the equilibrium conditions of the households and the firms
are transformed akin to the seminal contribution of Merton (1975), who normalises the stock
variables by the contemporaneous level of productivity.14 The solution to this augmented
system of difference equations characterises the evolution of all variables over time around a
balanced growth path rather than a deterministic steady state.
Once the mechanical non-stationarity of the system is mitigated, the only other source
of aggregate instability stems from the combination of sticky prices and sticky wages. The
latter source of non-stationarity is counteracted endogenously by the interventions of the local
central banks in the international bonds markets, on account that it provides guidance to the
product and labour market equilibria towards the balanced growth path. In this model, these
interventions are depicted by a stochastic Taylor rule to which local central banks credibly
commit for an indefinite period of time:
ri,t = (ri,t−1)ρi,r(r∗i,t)
1−ρi,r , (4.31)
r∗i,t =
p˙iγi
β
(
p˙i,t
p˙i
)νi, p ( y˜i,t
y˜i
)νi,y
exp(σi,ri,r,t), (4.32)
where σi,r > 0, ρi,r ∈ (0, 1), i,r,t ∼ iid(0, 1), νi, p > 0, νi,y > 0, and y˜i,t = yi,t/ai,t.
In the absence of public or private investment, the aggregate demand in this economy
consists of aggregate consumption, the trade balance, and short-run externalities such as
price adjustment costs internalised by the import-export manufacturers and wage adjustment
costs internalised by the households:
y˜i,t = c˜i,t + n˜xi,t + ∆i,w,tw˜i,thi,t +
N∑
n=1
∑
φ
∆in,t(φ)pin,t(φ)y˜in,t(φ), (4.33)
n˜xi,t =
N−i∑
n=1
pin,tqni,ty˜in,t − pni,tyni,t. (4.34)
When the international flows of country-specific bonds are unrestricted, the possibility
of fixed exchange rates is implicitly ruled out. Consequently, the combination of incomplete
financial markets, floating exchange rates and liberalised financial capital flows implies that
the real exchange rate is determined by the perfect consumption risk sharing relationship:
qni,tu˜i,c,t = µiu˜j,c,tei,t, (4.35)
14The full list of stationarised equilibrium conditions are displayed in Appendix B.5
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such that µni = 1/µin > 0, ei,t = e
ρi,e
i,t−1 exp(σi,ei,e,t), ρi,e ∈ (0, 1), σi,e > 0 and i,e,t ∼ iid(0, 1).
The term ei,t stands for exchange rate noise, capturing all of the exchange rate movements
unexplained by innovations in the macroeconomic fundamentals. It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to tackle peculiarities of the foreign exchange market, therefore exchange rate noise
appears as a simplest tool to account for large movements in the real exchange rate that cannot
be explained by the relatively small changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Although it
is admittedly unusual to impose persistent exogenous shocks to the perfect consumption
risk sharing identity, Bacchetta & van Wincoop (2017) introduce such innovations in the
context of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). They are also present in structural vector
autoregression models, such as Forbes et al. (2017), where this so-called ‘exogenous exchange
rate shock’ also emanates from the UIP.
4.3 Summary of the Multi-Country Model
There are a number of subtle differences between the models presented in chapters 2 and
4. First, exporters are no longer infinitesimally small within their market segment and they
exert some market power over the dynamics of sectoral prices, but not aggregate consumer
prices. As a result, firms set their prices strategically by taking the optimal behaviour of
other sectors into the account. Second, major currency areas now contaminate the entire
global economy with adverse innovations without facing exact opposite repercussions when
those innovations emanate from the minor currency areas. Third, the model with dynamic
strategic complementarities is based on quadratic price adjustment costs in order to distinguish
their influence from the possible downward price rigidities illustrated in the previous chapters.
When the global trade in commodities and manufactured goods is invoiced in a small
number of major currencies, this chapter shows that not all countries are subject to sym-
metrical intensity of external innovations. That channel crucially depends on country-specific
structural factors, such as exporter reliance on intermediate imports, import and export price
stickiness, as well as the shares of invoicing currency in which international prices are sticky.
Although the choice of invoicing currency may be weakly correlated with the intermediate
import intensity, this chapter shows that nominal rigidity and strategic complementarities
among exporters materialise in unprecedented developments in the minor-minor as well as
major-minor currency area terms of trade. The central policy implication for monetary au-
thorities in minor currency areas is that expansionary monetary policy may be more effective
in countries experiencing a currency mismatch between intermediate imports and final ex-
ports, but it leaves them more susceptible to instability attributed to innovations emanating
from the major currency areas. In order to infer the above policy implications in quantitative
terms, the next chapter is dedicated to estimating the model depicted above in the context
of United States, Japan, and South Korea.
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Chapter 5
Estimating a US-JP-KR DSGE Model
With Sticky Prices & Strategic
Complementarities
5.1 Synopsis
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium environment is a particularly appealing tool for policy
makers when conducting counterfactual scenario analysis, primarily because the deep struc-
tural parameters of these models can be easily disciplined by the data. And yet most of these
models developed in the open economy setting are confined to a two-country scenario using
Bayesian methods, such as Lubik & Schorfheide (2005), Adolfson et al. (2007), García-Cicco
et al. (2010), and De Walque et al. (2017). In spite of the fact that Bayesian methods in-
corporate prior knowledge about economically-plausible boundaries of structural parameters,
multi-country models, such as the one depicted in this chapter, are subject to a severe case
of the ‘curse of dimensionality’. That is, the number of parameters to be estimated grows
exponentially with the number of countries N , while the number of shocks increases at a
linear rate. In practice, whenever N > 2, stochastic singularity and issues related to pa-
rameter identification become even more prominent in the context of Bayesian analysis when
compared to the case of N ≤ 2.
Instead of incorporating a number of additional ad hoc stochastic variables in order to im-
prove parameter identifiability, this chapter adopts Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
à la Aguiar & Gopinath (2007). GMM is a tractable alternative when facing the overwhelm-
ingly large dimensions of multi-country business cycle models and especially useful in situ-
ations when the available set of time series on macroeconomic fundamentals is limited. It
circumvents the curse of dimensionality by harnessing moments on the global connectedness
from a variance-covariance matrix that increases exponentially with the number of countries.
In order to discard economically intractable local maxima and in order to incorporate reli-
able information outside of the model, GMM algorithm depicted in this chapter is further
augmented in two distinct dimensions. First, two-sided lower- and upper-bounds are imposed
for each deep structural parameter. It simultaneously eliminates the possibility of indeter-
minacy or multiple equilibria in a rational expectations setting and leaves a large parameter
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space unconfined by narrow prior beliefs. Second, the ‘bounded GMM’ incorporates a num-
ber of non-linear constraints applied to multiple combinations of inter-sectoral parameters.
The latter feature is helpful when information about the currency of invoicing across sectors
is only observed for say, the USD, but unobserved for the remaining currencies. Non-linear
constraints that condition available information about invoicing patters on the trade shares
can thus provide a reasonable educated guess about the magnitude of the unobserved invoic-
ing shares based entirely on the key moments of macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the
average volatility and the persistence of international prices and exchange rates.
5.2 Estimation
Once the values of all structural parameters are postulated, the multi-country model can be
solved numerically by perturbing the policy function up to a first order around a balanced
growth path à la Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2004).1 Some parameters may be successfully cali-
brated using information outside of the model. For example, Gopinath (2015) provides many
useful stylised facts about nationwide invoicing of imports and exports. Yet the intra-industry
data on the global export market structure is virtually scant, such that the parameters control-
ling the intra-sectoral dependence on imported intermediate inputs, their choice of invoicing
currency, and their market shares are mostly unknown. At the same time, studies using
the limited intra-sectoral data that are available, such as Berman et al. (2012) and Amiti
et al. (2014), demonstrate that there are predictable systematic differences in exchange rate
pass-through among individual exporters in France and Belgium respectively.
In the light of the limitations in terms of the micro-level data, this chapter maps the
inter-industry parameters to the moments of the most disaggregated data on macroeconomic
fundamentals that are available. In principal, the mapping could be implemented using either
maximum-likelihood or moment-based techniques. Although there are many examples of open
economy models estimated using Bayesian maximum-likelihood techniques, the multi-country
model depicted in this framework is subject to a severe case of the ‘curse of dimensional-
ity’. Instead of incorporating a number of additional ad hoc stochastic variables in order to
improve parameter identifiability, application of GMM is arguably more suitable, where the
emphasis is placed on targeting a select-few first and second moments of key the variables
such as import and export price inflation and the exchange rate. It also does not impose non-
standard prior distributions on the initialised values of the parameters, while the ‘posterior’
densities are characterised by the conventional properties of a normal distribution from which
standard inference can be drawn. The latter point can be viewed as both an advantage and a
disadvantage. On the one hand, the estimation algorithm is more flexible and immune to any
preconceptions. On the other hand, the results are more susceptible to model misspecifica-
tion. In order to preserve the accuracy of the solution and to ensure saddle-path stability, the
model parameters are thus disciplined by imposing lower- and upper-bounds on the estimates
that discard theoretically incredible values from the objective function, ultimately amounting
to ‘bounded GMM’.
1The detailed derivations of the balanced growth path are subsumed within Appendix B.6.
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5.2.1 Generalised Method of Moments
Suppose θ is a g1×1 vector of unknown parameters. Suppose further that T > 0 observations
of stationary and ergodic economic data, {$t}, is available to estimate a g2 × 1 vector of
moments m($t). Similarly, there exists an analogous g2× 1 vector of theoretical (i.e. uncon-
ditional) moments E[m(θ)] implied by the structural model with Gaussian disturbances. The
distance between the data- and the model-implied moments is defined as:
M(θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
m($t)− E[m(θ)]. (5.1)
The restricted GMM estimator can then be defined as:
θˆ = argmin
¯
θ<θ<θ¯
M(θ)′S−1M(θ), (5.2)
where
¯
θ and θ¯ are the lower- and upper-bound vectors of θ, while
S = lim
T→∞
Var
[
1√
T
T∑
t=1
m($t)
]
(5.3)
is a g1 × g2 positive-definite optimal weighting matrix obtained using the Newey-West esti-
mator with a Bartlett kernel. It ensures the efficiency of θˆ by putting the most weight on
the most accurately measured moments and simultaneously discounting the least accurately
measured moments. If and only if J = E[∂m(θ)/∂θ] is the g1 × g2 finite Jacobian matrix of
full column rank and g2 ≥ g1, then the GMM estimator is said to be ‘identified’. Moreover,
it follows an asymptotic normal distribution under the Hansen (1982) regularity conditions:
√
T (θˆ − θ0)→ N (0, (J′S−1J)−1), (5.4)
Similar to the basic maximum-likelihood technique, GMM is sensitive to model misspecifi-
cation, which is why it is useful to impose some natural limits on the individual elements
of θ. Consequently, they follow truncated-normal distributions, and the rule of thumb for
statistical significance is one-sided relative to a pre-determined lower- or upper-bound.
5.2.2 Data Description
The model is estimated for N = 3 using X-13 seasonally-adjusted monthly data covering the
period of 1994:M1-2016:M12, where United States is the major currency area, while Japan
and South Korea are the minor currency areas. Conditional on being some of the largest
exporters in the world, all economies were chosen on the basis of adopting monetary policy
regimes that encompass a freely-floating exchange rate and an inflation-targeting objective
throughout the sample period, which is arguably compatible with the Taylor rule depicted
in the model. The vector of time series in first-order differences contains the real aggregate
household consumption (CONS), the consumer price index (CPI), and the unit value indices
of imports and exports (UVIM, UVIX). The vector of time series also includes the levels of the
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nominal interest rate (NIR) and the CPI-based real exchange rates (KRW/USD, KRW/JPY,
and JPY/USD). There are 18 time series in total and 53 parameters to be estimated. GMM
uses the sample average, the standard deviation, the first- and the second-order autocorrela-
tion, as well as the covariance of each time series, such that g1 = 53 and g2 = 225.
5.2.3 Parameters
Calibration
Not all parameters described in the model enter into the vector θ. The goal is to use as much
information outside of the model and to calibrate as many structural parameters as possible,
thereby minimising the length of θ and maximising the degrees of freedom. All calibrated
parameters are displayed in table 5.1. Following Atkeson & Burstein (2008), the inter-sectoral
and inter-national elasticities of substitution adopt the following ordering: 1 < η < ζ < ∞.
Moreover, the magnitude of η is close to unity in order to keep the country-specific trade
weights sni,t relatively stable over time. Because the GMM objective function abstracts from
fitting the labour market dynamics, the aggregate hours of labour are assumed to be supplied
inelastically, such that ϕi = 1. The iceberg costs d are set to 10% for all source and destination
economies. It is in-line with UNCTAD (2015) global estimates of the differences between the
CIF and FOB price levels of internationally exchanged commodities and manufactured goods.
The relative size of the distribution sector α is equal to 2/3 of the final household consumption
basket – not far from the G7 estimates presented in Burstein et al. (2003).
The discount factor βn is computed as the inverse sample mean of the gross real interest
rate, while the trend of monthly consumer price inflation p˙n is simply approximated by the
sample average of the CPI inflation rate. The mean of the real exchange rate qni is proxied by
the average bilateral nominal exchange rate. However, without loss of generality, the relative
price of currencies are expressed in terms of the price of 0.01 USD rather than one unit. The
magnitude of ξn is computed using three indicators. First, the 1994-2016 average import
share of GDP obtained from the World Bank. These are 14.5%, 12.5%, and 36.9% for United
States, Japan, and South Korea (i.e. US, JP, KR) respectively. Second, the proportion of
imported intermediate goods relative to the total value of imports obtained from Miroudot
et al. (2009). In US, JP, and KR, 51.5%, 68.0%, and 75.1% of all imports respectively are
deemed to be intermediate goods. Because ξi measures the share of imported intermediate
goods in the tradable goods sector, it follows that (1 − α)ξi for each destination is equal to
the product of the above two shares. Around 83% of all exports in South Korea are estimated
to be re-exports to other destinations, which is evocative of its ubiquitous role as a gateway
for APEC economies. On the other hand, Japan and United States are almost four times less
dependent on imported intermediate goods than South Korea.
Similarly, the average trade weights sji are computed using the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics. First, the average home-bias sii is obtained by subtracting the product of the
import share of GDP and the consumption share of GDP from unity. Specifically, in US, JP,
and KR, 9.7%, 7.0%, and 19.0% of all consumer goods are imported from abroad. Second,
the average bilateral trade shares between each of these economies are computed. Namely,
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Table 5.1: Partial Calibration of the US-JP-KR Model
Structural Parameters
ζ 10
η 1.1
d 1.1
α 0.667
US JP KR
(1/βn − 1)× 100 0.043 0.025 0.209
(γn − 1)× 100 0.197 0.068 0.110
(p˙n − 1)× 100 0.18 0.01 0.25
ξn 0.224 0.255 0.831
aaaaan
i US JP KR
US 1 1/1.364 1/12.827
qni JP 1.364 1 1/9.404
KR 12.827 9.404 1
aaaaan
i US JP KR
US 0.8383 0.0896 0.1433
sni JP 0.1246 0.8833 0.1750
KR 0.0371 0.0271 0.6817
PCP LCP DCP PCP LCP DCP PCP LCP DCP
aaaaan
i US JP KR
US 0.97 0.03 − 0.73 0.27 − 0.98 0.02 −
sni(φ) JP 0.08 ∗ ∗ 0.39 0.11 0.50 0.70 0.03 0.27
KR 0.02 ∗ ∗ 0.38 0.08 0.54 0.01 0.14 0.85
An asterisk ∗ indicates an unknown parameter value that are subsequently estimated using
GMM. A hyphen − indicates that parameter does not exist. For example, DCP in the US
implies PCP, thus the distinction between the two is redundant.
2.8% (9.5%) of US imports originate from KR (JP); 15.0% (4.5%) of JP imports originate
from US (KR); 13.9% (17.0%) of KR imports originate from US (JP). Third, the product of
the aggregate import share and the bilateral import share gives the actual trade weight for
each trade partner. However, because US, JP, and KR trade with other economies outside of
this model, the framework is closed by adding the trade-weighted remainder to each of the
two trading partners such that
∑N
i=1 sni = 1.
Most of the market shares are calibrated by making use of the shares of invoicing currency
at the national level reported in Gopinath & Rigobon (2008), Gopinath (2015), and Boz et al.
(2017). In particular, Gopinath & Rigobon (2008) estimates that around 97% (90%) of US
exports (imports) are priced in USD. Moreover, Gopinath (2015) finds that 35% (5%) imports
in JP (KR) are priced in JPY (SKW); 39% (1%) of JP (KR) exports are invoiced in JPY
(SKW); and 50% (85%) of JP (KR) exports are invoiced in USD. Finally, Boz et al. (2017)
reports that 71% (81%) of imports in JP (KR) are invoiced in USD. Admittedly, these values
represent the global invoicing shares relative to all trade partners, while the model depicted
in this chapter is a three-country world. The predicament is that it is not immediately clear
if imports invoiced in USD in JP (KR) comes from the US or KR (JP). The shares of imports
invoiced in local currency are therefore multiplied by the trade weight (e.g. for JP imports
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from US, ski(`) = 0.35 × ski/(1 − sii) = 0.27), while the share invoiced in USD from either
the US or other minor economy must add up to the reported magnitude (e.g. for JP imports
from KR that are invoiced in USD, sji($) = 0.71 − (1 − ski(`)) × sji/(1 − sii) = 0.54). The
one segment of table 5.1 that the data outside of the model cannot determine is how much of
the US imports invoiced in USD come from LCP or DCP firms. However, these shares can be
estimated along with the remaining parameters using GMM as discussed in the next section.
A glance at the cross-country differences of the invoicing shares is already an indication
that the terms of trade elasticity to exchange rate movements is likely to be heterogeneous.
The exact patterns of comparative advantage are discussed in more detail in section 5.3.1.
Suffice it to say that the smaller the economy, the more likely it is to invoice profits in either
the local or major currency units, while the larger the economy, the more likely it is that its
currency becomes a customary medium of exchange for other smaller economies.
Bounds & Non-Linear Constraints
The configuration of the bounds imposed on the GMM algorithm is displayed in table 5.2. The
inter-sectoral convexity of the price adjustment costs κi(φ) is initialised to a relatively large
magnitude of 75, owing to the monthly nature of the data in which prices are expected to be
stickier than in the quarterly or annual settings that are more commonly encountered in the
New Keynesian literature. The lower bound of zero for κi(φ) allows for the narrative of perfect
price flexibility, while a relatively high upper bound of 500 ensures that the outcome of an
effectively flat Phillips curve is possible. Wage stickiness κi,w is initialised to 100, since wages
are expected to be more sluggish to adjust than prices as they are less sensitive to exchange
rate volatility. The remaining configurations of the nation-wide parameters are relatively
standard, with the exception of the shocks to the exchange rate noise σi,e. As discussed in the
modelling section, the perfect consumption risk sharing framework adopted in the household
optimisation problem does not fully capture the real exchange rate volatility encountered in
practice and gives rise to counterfactually stable exchange rate dynamics. Introduction of
exchange rate noise shocks with a sizeable upper bound of 8% mimics the otherwise puzzling
high exchange rate volatility observed in all three foreign exchange markets.
When it comes to the remaining inter-sectoral parameters, it is not enough to simply im-
pose bounds on the individual elements of θ. Each φ-type openness to intermediate imports,
namely ξi(φ), is in principle bounded between zero and unity. But it is not analogous to a
‘beta prior’ in the Bayesian estimation algorithms, because it needs to satisfy an additional
condition for each parameter iteration, namely
∑
φ ξi(φ)×
∑N
n=1 sin(φ) = ξi. Specifically, the
economy-wide average intermediate import intensity must equal the sum of the inter-sectoral
intermediate import intensities weighted by sectoral market shares. Guided purely by the
gradient of the GMM objective function, nothing prevents the algorithm from searching for
values of ξi(φ) that violate this non-linear constraint if the only restrictions imposed on the
parameter space were the bounds on the individual elements of θ. It is therefore paramount
to incorporate the non-linear constraint into the estimation routine in order to discard theo-
retically incredible values of unbounded GMM estimates, where
∑
φ ξi(φ)×
∑N
n=1 sin(φ) ≶ ξi.
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And yet if all 2(N2 − 1) + N restrictions were to be imposed simultaneously, namely
2(N2−1) number of bounds and N number of non-linear constraints, then the bounded GMM
estimates of the intermediate import intensity would be over-identified, but not in the usual
sense of that terminology. In practice, non-linear constraints are difficult to satisfy with exact
equality, because it generally comes at an internal trade-off of attaining the local maxima.
Imposing many tight non-linear constraints on a large parameter space along with the bounds
on the individual elements is somewhat reminiscent to the problem of stochastic singularity
as in Altug (1989) and Sargent (1989), since there may not be a feasible combination of deep
structural parameters that satisfies the convergence criterion. The pragmatic solution to this
problem is to impose a margin for error ς > 0, which is somewhat analogous to Schmitt-
Grohé & Uribe (2012) in the Bayesian maximum-likelihood setting. It requires transforming
each equality constraint
∑
φ ξi(φ) ×
∑N
n=1 sin(φ) = ξi into an inequality constraint, namely
ξi−ς ≤
∑
φ ξi(φ)×
∑N
n=1 sin(φ) ≤ ξi+ς. Inequality constraints with a pre-specified margin for
error are not as demanding on the objective function, since they discard futile computations
in the neighbourhood of the local maxima that ultimately satisfy the convergence criterion at
an infeasible point. The tighter is the margin for error, the less feasible is the local maxima,
but also the less likely are the constraints to be violated and vice versa.
Fortunately, the margin for error in this application is not required to be particularly broad.
After experimenting with a number of values for ς, which need not be symmetrical across all
non-linear constraints, the final specification applies a 5% margin for error for intermediate
import intensity and a 0% margin for error (i.e. equality constraint) for the sum of the
market shares, namely
∑N
n=1 sni(φ) = 1. Non-linear constraints on the bounded parameter
space can be useful not only in terms of satisfying abstract theoretical constructs, but also
as a viable alternative to the prior distributions in Bayesian analysis. The crucial difference
here is that (non-)standard ‘prior distributions’ are not controlled by pre-determined hyper-
parameters, but rather a pre-determined range of estimates. If the constraint consists of just
a linear combination of parameters, then the ‘posterior’ distribution is simply a truncated
normal distribution. This chapter makes use of additional non-linear constraints in order
to discipline the inter-sectoral parameters and bring the model predictions as close to the
available empirical literature as possible. In the end, bounded GMM estimation with 8 non-
linear constraints splices the parameter space into a lower-dimensional object, whose limits
may be as tight or slack as ones confidence in the information outside of the model.
Bounded GMM Estimates
All parameter estimates displayed in table 5.2 turn out to be well-identified in the sense that
they diverge from their initialised values and they are generally different from the lower- and
upper-bounds at less than 1% level of significance. The estimates of the market shares reveal
that more US imports from both JP and KR are priced in LCP rather than DCP strategies.2
The high share of LCP exporters thus implies that there are non-trivial differences in the
2Recall that more than 90% of all US imports are invoiced in dollars, while 54% (27%) of JP (KR) imports
from KR (JP) are invoiced in USD, which reinforces the role of the USD as the dominant medium of exchange
even in the present approximation of the world economy.
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prices of tradable goods across borders in the short-run. Moreover, the price adjustment costs
of LCP (PCP) export prices exhibit the greatest convexity in the US and JP (KR). One
would expect the DCP export prices to be the most rigid as they are virtually immune to the
global commodity price fluctuations, but that does not turn out to be the case. Instead, the
data favours the outcome of a substantial product market segmentation between the US and
other currency areas. By contrast, most trade that takes place between JP and KR is either
conducted by PCP or DCP firms, leaving very little room for price discrimination.
Table 5.2: US-JP-KR Model Estimation
GMM Configuration & Estimates
Parameter Initialised Value Lower Bound Upper Bound Point Estimate
θ θ0
¯
θ θ¯ θˆ
US JP KR US JP KR US JP KR US JP KR
sjk(`) 1/3 * * 0 * * 1 * * 0.51 * *
sjk($) 1−
∑
−$ sjk(−$) * * 0 * * 1 * * 0.41 * *
sik(`) 1/3 * * 0 * * 1 * * 0.77 * *
sik($) 1−
∑
−$ sik(−$) * * 0 * * 1 * * 0.21 * *
ξi(pi) ξk ξi ξj 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.10 0.00‡ 0.92‡
ξi(`) ξk ξi ξj 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.08‡ 0.04‡ 0.98‡
ξi($) - ξi ξj - 0 0 - 1 1 - 0.25‡ 0.35‡
κi(pi) 75 75 75 0 0 0 500 500 500 32.90 16.91 207.50
κi(`) 75 75 75 0 0 0 500 500 500 447.51 127.41 47.07
κi($) - 75 75 - 0 0 - 500 500 - 41.76 51.91
κi,w 100 100 100 0 0 0 500 500 500 22.04 0.15 13.41
ϑi 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.27 0.40 0.06
νi, p 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 5 5 5 3.26 3.95 3.89
νi,y 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.08 0.22 0.15
ρi,r 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.47 0.99 0.78
ρi,z 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.80 0.45 0.66
ρi,e 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.58 0.89 0.89
σi,r 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8% 8% 0.30% 0.00% 0.11%
σi,a 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8% 8% 0.04% 0.82% 0.02%
σi,z 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8% 8% 5.08% 0.99% 7.72%
σi,e 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0% 0% 0% 8% 8% 8% 4.58% 2.69% 1.50%
The (inverted) cross ( ) next to the point estimate indicates that it is not different from the upper (lower) bound
at a 5% level of significance. A double cross ‡ indicates that it is not different from either bounds at 5% level of
significance. The GMM algorithm is implemented using Dynare 4.5.4 and Matlab 2017a. The objective function is
minimised conditional on the bounds and non-linear constraints using the Sequential Quadratic Programming algorithm
embedded into fmincon, which takes around 60 minutes to converge when using a machine with a 4 GHz processor speed
and 16GB memory.
There is no coherent pattern across countries in terms of their intermediate import inten-
sity. Theoretically, one would expect the market share of the DCP firms to depend on the
share of intermediate imports are denominated in USD. But GMM portrayed in this chap-
ter captures the same idea in reverse – conditional on observing the invoicing shares, what
proportion of inputs would the data suggest to be intermediate? Indeed, it is not the most
efficient method to force a confession out of the data, which is reflected in large uncertainty
bands around the estimates of ξi(φ). Yet given the micro-level data limitations, it is the only
viable method available at hand aside from an outright calibration or other forms of indirect
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inference. The fact that most estimates of intermediate import intensity are inefficient is not
a reflection on the general performance of non-linear constraints, because market shares of US
imports turn out to be highly statistically significant. Instead it is mostly due to the choice of
linear production technology in import-export industries, leading to insensitive consumption,
interest rates, and international prices to changes in intermediate import intensity.
There are two competing views about what determines the choice of invoicing currency.
First, according to the firm-level data reported in Amiti et al. (2014), the more import-
dependent are the export production technologies in Belgium, the more likely are firms to
adopt LCP strategies and exercise sticky prices. In that case, large and transitory move-
ments in commodity prices are generally not reflected in import and export prices, but rather
absorbed by the producer price mark-ups, thereby creating some short-run arbitrage oppor-
tunities. The first view also reinforces the earlier evidence produced by Froot & Klemperer
(1989) about the sources of low exchange rate pass-through into import prices, which was
thought to be motivated by so-called market share hysteresis - temporary contraction is con-
sidered to be permanent, thus transitory adjustment of the price mark-up is considered to be
less costly than the present value of foregone market share. Second, Gopinath (2015) inadver-
tently shows that openness to intermediate imports strongly correlates with the adoption of
USD as the primary invoicing currency of overseas revenues in many advanced and emerging
economies. If most intermediate commodities are priced in USD, then adopting the DCP
strategy renders the export price mark-up immune to major exchange rate volatility, thereby
keeping the price mark-up constant at home and in the major economy. At the same time,
the DCP import price mark-up adjustments occur through adverse changes in market shares
in other minor currency areas. However, the latter effect may be dampened if the major
currency is sufficiently widespread (i.e. ‘dominant currency paradigm’).
In the US, both PCP and LCP firms are estimated to be relatively closed, which supports
neither of the views. Conversely, in JP, PCP firms are virtually closed, LCP firms are only
somewhat open, while DCP firms import nearly a quarter of their inputs, which conforms to
the view of Gopinath (2015). On the other hand, both PCP and LCP exports originating
from KR are almost entirely re-exports, which is evocative of the ubiquitous role of KR as a
gateway for APEC economies and somewhat supports the empirical regularities established
in Amiti et al. (2014). Consequently, both views seem to be warranted by GMM, such that
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather each sector tends to complement one
another. Irrespective of how mixed the results are across countries, they are poles apart
from the backbone of the classical Mundell-Fleming paradigm, in which international prices
of final goods are orthogonal to intermediate imports and all exporters invoice their profits in
producer currency units.
Wages turn out to be relatively flexible in all three economies. In fact, wage adjust-
ments are virtually costless in JP. Although additive habits are negligible in KR, they play an
important role in JP and KR in terms of lowering the inter-temporal substitution of consump-
tion. In general, both wage stickiness and additive habits are important when matching the
high volatility and persistence of exchange rates with relatively low volatility and persistence
of consumption. Notice that exchange rate noise shocks adjacent to short-run productivity
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shocks in the import-export industries are generally larger than other sources of macroeco-
nomic volatility. Both monetary policy surprises and long-run productivity shocks are mostly
negligible. With the exception of JP, where both short-run and long-run productivity shocks
are almost equally as important, much of the price mark-up variability associated with firms
domiciled in the US and KR comes from innovations to short-run productivity and the USD.
The Taylor rule feedback parameters for inflation (output gap) are estimated to be larger
(lower) than it is commonly found in the New-Keynesian literature. In general, the adoption
of the Taylor rule in a liquidity-trapped Japanese economy is an over-simplification of the
monetary policy conduct during the sample period. An extension of this model to accommo-
date a zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate would provide a more accurate fit of the
data, especially the low volatility and very high persistence of the nominal interest rate, but
it goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Although monetary policy shocks are very small in
the US due to the liquidity trap characterising a large part of the last decade, they capture a
large part of the nominal interest rate volatility. This result is important since it means that
exogenous monetary policy shocks are not required to explain the US business cycle. Instead,
transitory productivity shocks turn out to be large in the US and KR, which are capturing
the large movements in the fundamentals during the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09.
5.2.4 Assessing the Goodness of Fit
The empirical validity of the estimated parameters is based not only on their statistical
significance, but also on how well they perform in terms of minimising the GMM objective
function. Table 5.3 breaks down the distance between the data-implied and the model-implied
moments of the fitted variables. For the sake of transparency and space, the covariance
matrix of all 18 time series are not displayed. Overall, the quantitative fit of the model is
quite remarkable given the simplicity of the demand-side depicted in this framework – not
a single series exhibits dynamics that stray afar from those of the data generating process.
However, the volatility of all series is somewhat underestimated, which is not surprising, since
the model does not incorporate any form of capital formation – both physical and financial
capital market imperfections tend to exacerbate the business cycle. Several other observations
are particularly noteworthy.
First, the model predicts low volatility and persistence of the consumer price inflation and
a high volatility and persistence of the exchange rates. The compatibility of these moments
is an especially desirable feature of many open economy models, because it renders exchange
rate pass-through into consumer prices relatively low – in-line with the empirical estimates,
such as Campa & Goldberg (2010). Second, the model captures a large part of the exchange
rate volatility and persistence in each market, which is largely driven by the autoregressive
process of exchange rate noise. Some of the missing volatility in consumption accounts for
the remnants of the missing volatility in exchange rates. Third and most surprisingly, the fit
of the second moment of the nominal interest rate is exceptionally good, especially for JP,
where the nominal interest rate is virtually constant and highly persistent as though it were
a unit root. As a result, the model overcomes the risk-free rate puzzle to some extent in that
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Table 5.3: Data- and Model-Implied Moments (1994:M1-2016:M12)
(i) United States
Mean Std. Dev. ACF(1) ACF(2)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption (M-o-M) 0.19% 0.20% 0.39% 0.28% -0.23 0.15 0.05 0.01
Consumer Price Index (M-o-M) 0.18% 0.18% 0.27% 0.15% 0.41 0.27 0.00 0.12
Import Unit Value Index (M-o-M) 0.10% 0.18% 1.22% 0.80% 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.13
Export Unit Value Index (M-o-M) 0.08% 0.18% 0.59% 0.32% 0.48 0.73 0.29 0.51
Nominal Interest Rate 0.23% 0.43% 0.19% 0.17% 0.99 0.55 0.99 0.43
(ii) Japan
Mean Std. Dev. ACF(1) ACF(2)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption (M-o-M) 0.08% 0.07% 1.07% 0.65% -0.48 0.46 0.09 0.22
Consumer Price Index (M-o-M) 0.01% 0.01% 0.26% 0.22% 0.13 0.46 -0.02 0.23
Import Unit Value Index (M-o-M) 0.18% 0.01% 2.66% 1.96% 0.35 0.01 0.16 0.14
Export Unit Value Index (M-o-M) 0.13% 0.01% 1.76% 0.94% 0.18 0.54 0.08 0.26
Nominal Interest Rate 0.04% 0.10% 0.03% 0.02% 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.92
(iii) South Korea
Mean Std. Dev. ACF(1) ACF(2)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption (M-o-M) 0.11% 0.11% 1.09% 0.64% 0.47 -0.09 0.30 -0.04
Consumer Price Index (M-o-M) 0.25% 0.25% 0.35% 0.25% 0.31 0.02 0.06 0.13
Import Unit Value Index (M-o-M) 0.12% 0.25% 2.07% 1.26% 0.60 0.13 0.35 0.02
Export Unit Value Index (M-o-M) -0.16% 0.25% 1.34% 0.94% 0.68 0.52 0.41 0.21
Nominal Interest Rate 0.46% 0.57% 0.37% 0.25% 0.98 0.75 0.95 0.65
(iv) Real Exchange Rate
Mean Std. Dev. ACF(1) ACF(2)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
JPY/USD 1.36 1.37 0.079 0.076 0.92 0.62 0.80 0.39
SKW/USD 12.83 12.84 1.06 0.71 0.83 0.60 0.69 0.36
SKW/JPY 9.40 9.43 0.80 0.46 0.85 0.86 0.71 0.74
All variables as expressed as monthly percentage changes with the exception of the nominal interest rates and the real
exchange rates, all of which are depicted in levels. The stochastic trend of the real exchange rate series is removed
by means of a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with the standard smoothing factor of 14400. The stationary cyclical
components are then fitted to the model-implied real exchange rates.
the nominal interest rate in all economies is excessively stable in spite of large fluctuations in
productivity and exchange rates.
5.3 Average Causal Effect
5.3.1 Terms of Trade Warp
How important is the notion of nominal price stickiness when quantifying the shifts in the
terms of trade in response to exchange rate innovations? Now that we have obtained the
estimates of deep structural parameters and simulated the model with the estimated degree of
nominal rigidity, we can answer this question by making use of lemmas 4 – 10. In particular,
table 5.4 presents the 95% confidence intervals of the terms of trade elasticities to major
currency innovations in the US, JP, and KR under three alternative scenarios. Namely, the
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actual elasticity that prevails under the estimated degree of price stickiness and two other
hypothetical narratives - perfect price flexibility or perfect price rigidity. These estimates
represent the ex ante average causal effect of exchange rates on the terms of trade. It is
said to be ‘average’ in the sense that it conditions the elasticities on the distributions of all
Gaussian innovations in this model. Moreover, it stands for the ‘causal’ effect, since this
measurement is immune to endogeneity that plagues the co-movements of international prices
and exchange rates at the aggregate level.
By definition, the terms of trade measure the amount of final imports that the destination
economy can purchase for every unit of final exports it sells abroad. A negative terms of
trade elasticity means that a unilateral depreciation of the major currency (i.e. orthogonal
to the bilateral minor-minor exchange rate) leads to an improvement in the terms of trade
in the destination economy. The average terms of trade elasticity turns out to be bounded
between negative unity and zero not by mere accident, but because it is primarily driven
by the market shares of multi-national exporters choosing to invoice profits in heterogeneous
currencies, which are bounded between zero and unity by construction.
Table 5.4: Sticky Prices & Terms of Trade Neutrality
aaaaa
n k (i) United States
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
limζ→∞ τknk = 0 τ
k
nk = erptkk − erptnk limκ→∞ τknk = −snk(pi)
min. avg. max. min. avg. max. min. avg. max.
Japan – 0.00 – -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 -0.01
South Korea – 0.00 – -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00
aaaaa
n j (ii) Japan
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
limζ→∞ τknj = −sjj($) τknj = erptjj − erptnj limκ→∞ τknj = −{sij($), skj(pi)}
min. avg. max. min. avg. max. min. avg. max.
United States -0.55 -0.50 -0.45 -0.83 -0.67 -0.51 -0.88 -0.72 -0.57
South Korea -0.55 -0.50 -0.45 -0.55 -0.50 -0.44 -0.59 -0.54 -0.48
aaaaa
n i (iii) South Korea
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
limζ→∞ τkni = −sii($) τkni = erptii − erptni limκ→∞ τkni = −{sji($), ski(pi)}
min. avg. max. min. avg. max. min. avg. max.
United States -0.89 -0.85 -0.81 -0.98 -0.97 -0.96 -0.99 -0.98 -0.97
Japan -0.89 -0.85 -0.81 -0.41 -0.36 -0.30 -0.33 -0.27 -0.22
All numbers in bold represent the average exchange rate pass-through into the bilateral terms of trade following a
movement in the USD. The numbers on the left and the right hand-side stand for the 95% confidence interval. All
predictions are conditional on a single set of GMM parameter estimates, such that transitions between the states where
prices are perfectly flexible or perfectly rigid are hypothetical as shown in lemmas 4 – 10.
A unilateral depreciation (appreciation) of the USD improves (deteriorates) the terms
of trade around the world in almost all possible scenarios – analogous to the stylised facts
established in Boz et al. (2017). But the value-added from conducting this exercise is that
it shows how important price stickiness is in terms of explaining the qualitative finding of
global trade flow intensification (abatement) due to a weakening (strengthening) of the USD.
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For instance, the US-JP terms of trade response in the sticky price scenario is warped in
that it statistically lies in-between the flexible and the rigid price setting scenarios (see table
5.4, panel (ii), first row). On the other hand, KR-JP terms of trade elasticity is practically
identical to the hypothetical case of perfect price flexibility, indicating that nominal rigidities
conditional on all other properties play very little role (see table 5.4, panel (ii), second row).
By contrast, the US-KR terms of trade elasticity is very close to unity – a lot like when
prices are perfectly rigid – inducing an average of 12% stronger terms of trade response to
USD movements than in the case of perfect price flexibility (see table 5.4, panel (iii), first
row). Similarly, the JP-KR terms of trade elasticity is around 50% lower when compared
to the case of perfect price flexibility, but not significantly different from the perfectly rigid
price scenario (see table 5.4, panel (iii), second row). However, in the US, the terms of trade
are almost entirely neutral to exchange rate movements regardless of the extent of nominal
rigidity, primarily because JP and KR both choose USD as their invoicing currency when
exporting goods to the US (see table 5.4, panel (i), first and second rows).
As discussed in section 4.2.2, the patterns of the rest-of-the-world comparative advantage
following USD innovations can be deduced by comparing the terms of trade elasticities against
one another. For instance, τˆkij − τˆkji = −0.14 < 0, where j stands for JP and i denotes
KR. Because this difference is negative, it means that the KR-JP terms of trade improve
by more than the JP-KR, thereby boosting the bilateral competitiveness of the KR exports
into JP by more than the other way around. In the end, although both economies gain a
comparative advantage against the major economy whenever USD weakens, such that τˆkjk −
τˆkkj = 0.65 > 0 and τˆ
k
ik− τˆkki = 0.95 > 0, KR further develops a trade surplus vis-à-vis JP. The
movements in the USD therefore generate global trade imbalances, the patterns of which can
be systematically predicted using a multi-country model with sticky prices such as the one
presented in this chapter. The patterns of trade imbalances could also be naïvely proxied by
invoicing shares as described in lemmas 4 – 10. But some questions following that approach
always remain, namely ‘how sticky are international prices’ and ‘which shares matter more:
USD exports or USD imports?’ Fitting a rich multi-country business cycle model to the data
on international prices and exchange rates and using the simulated measures of the terms of
trade elasticities presented in this chapter is one way to answer these questions pragmatically
and in relative terms without having to impose value judgements onto the data.
How random are the fluctuations in the terms of trade elasticity? Are there any distinct
patterns of co-movement with the macroeconomic fundamentals? The main novelty of the
model-implied terms of trade elasticities is that they can be used as a ‘rule of thumb’ for
testing non-linearities in the terms of trade channel by checking their correlation with a
number of endogenous variables. In other words, we can analyse the causal effect without
averaging across all innovations and instead exploring how the causal effect co-moves with
the macroeconomic fundamentals conditional on all innovations simultaneously. Although
there are a myriad of possibilities, one of the most obvious candidates is the exchange rate
against the USD itself, since it reveals whether there are any state-dependence patterns in
the transmission of exchange rate innovations. Yet before jumping to policy implications, the
reader ought to be cautioned that the model presented in this chapter is linearised around
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Table 5.5: Co-Movement of the Terms of Trade Elasticity and the U.S. Dollar
aaaaa
n k (i) United States
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
corr.(q˙nk, limζ→∞ τknk) corr.(q˙nk, τ
k
nk) corr.(q˙nk, limκ→∞ τ
k
nk)
η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10
Japan – – – 0.46 0.5 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.59
South Korea – – – -0.22 -0.4 -0.42 0.52 0.58 0.56
aaaaa
n j (ii) Japan
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
corr.(q˙kj , limζ→∞ τknj) corr.(q˙kj , τ
k
nj) corr.(q˙kj , limκ→∞ τ
k
nj)
η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10
United States -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.20
South Korea -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.19
aaaaa
n i (iii) South Korea
(a) Flexible Prices (b) Sticky Prices (c) Rigid Prices
corr.(q˙ki, limζ→∞ τkni) corr.(q˙ki, τ
k
ni) corr.(q˙ki, limκ→∞ τ
k
ni)
η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10 η = 1.1 η = 5 η = 10
United States 0.03 0.01 > 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.15
Japan 0.03 0.01 > 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08
All numbers in bold are conditional on a single set of GMM parameter estimates, while the remaining estimates are
obtained by changing the value of intra-temporal elasticity of substitution η. Transitions between the states of perfect
price flexibility or rigidity are hypothetical as shown in lemmas 4 – 10.
the balanced growth path, but in principal the co-movement patterns could also depend on
the order of the perturbation. This means that higher order perturbations can lead to a non-
monotonic relationship between the terms of trade elasticity and the major exchange rate,
something that is not explored in due diligence in this chapter. More importantly, if the
terms of trade elasticities reveal strong state-dependent tendencies, then at the same time it
means that another, and indeed unobserved, channel must completely undo these effects at
the aggregate level within the confines of the model for the system of difference equations
is ultimately linear. It therefore speaks volumes to the literature on time-varying exchange
rate pass-through – state-dependence at the disaggregated level does not always translate into
time-varying transmission at the aggregate level. Because the model is not subject to any
explicit forms of non-linearities, such as the zero lower-bound of the nominal interest rate
or the downward rigidity of wages for example, all state-dependence patterns are essentially
attributable to strategic complementarities of the firms. This is because the terms of trade
elasticities are strongly correlated to the shares of invoicing currency (see lemmas 4 – 10),
which in turn depend on relative prices of the underlying varieties that are optimally set by
exporters who take their sectoral prices into the account.
Table 5.5 presents the unconditional correlations between the terms of trade elasticities
and the value of the local currency relative to the USD, except for the US, where the exchange
rate is bilateral as per usual. As expected, when the intra-temporal elasticity η is close to
unity, the bilateral JPY/SKW exchange rate is mostly orthogonal to the terms of trade
elasticities with respect to major currency innovations. This is because the price mark-ups
are close to their theoretical maximum as shown in equation (4.15). When η → 10, the price
89
mark-ups decline and become time-invariant, since ζ = 10 in columns (b) and (c) of table 5.5,
which seems to increase the correlation between the bilateral JPW/SKW exchange rate and
the terms of trade elasticity. In general, there appears to be a positive relationship between
the unconditional correlations and nominal rigidity for a given value of η, but it tends to
subside as η rises, except in the case of the US. Hence, when prices are flexible, the terms
of trade elasticity in minor economies is mostly unrelated to the exchange rate, because it is
mostly driven by the market share of the DCP exports, whose unit costs are orthogonal to the
movements in the USD by construction (see lemma 5). But when prices become increasingly
rigid, the terms of trade elasticity becomes increasingly positively correlated to the exchange
rate, because it closely follows the dynamics of the DCP import market share (see lemma 9).
It is paramount to integrate the forces of strategic complementarities at this point, since USD
depreciation (appreciation) implies a decrease (increase) in the price of DCP imports, thereby
crowding out (in) PCP and LCP imports and leading to a rise (fall) in the DCP market
share. Because the market share of DCP imports is endogenous to the USD movements, their
positive unconditional correlation reveals an unprecedented new mechanism associated with
the terms of trade channel. Specifically, a USD depreciation on average leads to a greater
improvement in the rest-of-the-world terms of trade than an equally large appreciation causes
them to deteriorate.
The second-order findings may initially seem to suggest redefining the notion of dynamic
comparative advantage altogether. On the one hand, US insulates itself from external shocks
by exercising hegemonic power over the global flows of its currency. On the other hand, it
comes at the expense of a decline in the US export competitiveness over time. Hence, the US
terms of trade are virtually neutral to movements in the USD, but the terms of trade of JP and
KR against the US are correlated with the USD, such that the US experiences a perpetually
increasing current account deficit even if exchange rate changes are distributed normally. It
strongly reinforces the findings of Bernanke (2005) for the US data since the 1980s. And yet
a closer look at the estimates of the terms of trade elasticity suggests that their volatility is
not high enough and the unconditional correlation is not strong enough to warrant abrupt
shifts in the U.S. trade policy. That said, although pricing-to-market on its own may not be
responsible for the non-linear transmission of exchange rate shocks, it nevertheless reveals the
potential to amplify them if they were incorporated into the model explicitly.
To summarise, (i) US terms of trade are effectively neutral to the USD innovations; (ii)
USD depreciations improve the rest-of-the-world terms of trade by more than USD apprecia-
tions cause them to deteriorate; (iii) sticky prices can either significantly increase or decrease
the magnitude of the terms of trade elasticity to major currency innovations, depending on
the shares of imports and exports invoiced in USD; and (iv) pricing-to-market alone does not
automatically lend itself to non-linear exchange rate pass-through, but it could potentially
amplify the non-monotonicity of the exchange rate channel.
5.3.2 Granularity
To what extent are the estimated terms of trade elasticities to USD innovations driven by
the market shares as opposed to other properties of the model? If prices were either perfectly
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flexible or perfectly rigid, then predicting exchange rate pass-through across different sectors
is relatively straight-forward as shown in lemmas 4 – 10. However, when the actual transition
of prices from vintages to the inter-temporal optimum is gradual, the magnitude of sectoral
pass-through could in principal move away from the neighbourhood of zero or unity, leading
to partial transmission even in the long-run, thereby diminishing the important role played
by the market shares encapsulated by other corner solutions. For this reason, the discussion
now turns to the granularity of the exchange rate channel, which refers to the dispersion of
exchange rate pass-through across sectors and across countries.
The average causal effect of exchange rates on prices from the upstream to the downstream
level are presented in table 5.6, which are computed using the micro-founded measurement
described in section 4.2. The table is split into two panels – one for measuring the causal effect
due to major currency innovations and the other for the minor currency innovations. Consider
the first panel, where the inter-sectoral causal effects are shown in the first three lines. They
all depend on the pricing strategy and an indicator specifying whether the country is the
source or the destination for each country pair. As expected, the exchange rate pass-through
into the export and import prices of DCP firms for any country or the US firms does not
move away from from the neighbourhoods of zero or unity. The most significant movements
of exchange rate pass-through away from zero are in the PCP sector of JP, transmitting 13%
of major currency innovations into import and export prices, as well as the LCP sector of KR,
which transmits around 7-8% of major currency innovations into export and import prices in
KR and JP respectively. The magnitude of exchange rate pass-through for all other sectors is
very close to either zero or unity. Consequently, import and export prices aggregated across
sectors indeed mostly depend on the market shares pertaining to each sector (see tables 5.1
and 5.2 for comparison purposes). In particular, exchange rate pass-through into export prices
in all countries is less than 6% in spite of the pronounced openness to intermediate imports.
It is worth re-emphasising that this finding is attributable to a large estimated value of the
convexity of price adjustment costs displayed in table 5.2. By contrast, import prices are
more responsive to major currency innovations in minor economies – they absorb 72% (55%)
of USD movements in JP from US (KR) and 98% (37%) of USD movements in KR from US
(JP). In order to grasp the effective exchange rate pass-through into import prices, the table
also provides a trade-weighted average of the causal effects. In both JP and KR, the effective
exchange rate pass-through is around 65%. On the other hand, both import and export prices
in the US are practically neutral to the USD innovations, because most final and intermediate
imports are invoiced in USD.
Consistent with the stylised facts presented in Boz et al. (2017), the difference between
the major and minor ‘own’ exchange rate pass-through is very low, but positive, indicating
that major currency innovations dominate the minor currency innovations. Hence, minor
‘own’ depreciations imply a depreciation against all other major and minor currency areas,
therefore leading to considerably greater exchange rate pass-through into effective import
prices by definition. When it comes to exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices,
it is computed as a weighted average of pass-through into export and import prices, where
the weights are the home-bias and the import penetration ratio respectively (see lemma 7).
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Table 5.6: Granularity of Exchange Rate Pass-Through
(i) Major Exchange Rate Innovations
aaaaaaaaa
Source
Destination
US JP KR
PCP LCP DCP PCP LCP DCP PCP LCP DCP
US 0.00 0.00 - 1.00 0.00 - 1.000 0.000 -
Inter-Sectoral Prices JP 0.13 0.02 > 0.01 0.13 0.03 > 0.01 0.13 0.03 < 1.00
KR 0.02 0.02 > 0.01 0.02 0.08 < 1.000 0.02 0.07 > 0.01
US JP KR
US 0.00 0.72 0.98
Import & Export Prices JP 0.02 0.06 0.37
KR 0.02 0.55 0.01
US JP KR
Effective Import Prices 0.02 0.68 0.64
US JP KR
Consumer Prices 0.002 0.06 0.12
(ii) Minor ‘Own’ Exchange Rate Innovations
aaaaaaaaa
Source
Destination
JP KR
PCP LCP DCP PCP LCP DCP
US 1.00 0.00 - 1.00 0.00 -
Inter-Sectoral Prices JP 0.13 0.00 > 0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00
KR 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 > 0.01
JP KR
US 0.72 0.98
Import & Export Prices JP 0.06 0.97
KR 0.92 0.01
JP KR
Effective Import Prices 0.77 0.98
JP KR
Consumer Prices 0.07 0.19
The (inverted) cross ( ) next to the point estimate indicates that it is not different from the upper (lower) bound
at a 5% level of significance. The inequality operators indicate numbers that are beyond the third decimal point, but
nevertheless statistically different from zero or unity.
Exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices is significantly different from zero and unity
for all countries – a case commonly referred to as ‘incompleteness’. This is because only a
relatively small proportion of final goods are imported from abroad, while the majority of the
consumer goods are produced domestically, priced at the factory door, and largely bundled
with non-tradable services, thereby insulating consumer price inflation from exchange rate
innovations. Notice that higher major exchange rate pass-through into effective import prices
in JP compared to KR does not imply higher pass-through into consumer prices, since KR is
relatively more open to trade in final goods and services compared to JP. Although the most
open economy KR in relative terms exhibits the highest pass-through into consumer prices
(i.e. 12% in response to SKW/USD movements), it is still far less volatile than the nominal
exchange rate, thereby invalidating the classical Purchasing Power Parity hypothesis.
Ultimately, a compressed US-JP-KR environment portrayed in this chapter predicts that
USD depreciations are expansionary in both KR and JP, but more so in KR. To put this into
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a broader perspective, a USD depreciation not only implies downward pressure on consumer
prices in both KR and JP, but also an increase in their trade balance against the major
economy. In the familiar two-dimensional space of CPI and real output, it is analogous to a
rightward shift in both the aggregate supply and demand, where the supply shift outweighs
the demand shift leading to consumer price deflation. The expansionary effect is stronger
(weaker) in KR (JP), since it also gains (loses) comparative advantage against JP (KR). On
the other hand, the US remains mostly unaffected by USD innovations, closely approximating
the analytical construct of a closed economy.
In summary, (i) major currency innovations lead to greater exchange rate pass-through
than minor currency innovations; (ii) import prices are more responsive to exchange rate
changes than export prices; (iii) exchange rate pass-through into import prices is determined
primarily by the market shares of exporters choosing heterogeneous invoicing currencies; and
(iv) consumer prices are positively related, but much less responsive to exchange rates than
effective import prices.
5.4 Dynamic Causal Effect
What is the causal effect of exchange rates on the terms of trade over time? Is the tran-
sition path monotonic or rather subject to J-curve effects? There are two ways to answer
these questions. In the first instance, we could generate the impulse response functions to
the inflation rates of international prices and first-order differenced exchange rates, find their
cumulative sums, and compute the ratio between the two as suggested by Shambaugh (2008).
The aforementioned agnostic measurement of exchange rate pass-through is, however, subject
to at least two concerning limitations. Firstly, it is always conditional on observing a certain
state of the economy, which does not bear a meaningful long-run counterpart, since all impulse
response functions of saddle-path stable systems of difference equations are by default con-
verging to zero as time goes to infinity. Second, and more importantly, all impulse response
functions of endogenous variables at the aggregate level are driven by multiple state variables
that may be irrelevant for the optimal price setting decision of the exporters, since they do
not exert enough market power to influence their developments. Using the reduced-form mea-
surement of exchange rate pass-through can therefore provide misleading policy implications
about the magnitude of exchange rate transmission, since the dynamics of exchange rates
and international prices at the aggregate level are tainted by indirect co-movements with a
multitude of other macroeconomic fundamentals.
This chapter proposes a viable alternative that abstracts from the irrelevant aggregate
co-movements from the perspective of individual exporters and instead allows exchange rate
pass-through to respond endogenously to innovations through a limited subset of state-space
captured in lemma 8. At each point in time, there is a tight compromise between eco-
nomic structure, captured by the steady state of each endogenous variable, and the pattern of
shock-dependence, encompassing intrinsic uncertainty about the aggregate state. Their rela-
tive importance has already been articulated by Forbes et al. (2017), but unlike their SVAR
approach, this chapter adopts the view that both elements are ex ante equally important and
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in principal do not supersede one another even in the short-run.3 This line of reasoning can be
challenged by pointing out that what ultimately matters is indeed the aggregate co-movement
of exchange rates and international prices, since that is explicitly observed and targeted by
monetary authorities all around the world. But the response to this criticism is simple –
all structural models, regardless of their scale, are subject to model-specific nuances, such as
the ‘true, but unknown’ identification of macroeconomic innovations in SVARs or the way in
which the model is closed in a general equilibrium environment. No matter how sophisticated
is the system of difference equations characterising the dynamics of the macroeconomic funda-
mentals, the reduced-form measurement of pass-through is almost surely susceptible to model
misspecification and measurement errors. Although the approach presented in this chapter is
not immune to these criticisms in the short-run, it is nevertheless consistent in the long-run
as long as the system of difference equations is saddle-path stable and all innovations are
Gaussian. This is because observable elements of the economic structure, such as the shares
of invoicing currencies for imports or exports, pin down the magnitude of the terms of trade
elasticity in the long-run steady state when the transitory innovations fade away (see lemmas
4 – 10).
Figure 5.1 displays the dynamic causal effect of exchange rate noise on international prices
as well as the auxiliary endogenous variables underlying the channel of exchange rate trans-
mission. Each impulse response represents a real depreciation of JPY or SKW against the
USD equal to one standard deviation. The focus here is on JP and KR, since US prices
have already been shown to be disconnected from exchange rates. First, a local currency
depreciation in real terms shows up as a rise in the value of the real bilateral exchange rate
(subplot (6)), which leads to an increase in the price of domestically produced and imported
final goods (subplots (4) and (3) respectively) due to an increase in the price of commodities
priced in USD. It also renders domestic currency less valuable abroad, thus all imports not
priced in domestic currency units exhibit a currency conversion effect (i.e. greater rise in the
price of imports than exports). In turn, local currency depreciation creates upward pressure
on consumer price inflation and a temporary decline in the aggregate consumption growth in
real terms (subplots (2) and (1) respectively).
Second, according to lemma 8, transitory exchange rate innovations ought to shift the
magnitude of exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices in the short-run.
Indeed, exchange rate pass-through into export prices rises, but only by around 0.1% in
JP (0.03% in KR) and it rapidly converges to the magnitude of the steady state, since the
objective function of the firms incentivises smoothing out the present value of discounted
future profits (see subplot (9)). To elaborate, ceteris paribus, q˙ki,t > 1 leads to p˙ii,t(φ) >
3Unlike SVARs, where truly exogenous exchange rate shocks are unobserved, such as the external in-
struments advocated by Stock & Watson (2018)), business cycle models can single-out innovations without
resorting to ad hoc internal instruments such as a Cholesky decomposition. The premise of exogeneity is
the assumption that the variance-covariance matrix of innovations is diagonal. The first order conditions
summarising the inter-temporal motion of the equilibria are then transformed into policy functions as in
Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2004), which expresses each control variable at any given point in time as a function
of (pre-determined) state variables and exogenous innovations, thereby providing credible identification re-
strictions. Each synthetic data point represents a random and independent draw of shocks from their normal
distributions simultaneously. Similarly, each impulse response function is generated by drawing an innovation
of a given magnitude independently of other innovations and tracing out the ensuing transition path.
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1∀φ. The extent to which it does depends on the size of the innovation and the relative
importance of price stickiness compared to strategic complementarity. A rise in export prices
generally implies a decrease in Ξii,t(φ) ∀φ, because exporters must re-label the price tags of
their products, thereby internalising the price adjustment costs. In turn, the magnitude of
Γii,∆,t(φ) ∀φ decreases, which implies a rise in erptkii,t(φ) ∀φ (see subplots (10)-(12), (14)-(16),
(18)-(20)). Although the nominal rigidity component of DCP firms domiciled in KR suggests
exchange rate pass-through ought to increase in the short-run as it does in other sectors,
strong strategic complementarities due to a large DCP market share (i.e. 85% as shown in
table 5.1) completely undo those effects leading to practically time-invariant exchange rate
pass-through into export prices that is in the neighbourhood of zero as shown in table 5.6 (see
subplots (19) and (20)).
Conversely, exchange rate pass-through into JP (KR) import prices from KR (JP) falls
by around 0.6% (0.05%) as is seen subplot (13), which closely follows the trajectory of the
USD invoicing share (subplot (26)). Hence, a local currency depreciation against the USD
induces an income and a substitution effect, whereby fewer goods can be purchased in USD
for a given budget without excessive borrowing, thus consumers substitute imports invoiced
in USD and domestically produced goods with imports priced in local currency units (see
subplots (24)-(26)). Similarly, pass-through into import prices from the US falls in both JP
and KR, because USD depreciation implies a fall in the share of US imports priced in USD
and the exact opposite rise in the share of US imports priced in local currency units (subplots
(27) and (28)). Because the fall in exchange rate pass-through from other minor and major
currency areas is considerably larger than the rise in export prices, at least in JP, the pass-
through into aggregate consumer prices falls (subplot (5)). A local currency depreciation is
therefore less inflationary at the consumer level than an identical appreciation is deflationary.
This is because local currency depreciations lead to a fall in the amount of imported goods and
an endogenous rise in the home-bias of consumption, such that pass-through into consumer
prices is pro-cyclical when subject to domestic currency innovations.
The net causal effect of exchange rates on the prices of imports and exports constitutes
the terms of trade transmission channel. Consistent with the volatility of the terms of trade
elasticities shown in table 5.5, they are more responsive in JP than KR (see subplots (7)
and (8)). In fact, the terms of trade elasticity in KR is mostly constant and equal to the
steady state throughout the projected horizon. It does not imply that exchange rates exert
no influence on the terms of trade. It simply reflects the large share of USD imports in KR,
which enhances the average causal effect and diminishes the dynamic causal effect.
What is the relative importance of sticky prices and strategic complementarities? Figures
5.2 present the dynamic causal effects generated by setting the convexity of price adjustment
costs for all firms in all countries to zero while keeping all other estimates at their default
values. Although price stickiness exerts important implications for the average causal effect, it
appears that the impulse response functions of exchange rate pass-through into import prices
remain practically unchanged upon impact, but notably the transition path is somewhat less
persistent. The main difference appears to be the change in the sign of the exchange rate pass-
through into export prices. Hence, when prices are perfectly flexible, even if wage stickiness
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic Causal Effect When Prices Are Sticky
Each subplot depicts the dynamic causal effect on a given variable due to a one-off unanticipated exogenous
innovation at time t = 0 equal to one standard deviation in magnitude. The horizontal axis measures time in
monthly intervals, while the vertical axis measures the absolute change in the variable over time.
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Figure 5.2: Dynamic Causal Effect When Prices Are Flexible
Each subplot depicts the dynamic causal effect on a given variable due to a one-off unanticipated exogenous
innovation at time t = 0 equal to one standard deviation in magnitude. The horizontal axis measures time in
monthly intervals, while the vertical axis measures the absolute change in the variable over time.
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spills over into price stickiness, strategic complementarity of PCP and LCP exporters with the
DCP exporters leads to a decline in exchange rate pass-through into export prices. Because
DCP export unit costs are orthogonal to the fluctuations of home currency against the USD,
but PCP and LCP firms exhibit strong cost-push effects, they optimally choose to reflect
some of the exchange rate innovations as indicated by a positive average causal effect in
table 5.6. But the dynamic causal effect of exchange rates on export prices is pro-cyclical
(counter-cyclical) when they are flexible (sticky).
To sum up, (i) dynamic causal effect of exchange rates on the terms of trade is quanti-
tatively dominated by the average causal effect; (ii) dynamic causal effect of exchange rates
on export prices is pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) when they are flexible (sticky); and (iii)
exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices is small, but positive and pro-cyclical.
5.5 Summary of Empirical Results
One may be inclined to dismiss some of the seemingly subtle differences between the US-
JP-KR model presented in this thesis and a number of other open economy models as mere
‘bells and whistles’. After all, the ‘impossible trinity’ articulated by the Mundell-Fleming
paradigm still holds and the nexus of the design associated with the monetary policy conduct
remains unchanged in large economies, such as the United States. But this chapter bears
important implications for the literature on the international monetary system. The core
of the US-JP-KR model expands the blueprint of the Dominant Currency Paradigm (DCP)
in multiple dimensions and uncovers a myriad of new insights about the effectiveness of
monetary policy in open economies characterised by the globalised export market structure.
The most noteworthy qualitative and quantitative predictions presented in this chapter can
be summarised as follows: (i) US terms of trade are effectively neutral to movements of the
USD; (ii) USD depreciations improve the rest-of-the-world terms of trade by more than USD
appreciations cause them to deteriorate; (iii) sticky prices can either significantly increase
or decrease the magnitude of the terms of trade elasticity to major currency innovations,
depending on the shares of imports and exports invoiced in USD; (iv) pricing-to-market alone
does not automatically lead to non-linear exchange rate pass-through, but it could potentially
amplify the non-monotonicity of the exchange rate channel; (v) dynamic causal effect of
exchange rates on the terms of trade is quantitatively dominated by the average causal effect;
and (vi) dynamic causal effect of exchange rates on export prices is pro-cyclical (counter-
cyclical) when they are flexible (sticky).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
After all that is said and done, there remains a stark incongruity between the US-UK and the
US-JP-KR models. On the one hand, when the multi-country model is linearised around the
balanced growth path, the US terms of trade are virtually neutral to exchange rate movements.
On the other hand, when international price inflation is subject to non-trivial higher order
moments, the US terms of trade elasticity exhibits excessively strong negative correlation with
the exchange rate. One thing is for certain, this discrepancy is unrelated to the properties
of the exchange rate noise, because both models are remarkably successful in terms of char-
acterising the volatility and the persistence of the real exchange rate dynamics. Indeed, the
dynamic causal effect is quantitatively negligible in the linearised model, while the non-linear
model exhibits substantial non-monotonicities, but only when exchange rate innovations are
sufficiently large. Although the analysis of downward price rigidities combined with strategic
complementarities is not carried out explicitly in this thesis, the results suggest that it has
the potential to enlarge the size and the persistence of exchange rate pass-through asymmetry
even further. It is also explicitly assumed that US monetary authorities do not exacerbate the
non-linearities with overly hawkish or dovish responses when USD fluctuates, but that may
well be the case in practice. Still, much of the skewness in international prices has largely
subdued in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, which has lead to almost a decade of
persistently low rate of inflation. As a result, the selection effect that is chiefly responsible
for the predicted non-linearities is mostly dampened in spite of the multiple rounds of un-
conventional monetary policy measures implemented in many major currency areas around
the world. Only time will tell if previously observed large swings in exchange rates are able
to shift inflation expectations across distinct states in the future. Until then, it seems that
among many other things – ‘money’ cannot buy US export competitiveness.
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Appendix A
A.1 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Consider the symmetric equilibrium price setting condition for the φ-type firm:
pin,t(φ) = τinqin,tδin,t(φ)pii,t(φ).
Differentiate both sides with respect to the real exchange rate qin,t and rearrange:
∂pin,t(φ)
∂qin,t
= τin
[
δin,t(φ)pii,t(φ) + qin,tδin,t(φ)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qin,t
+ qin,tpii,t(φ)
∂δin,t(φ)
∂qin,t
]
,
∂pin,t(φ)
∂qin,t
qin,t
pin,t(φ)
=
τinδin,t(φ)qin,tpii,t(φ)
pin,t(φ)
[
1− ∂pii,t(φ)
∂qni,t
qni,t
pii,t(φ)
− ∂δin,t(φ)
∂qni,t
qni,t
δin,t(φ)
]
,
∂ ln pin,t(φ)
∂ ln qin,t
= 1− ∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
− ∂ ln δin,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
,
erptin,t(φ) = 1− erptii,t(φ)− ptmin,t(φ), (A.1)
since
qni,t = q
−1
in,t, (A.2)
∂ ln qin,t
∂ ln qni,t
= − 1. (A.3)
By construction, the product market of PCP exports is perfectly integrated such that δin,t(pi) =
1 and ptmin,t(pi) = 0. As a result, pass-through into PCP import prices is inversely related
to pass-through into PCP export prices:
erptin,t(pi) = 1− erptii,t(pi). (A.4)
Conversely, LCP product market is imperfectly integrated such that ptmin,t(pi) 6= 0 and
determined as the wedge between price changes and exchange rate volatility:
ptmin,t(φ) = 1− erptii,t(φ)− erptin,t(φ). (A.5)
Next, recall that the aggregate import price index in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)pin,t(φ)
1−ε
1/(1−ε) .
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The exchange rate pass-through into aggregate import prices is therefore obtained as a
weighted average of pass-through into each φ-type import prices:
erptin,t =
∂ ln pin,t
∂ ln qin,t
=
∑
φ
χin(φ)
[
pin,t(φ)
pin,t
]1−ε
erptin,t(φ) =
∑
φ
sin(φ)erptin,t(φ). (A.6)
Similarly, the consumer price index is given by
pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi 1
1− αi
(
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
) 1
1−η
1−αi .
Exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices is therefore obtained using the producer and
consumer price index identities:
erpti,t =
∂ ln pi,t
∂ ln qni,t
= (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
αni
(
pni,t
pi,x,t
)1−η
erptni,t = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terptni,t. (A.7)
It follows that if erptin,t(φ) is known, then exchange rate pass-through into all prices can be
determined endogenously. Consider the optimal real export price:
pii,t(φ) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
.
Exchange rate pass-through into i’th economy export prices is derived by differentiating the
above with respect to the real exchange rate using the quotient rule:
erptii,t(φ) =
∂ lnmcii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
− ∂ ln Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
. (A.8)
Without loss of generality it is assumed that Qii,t(φ) = min {qni,t; n = 1, . . . , N} = qni,t, such
that
mcii,t(φ) =
ξiqni,t
zi,t
,
thus
∂ lnmcii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
= 1. (A.9)
The auxiliary price setting variable is given by
Φii,t(φ) = 1−∆ii,t(φ) +
∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1
]
.
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Differentiating the above with respect to the real exchange rate gives:
∂ ln Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
= −∆
′
ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
+
1
Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1)
[
∆′′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
2∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
+ ∆′ii,t(φ)qni,t
∂p˙ii,t(φ)
∂qni,t
]
− λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′′ii,t+1(φ)p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1)
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qni,t
]
− λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
2∆′ii,t+1(φ)p˙ii,t+1(φ)qni,t
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1)
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qni,t
]
+ λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1)
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
]
,
=
p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1
erptii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− ε)∆′ii,t(φ)
]
+ Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
ri,t(ε− 1)
erptii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
(
p˙ii,t+1(φ)∆
′′
ii,t+1(φ) + (2− ε)∆′ii,t+1(φ)
)]
,
= erptii,t(φ)
{
Ξii,t(φ) + Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
ri,t
]}
,
= erptii,t(φ)Γii,t(φ), (A.10)
where
Γii,t(φ) = Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
]
, (A.11)
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− ε)∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1) , (A.12)
∂p˙ii,t(φ)
∂qni,t
=
p˙ii,t(φ)
pii,t(φ)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qni,t
=
erptii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
qni,t
, (A.13)
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qni,t
= − p˙ii,t+1(φ)
pii,t(φ)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qni,t
= −erptii,t(φ)p˙ii,t+1(φ)
qni,t
, (A.14)
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
=
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qni,t
= −ε erptii,t(φ). (A.15)
Substituting equation (A.10) and (A.9) into (A.8) and solving for erptii,t(φ) gives
erptii,t(φ) =
1
1 + Γii,t(φ)
. (A.16)
It follows from equation (A.4) that exchange rate pass-through into PCP import prices is
given by
erptin,t(pi) = 1− erptii,t(pi) = Γii,t(pi)
1 + Γii,t(pi)
. (A.17)
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Because the first order condition for LCP import prices is analogous to LCP export prices,
the pass-through into LCP import prices is analogous to LCP export prices:
erptin,t(−pi) = 1
1 + Γin,t(−pi) . (A.18)
Notably, equation (A.18) assumes that Qin,t(φ) = min {qin,t; n = 1, . . . , N} = qin,t, such that
mcin,t(φ) =
ξiqin,t
zi,t
,
thus
∂ lnmcin,t(φ)
∂ ln qin,t
= 1. (A.19)
Substituting the above results into equation (A.6) gives the final expression for exchange rate
pass-through into aggregate import prices:
erptin,t = sin,t(−pi)erptin,t(−pi) + sin,t(pi)erptin,t(pi),
=
sin,t(−pi)
1 + Γin,t(−pi) +
sin,t(pi)Γii,t(pi)
1 + Γii,t(pi)
. (A.20)
Note that if the assumption of monopolistic competition is maintained throughout the deriva-
tions, such that each individual firm is too ‘small’ to influence the aggregate variables, then
it makes no quantitative difference whether exchange rate pass-through is derived in nominal
terms or real terms. However, it is more convenient to showcase the results in real terms,
since the model is solved for a general case in which price levels are indeterminate due to the
deterministic trend of inflation pursued by the central banks. Moreover, all innovations in
this model are generated in a perfectly unanticipated manner. Therefore, the derivations of
exchange rate pass-through presented above treat all forward-looking variables as orthogonal
to contemporaneous exchange rate movements.
A.2 Production Technology
Import-export wholesalers solve the following real cost minimisation problem:
min
{yin,t(ω,φ)}
tcij,t(ω, φ) = Qin,t(φ)min,t(ω, φ) =
ξiQin,t(φ)yin,t(ω, φ)
zi,t
, (A.21)
where the first-order condition is simply given by
∂tcin,t(ω)
∂yin,t(ω)
= mcin,t(φ) =
ξiQin,t(φ)
zi,t
, (A.22)
where
Qin,t(pi) = min {qni,t;n = 1, 2, ..., N} , Qin,t(−pi) = min {qjn,t; j = 1, 2, ..., N} . (A.23)
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The next step along the pricing chain is the relationship between the wholesale sector and
the distributors. The demand facing the upstream wholesalers from the distribution sector
is derived from the profit maximisation problem of the competitive collectors, who aggregate
individual varieties of goods into country-specific bundles:
max
{yin,t(φ)}
pin,tyin,t −
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)yin,t(ω, φ)dω
s.t. yin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)
1−1/εdω

1/(1−1/ε)
,
which gives rise to the following first order condition:
yin,t(ω, φ) = yin,t
[
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
]−ε
. (A.24)
The aggregate demand for the φ-type imports from location i to n is then given by
yin,t(φ) =
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)dω = χin(φ)yin,t
[
pin,t(φ)
pin,t
]−ε
(A.25)
The aggregate upstream price index is derived by substituting the above first order condition
into the budget constraint of the collector, which gives rise to the following expression:
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)
1−εdω

1/(1−ε)
, (A.26)
or, alternatively, in the symmetric equilibrium it is equivalent to
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)pin,t(φ)
1−ε
1/(1−ε) . (A.27)
The optimal demand for locally-produced and imported goods are derived from the second
stage of aggregation:
max
{yni,t}
pi,x,txi,t −
N∑
n=1
pni,tyni,t, s.t. xi,t =
(
N∑
n=1
α
1/η
ni y
1−1/η
ni,t
)1/(1−1/η)
,
The first order condition is given by
yni,t = αnixi,t
[
pni,t
pi,x,t
]−η
, (A.28)
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The aggregate producer price index is derived by substituting the above first order condition
into the budget constraint of the distributor, which gives rise to the following expression:
pi,x,t =
(
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
)1/(1−η)
. (A.29)
Finally, the competitive retailer maximises profits subject to the Cobb-Douglas production
technology characterising the downstream market:
max
{hi,t,xi,t}
pi,tci,t − wi,thi,t − pi,x,txi,t, s.t. ci,t = (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t .
The cost minimisation problem is formulated as a static Lagrangian:
L = pi,tci,t − wi,thi,t − pi,x,txi,t − oi,t
(
yi,t − (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t
)
, (A.30)
where the first order conditions are given by
pi,x,t − (1− αi)oi,t
(
ci,t
xi,t
)
= 0, (A.31)
wi,t − αioi,t
(
ci,t
hi,t
)
= 0, (A.32)
ci,t − (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t = 0. (A.33)
It can be shown that the shadow price of technology oi,t corresponds to the consumer price
index. In order to find the functional form of the retail price index, consider the unconditional
demand schedule for each of the factor inputs. They are obtained by firstly dividing the top
two first order conditions one by the other:
hi,t
xi,t
=
αi
1− αi
pi,x,t
wi,t
, (A.34)
and then substitute the above schedule for tradable goods bundle and labour, each in turn,
into the technological constraint:
xi,t = ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)−αi
, (A.35)
hi,t = ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
1− αi
)1−αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)αi−1
. (A.36)
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Then substitute the unconditional demand schedules into the expression for the total effective
real costs of production to obtain
tci,t =wi,thi,t + pi,x,txi,t = (αi + 1− αi)oi,tci,t = oi,tci,t
= ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
, (A.37)
∂tci,t
∂ci,t
= pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
. (A.38)
Therefore, the first order conditions can be written as
pi,x,txi,t = (1− αi)pi,tci,t,
wi,thi,t =αipi,tci,t.
A.3 Price Stickiness
The optimal price that the ω wholesaler decides to set is derived by maximising the present
discounted value of the real profits subject to a sequence of demand schedules:
max
{Pii,t(ω,φ)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,t,t+1
{
N∑
n=1
[(1−∆ii,t (ω, φ)) pii,t(ω, φ)−mcii,t(φ)] yii,t(ω, φ)
}
s.t. yii,t(ω, φ) = yii,t
[
pii,t(ω, φ)
pii,t
]−ε
,
The first-order condition is obtained using the product rule:
(1−∆ii,t(φ))(1− ε)
(
yii,t(ω, φ)
Pi,t
)
+ εmcii,t(φ)
(
yii,t(ω, φ)
Pii,t(ω, φ)
)
,
−∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(ω, φ)
(
yii,t(ω, φ)
Pi,t
)
+ Et
[
λi,t,t+1∆
′
ii,t+1(φ)p˙ii,t+1(ω, φ)
2
(
yii,t+1(ω, φ)
Pi,t+1
)]
= 0.
Alternatively
(1−∆ii,t(φ))pii,t(ω, φ)−
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(φ),
+
(
∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(ω, φ)
ε− 1
)
pii,t(ω, φ)− Et
[
yii,t+1(ω, φ)
yii,t(ω, φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(ω, φ)
2
ri,t
]
pii,t(ω, φ) = 0,
where p˙ii,t(ω, φ) = p˙i,tpii,t(ω, φ)/pii,t−1(ω, φ). Then note that linear production technol-
ogy and homogenous productivity implies pii,t(ω, φ) = Pii,t(ω, φ)/Pi,t = Pii,t(φ)/Pi,t ⇒
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yii,t(ω, φ) = yii,t(φ), therefore
pii,t(φ) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
, (A.39)
Φii,t(φ) = 1−∆ii,t(φ) +
∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1
]
.
(A.40)
A.4 Wage Bargaining
The competitive labour packer maximises the real profits that accrue as part of the aggregation
process:
max
{hi,t(ω)}
wi,thi,t −
1∫
0
wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω)dω,
s.t. hi,t =
 1∫
0
hi,t(ω)
ε−1
ε dω

ε
ε−1
.
The first-order condition gives rise to the following service-specific demand schedule:
hi,t(ω) = hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ε
. (A.41)
The optimal inter-temporal allocation of consumption, savings and optimal wage is derived
by solving the following dynamic stochastic optimisation problem:
max
{ci,t(ω),wi,t(ω),bi,t+1(ω)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
}
s.t. hi,t(ω) =
hi,t
Ωi
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ε
,
s.t. ci,t(ω) + λi,t,t+1Et[bi,t+1(ω)] ≤ bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t(ω))wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + di,t(ω),
Re-writing the above in terms of the Current Value Lagrangian gives
CVL =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{log
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
+ oi,h,t(ω)
[
hi,t
Ωi
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ε
− hi,t(ω)
]
+ oi,c,t(ω) [bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t(ω))wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + di,t(ω)− ci,t(ω)− λi,t,t+1Et[bi,t+1(ω)]]} .
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Consider the first-order conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings:
1
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω) − ϑiβEt
[
1
ci,t+1(ω)− ϑici,t(ω)
]
− oi,c,t(ω) = 0, (A.42)
oi,c,t(ω)Et[λi,t,t+1]− βEt[oi,c,t+1(ω)] = 0. (A.43)
Alternatively, imposing preference homotheticity gives
ui,c,t =
∂ui,t
∂ci,t
= oi,c,t = Ψi,t − ϑiβEt[Ψi,t+1], (A.44)
1 = Ψi,t(ci,t − ϑici,t−1), (A.45)
λi,t,t+1ui,c,t =βEt [ui,c,t+1] . (A.46)
The first-order condition with respect to the real hourly wage rate is given by
(1−∆i,w,t(ω))(1− ε)oi,c,t(ω)hi,t(ω)− ε
(
oi,h,t(ω)hi,t(ω)
wi,t(ω)
)
−∆′i,w,t(ω)w˙i,t(ω)oi,c,t(ω)hi,t(ω),
+ βEt
[
∆′i,w,t+1(ω)w˙i,t+1(ω)
2oi,c,t+1(ω)hi,t+1(ω)
]
= 0. (A.47)
Preference homotheticity implies wi,t(ω) = wi,t ⇒ hi,t(ω) = hi,t, thus
(1−∆i,w,t)wi,t +
(
ε
ε− 1
)
ui,h,t
ui,c,t
+
(
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ε− 1
)
wi,t
−βEt
[
ui,c,t+1
ui,c,t
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ε− 1 wi,t
]
= 0, (A.48)
or simply
wi,t =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mrsi,t
Θi,t
, (A.49)
Θi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ε− 1
]
, (A.50)
where w˙i,t = wi,t/wi,t−1, mrsi,t = −ui,h,t/ui,c,t, and ui,h,t = ∂ui,t/∂hi,t = oi,h,t = −ψihϕii,t.
A.5 De-trended Equilibrium Conditions
Consumption Smoothing:
u˜i,c,tqni,t =µieni,tu˜n,c,t, (A.51)
u˜i,c,tλi,t,t+1Et [a˙i,t+1] =βEt [u˜i,c,t+1] , (A.52)
u˜i,c,t = Ψ˜ i,t − ϑiβEt
[
Ψ˜ i,t+1
a˙i,t+1
]
, (A.53)
Ψ˜ i,t =
a˙i,t
a˙i,tc˜i,t − ϑic˜i,t−1 . (A.54)
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Production Technology:
c˜i,t =h
αi
i,tx˜
1−αi
i,t , (A.55)
hi,t
x˜i,t
=
αi
1− αi
pi,x,t
w˜i,t
, (A.56)
ξiy˜ij,t = zi,tm˜ij,t, (A.57)
y˜ii,t = sii,tx˜i,t, (A.58)
y˜in,t = sin,tx˜j,t. (A.59)
Trade Weights:
sii,t =αii
(
pii,t
pi,x,t
)−η
, (A.60)
sin,t =αin
(
pin,t
pn,x,t
)−η
. (A.61)
Market Clearing Conditions:
y˜i,t = c˜i,t + n˜xi,t + ∆i,w,tw˜i,thi,t +
∑
φ
N∑
n=1
∆in,t(φ)pin,t(φ)y˜in,t(φ), (A.62)
n˜xi,t = − n˜xj,t = pij,tqji,ty˜ij,t − pji,ty˜ji,t. (A.63)
Wage Bargaining:
w˜i,t =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mrsi,t
Θi,t
, (A.64)
Θi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ε− 1
]
, (A.65)
mrsi,t = − u˜i,h,t
u˜i,c,t
, (A.66)
u˜i,h,t = − ψihϕii,t, (A.67)
∆i,w,t =
κi,w [exp (ζi,w (w˙i,t − γi))− ζi,w (w˙i,t − γi)− 1]
ζ2i,w
, (A.68)
∆′i,w,t =
κi,w [exp (ζi,w (w˙i,t − γi))− 1]
ζi,w
. (A.69)
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Relative Prices:
1 =
(
w˜i,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
, (A.70)
pi,x,t =
[
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
]1/(1−η)
, (A.71)
sin,t(φ) =χin(φ)
[
pin,t(φ)
pin,t
]1−ε
, (A.72)
1 =
∑
φ
sin,t(φ), (A.73)
mcii,t(pi) = mcii,t(−pi) = ξiqni,t
zi,t
, (A.74)
mcin,t(−pi) = ξiqin,t
zi,t
. (A.75)
Producer Currency Pricing:
pin,t(pi) = τinqin,tpii,t(pi), (A.76)
pii,t(pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(pi)
Φii,t(pi)
, (A.77)
Φii,t(pi) = 1−∆ii,t(pi) +
∆′ii,t(pi)p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
y˜ii,t+1(pi)a˙i,t+1
y˜ii,t(pi)
∆′ii,t+1(pi)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(pi)
2
p˙i,t+1
]
,
(A.78)
∆ii,t(pi) =
κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(pi)− p˙i))− ζi,p (p˙ii,t(pi)− p˙i)− 1]
ζ2i
, (A.79)
∆′ii,t(pi) =
κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(pi)− p˙i))− 1]
ζi,p
, (A.80)
∆′′ii,t(pi) =κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(pi)− p˙i))] . (A.81)
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Local Currency Pricing:
pin,t(−pi) = τinqin,tδin,t(−pi)pii,t(−pi), (A.82)
pii,t(−pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii,t(−pi)
Φii,t(−pi) , (A.83)
Φii,t(−pi) = 1−∆ii,t(−pi) +
∆′ii,t(−pi)p˙ii,t(φ)
ε− 1
− λi,t,t+1Et
[
y˜ii,t+1(−pi)a˙i,t+1
y˜ii,t(−pi)
∆′ii,t+1(−pi)
ε− 1
p˙ii,t+1(−pi)2
p˙i,t+1
]
, (A.84)
pin,t(−pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
τinmcin,t(−pi)
Φin,t(−pi) , (A.85)
Φin,t(−pi) = 1−∆in,t(−pi) +
∆′in,t(−pi)p˙in,t(φ)
ε− 1
− λi,t,t+1Et
[
y˜in,t+1(−pi)a˙i,t+1
y˜in,t(−pi)
∆′in,t+1(−pi)
ε− 1
p˙in,t+1(−pi)2
p˙n,t+1
]
, (A.86)
∆ii,t(−pi) = κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(−pi)− p˙i))− ζi,p (p˙ii,t(−pi)− p˙i)− 1]
ζ2i
, (A.87)
∆′ii,t(−pi) =
κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(−pi)− p˙i))− 1]
ζi,p
, (A.88)
∆′′ii,t(−pi) =κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙ii,t(−pi)− p˙i))] , (A.89)
∆in,t(−pi) = κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙in,t(−pi)− p˙n))− ζi,p (p˙in,t(−pi)− p˙n)− 1]
ζ2i
, (A.90)
∆′in,t(−pi) =
κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙in,t(−pi)− p˙n))− 1]
ζi,p
, (A.91)
∆′′in,t(−pi) =κi,p [exp (ζi,p (p˙in,t(−pi)− p˙n))] . (A.92)
Monetary Policy:
ri,t =Et
[
p˙i,t+1
λi,t,t+1
]
, (A.93)
ri,t = (ri,t−1)ρi,r(r∗i,t)
1−ρi,r , (A.94)
r∗i,t =
γip˙i
β
(
p˙i,t
pi
)νp ( y˜i,t
y˜i
)νy
exp(σi,ri,r,t). (A.95)
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Exchange Rate Pass-Through:
erpti,t = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terptni,t, (A.96)
erptii,t =
∑
φ
sii,t(φ)
1 + Γii,t(φ)
, (A.97)
erptin,t =
sin,t(−pi)
1 + Γin,t(−pi) +
sin,t(pi)Γii,t(pi)
1 + Γii,t(pi)
, (A.98)
Γii,t(φ) = Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
y˜ii,t+1(φ)a˙i,t+1
y˜ii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
]
, (A.99)
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− ε)∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(ε− 1) , (A.100)
(A.101)
A.6 Deterministic Steady State
The focus of this paper is on the possibility of long-run trend of price inflation:
p˙i > 1 (A.102)
and positive labour productivity growth:
a˙i = γi > 1. (A.103)
The nominal interest rate and real interest rates are related via the Fisher equation:
ri =
p˙i
λi
, (A.104)
and the stochastic discount factor is pinned down by the Euler equation:
λi =
β
γi
, (A.105)
which implies that the real interest rate (i.e. 1/λi− 1) is lower than the nominal interest rate
in the deterministic steady state. The initial condition of the real exchange rate is set to it’s
long-run mean:
qni,0 = q
−1
in,0 = qni > 0, (A.106)
which implies the following restrictions:
µni =
qniu˜i,c
u˜n,c
, (A.107)
eni = 1, (A.108)
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and pin down the real marginal costs:
mcii(pi) =mcii(−pi) = mcii = ξiQii = ξi min {qni; n = 1, . . . , N} = qni, (A.109)
mcin(−pi) = ξiQin(−pi) = ξi min {qni; n = 1, . . . , N} = qni. (A.110)
since zi = 1. Next, price adjustment and wage bargaining costs are equal to zero in the steady
state such that the resource allocation is Pareto-efficient in the long-run:
∆ii,p(pi) = ∆ii,p(−pi) = ∆in,p(−pi) = ∆i,w = 0, (A.111)
∆′ii,p(pi) = ∆
′
ii,p(−pi) = ∆′in,p(−pi) = ∆′i,w = 0, (A.112)
∆′′ii,p(pi) = ∆
′′
ii,p(−pi) = ∆′′in,p(−pi) =κi,p. (A.113)
As a result, the auxiliary variables associated with wage and price adjustment are given by
Θi = 1, (A.114)
w˙i = γi, (A.115)
Φii(pi) = Φii(−pi) = Φni(−pi) = 1, (A.116)
p˙ii(pi) = p˙ii(−pi) = p˙ni(−pi) = p˙i. (A.117)
The first order conditions of the wholesalers pin down the real export prices of both PCP and
LCP firms as well as LCP import prices:
pii(pi) = pii(−pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
mcii =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
qni, (A.118)
pin(−pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
τinmcin(−pi) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
τinqin. (A.119)
therefore δin(−pi) = qin. If the densities χni(pi) and χni(−pi) are known, then the market
share of each firm type is given by
sni(φ) = χni(φ)
[
pni(φ)
pni
]1−ε
(A.120)
where
pni =
∑
φ
χni(φ)pni(φ)
1−ε
1/(1−ε) . (A.121)
Similarly, if the values of αii and αni were known, then the trade weights are determined by
sni = αni
[
pin
pi,x
]1−η
(A.122)
where
pi,x =
[
N∑
n=1
αnip
η−1
ni
]1/(η−1)
. (A.123)
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Combining the above results together pins down the demand for each φ-type products
y˜in(φ) = sin(φ)
[
piny˜in
pin(φ)
]
, (A.124)
and the demand for imported intermediate goods
m˜in(φ) = ξiy˜in(φ), (A.125)
but only if y˜in is known. The demand for home production would also be known:
y˜in = sin
[
pn,xx˜n
pin
]
, (A.126)
but only if x˜n is known. Recall that the wage bill and the total cost of tradable goods are
proportional to the total consumption expenditure:
pi,xx˜i = (1− αi)pic˜i ⇒ x˜i = (1− αi)c˜i
pi,x
, (A.127)
w˜ihi = αipic˜i ⇒ c˜i = w˜ihi
αi
, (A.128)
where pi = 1. Therefore, if c˜i is known, then the steady state is well-defined. However, in
order to determine consumption, one must first pin down the wage bill. The hourly wages are
obtained from the consumer price index identity:
1 =
(
w˜i
αi
)αi ( pi,x
1− αi
)1−αi
⇒ w˜i = αi
(
pi,x
1− αi
)1−1/αi
. (A.129)
Secondly, the hours of labour are pre-determined hi ∈ (0, 1), which puts a restriction on the
parameter controlling the relative disutility of labour:
w˜i =
ε
ε− 1m˜rsi,
=
ε
ε− 1
ψih
ϕi
i
u˜i,c
,
⇒ ψi = ε− 1
ε
w˜iu˜i,c
hϕii
, (A.130)
where
u˜i,c =
1− βiϑi
c˜i
(
γi
γi − ϑi
)
. (A.131)
It follows that the steady state values of endogenous variables derived above are consistent
with all structural equations of the model. Therefore, the aggregate output can be obtained
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using the income-expenditure identity:
y˜i = c˜i + n˜xi,
n˜xi =
N−i∑
n=1
pinqniy˜in − pniy˜ni.
Now that the steady state of all the endogenous control variables is set out, the deterministic
steady state of exchange rate pass-through immediately follows. Firstly, consider the auxiliary
variables:
Ξii(pi) = Ξii(−pi) = Ξii = κi,pp˙
2
i
ε− 1 , (A.132)
Ξin(−pi) = κi,pp˙
2
n
ε− 1 , (A.133)
Γii(pi) = Γii(−pi) = Γii = Ξii (1 + λiγi) = Ξii (1 + β) , (A.134)
Γin(−pi) = Ξin(−pi) (1 + λiγn) = Ξin(−pi)
(
1 +
βγn
γi
)
. (A.135)
Next, consider exchange rate pass-through into import, export, and consumer prices respec-
tively:
erptii =
∑
φ
sii(φ)
1 + Γii(φ)
=
1
1 + Γii
=
1
1 + Ξii (1 + λiγi)
=
1
1 +
κi,p
ε−1 (1 + λiγi) p˙
2
i
, (A.136)
erptin =
sin(−pi)
1 + Γin(−pi) +
sin(pi)Γii(pi)
1 + Γii(pi)
, (A.137)
erpti = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
snierptni. (A.138)
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Appendix B
B.1 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Consider the symmetric equilibrium import price of the φ-type firm in economy j ∈ n 6= i, k:
pij,t(φ) = djqij,tδij,t(φ)pii,t(φ). (B.1)
Differentiating both sides of the above with respect to the major exchange rate in real terms
qkj,t and rearranging gives:
∂pij,t(φ)
∂qkj,t
= dj
[
δij,t(φ)pii,t(φ)
∂qij,t
∂qkj,t
+ qij,tpii,t(φ)
∂δij,t(φ)
∂qkj,t
+ qij,tδij,t(φ)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qkj,t
]
,
∂pij,t(φ)
∂qkj,t
qkj,t
pij,t(φ)
= dj
(
qij,tδij,t(φ)pii,t(φ)
pij,t(φ)
)[
∂δij,t(φ)
∂qkj,t
qkj,t
δij,t(φ)
+
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
qki,t
pii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
∂qkj,t
qkj,t
qki,t
]
,
∂ ln pij,t(φ)
∂ ln qij,t
=
∂ ln δij,t(φ)
∂ ln qkj,t
+
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
, (B.2)
erptkij,t(φ) = ptm
k
ij,t(φ) + erpt
k
ii,t(φ), (B.3)
since
qkj,t = qki,tqij,t,
∂qki,t
∂qkj,t
qkj,t
qki,t
= 1 if k,e,t > 0,
∂qij,t
∂qkj,t
qkj,t
qij,t
= 0.
Next, consider the optimal export price setting condition:
pii,t(φ) =
Θii,t(φ)mci,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
(B.4)
Exchange rate pass-through into i’th economy export prices is derived by differentiating the
above with respect to the major exchange rate using the quotient rule:
erptkii,t(φ) =
∂ ln Θii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
+
∂ lnmci,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
− ∂ ln Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
> 0. (B.5)
Each of the three sub-elasticities can be derived as separate endogenous variables using the
structure of the general equilibrium model. First, recall that the variable price mark-up
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expression is given by:
Θii,t(φ) =
εii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)− 1 (B.6)
εii,t(φ) = ζ(1− sii,t(φ)) + ηsii,t(φ), (B.7)
sii,t(φ) =χii(φ)
(
pii,t(φ)
pii,t
)1−ζ
, (B.8)
pii,t =
∑
φ
χii(φ)pii,t(φ)
1−ζ
1/(1−ζ) . (B.9)
The exchange rate elasticity of the price mark-up is therefore obtained as follows:
∂ ln Θii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
= −
[
1
εii,t(φ)− 1
]
∂ ln εii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
,
=
[
ζ − η
εii,t(φ)− 1
sii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)
]
∂ ln sii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
,
=
[
(ζ − 1)(η − ζ)
εii,t(φ)− 1
sii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)
](
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
− ∂ ln pii,t
∂ ln qki,t
)
,
=
[
(ζ − 1)(η − ζ)
εii,t(φ)− 1
sii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)
](
erptkii,t(φ)− erptkii,t
)
, (B.10)
= −Γii,Θ,t(φ)
(
erptkii,t(φ)− erptkii,t
)
, (B.11)
= −Γii,Θ,t(φ)
(1− sii,t(φ))erptkii,t(φ)−∑
−φ
sii,t(−φ)erptkii,t(−φ)
 , (B.12)
where the notation −φ indicates all of the remaining types of firms (e.g. if φ = pi, then it
follows that −φ = {`, $}). Second, the real marginal costs are linearly related to the major
exchange rate:
mci,t(φ) =
ξi(φ)qki,t
zi,t
, (B.13)
∂ lnmci,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
= Γii,mc,t(φ). (B.14)
Third, the price stickiness is subsumed with the auxiliary variable:
Φii,t(φ) = 1−∆ii,t(φ)+
∆′ii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)− 1 −λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(φ)
εii,t(φ)− 1
p˙2ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
]
. (B.15)
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Differentiating the above with respect to the major exchange rate gives:
∂ ln Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
= −∆
′
ii,t(·)p˙ii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
+
(
1
Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1)
)[
∆′′ii,t(·)p˙ii,t(φ)2
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
+ ∆′ii,t(·)qki,t
∂p˙ii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
]
− λi,t,t+1 Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′′ii,t+1(·)p˙ii,t+1(φ)2
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1)
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qki,t
]
− λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
2∆′ii,t+1(·)p˙ii,t+1(φ)qki,t
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1)
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qki,t
]
+ λi,t,t+1Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
∆′ii,t+1(·)p˙ii,t+1(φ)2
p˙i,t+1Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1)
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
]
,
=
p˙ii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)− 1
erptkii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(·) + (2− εii,t(φ))∆′ii,t(·)
]
+
λi,t,t+1
εii,t(φ)− 1
erptkii,t(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
Et
[
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
2
p˙i,t+1
(
p˙ii,t+1(φ)∆
′′
ii,t+1(·) + (2− εii,t(φ))∆′ii,t+1(·)
)]
,
= erptkii,t(φ)
{
Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
(
yii,t+1(φ)
yii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
)]}
(B.16)
= erptkii,t(φ)Γii,∆,t(φ), (B.17)
where
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− εii,t(φ))∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1) ,
∂p˙ii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
=
(
p˙ii,t(φ)
pii,t(φ)
)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
=
(
erptkii,t(φ)p˙ii,t(φ)
qki,t
)
,
∂p˙ii,t+1(φ)
∂qki,t
= −
(
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
pii,t(φ)
)
∂pii,t(φ)
∂qki,t
= −
(
erptkii,t(φ)p˙ii,t+1(φ)
qki,t
)
,
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
=
∂ ln yii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln pii,t(φ)
∂ ln qki,t
= −εii,t(φ) erptkii,t(φ).
The structure of the sub-elasticities is now explicitly derived. Next, the solution to exchange
rate pass-through into the i’th economy export prices is obtained by substituting (B.12),
(B.14), and (B.17) into (B.5) and solving for erptkii,t(φ) as follows:
erptkii,t(φ) = Γii,mc,t(φ)− erptkii,t(φ)Γii,∆,t(φ)− Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ
sii,t(−φ)
(
erptkii,t(φ)− erptkii,t(−φ)
)
,
erptkii,t(φ)
1 + Γii,∆,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)∑
−φ
sii,t(−φ)
 = Γii,mc,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)∑
−φ
sii,t(−φ)erptkii,t(−φ),
erptkii,t(φ) =
Γii,mc,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ sii,t(−φ)erptkii,t(−φ)
1 + Γii,∆,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ sii,t(−φ)
(B.18)
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The next step is to find the exchange rate pass-through into an aggregate import price index,
which is obtained as follows:
erptkij,t =
∂ ln pij,t
∂ ln qkj,t
=
∑
φ
(
pij,t(φ)
pij,t
)1−ζ [
ptmkij,t(φ) + erpt
k
ii,t(φ)
] χij(φ)∫
0
dω,
=
∑
φ
χij(φ)
(
pij,t(φ)
pij,t
)1−ζ [
ptmkij,t(φ) + erpt
k
ii,t(φ)
]
,
=
∑
φ
sii,t(φ)
[
ptmkij,t(φ) + erpt
k
ii,t(φ)
]
. (B.19)
Finally, the the consumer price index is less elastic to exchange rate fluctuations than the
price of manufactured goods due to home-bias and distribution services:
pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi 1
1− αi
(
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
) 1
1−η
1−αi , (B.20)
erptki,t =
∂ ln pi,t
∂ ln qki,t
= (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
αni
(
pni,t
pi,x,t
)1−η
erptkni,t = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terpt
k
ni,t (B.21)
B.2 Supply-Side
Import-export manufacturers solve the following real cost minimisation problem:
min
{yin,t(ω,φ)}
tcij,t(ω, φ) = qki,tmin,t(ω, φ) =
ξi(φ)qki,tyin,t(ω)
zi,t
, (B.22)
where the first order condition is simply given by:
∂tcij,t(ω, φ)
∂yij,t(ω, φ)
= mci,t(φ) =
ξi(φ)diqki,t
zi,t
. (B.23)
The next step along the pricing chain is the relationship between the manufacturing sector
and the distributors. The demand facing the upstream manufacturers from the distribution
sector is derived from the profit maximisation problem of the competitive collectors, who
aggregate individual varieties of goods into country-specific bundles:
max
{yin,t(φ)}
pin,tyin,t −
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)yin,t(ω, φ)dω
s.t. yin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)
1−1/ζdω

1/(1−1/ζ)
,
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which gives rise to the following first order condition:
yin,t(ω, φ) = yin,t
[
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
]−ζ
. (B.24)
The aggregate demand for the φ-type imports from location i to n is then given by:
yin,t(φ) =
χin(φ)∫
0
yin,t(ω, φ)dω = χin(φ)yin,t
[
pin,t(φ)
pin,t
]−ζ
(B.25)
The aggregate upstream price index is derived by substituting the above first order condition
into the budget constraint of the collector, which gives rise to the following expression:
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)∫
0
pin,t(ω, φ)
1−ζdω

1/(1−ζ)
, (B.26)
or alternatively in the symmetric equilibrium it is equivalent to:
pin,t =
∑
φ
χin(φ)pin,t(φ)
1−ζ
1/(1−ζ) . (B.27)
The optimal demands for locally-produced and imported goods are derived from the second
stage of aggregation:
max
{yni,t}
pi,x,txi,t −
N∑
n=1
pni,tyni,t
s.t. xi,t =
(
N∑
n=1
α
1/η
ni y
1−1/η
ni,t
)1/(1−1/η)
,
The first order condition is given by:
yni,t = αnixi,t
[
pni,t
pi,x,t
]−η
, (B.28)
The aggregate producer price index is derived by substituting the above first order condition
into the budget constraint of the distributor, which gives rise to the following expression:
pi,x,t =
(
N∑
n=1
αni p
1−η
ni,t
)1/(1−η)
. (B.29)
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Finally, the competitive retailer maximises profits subject to the Cobb-Douglas production
technology characterising the downstream market:
max
{hi,t,xi,t}
pi,tyi,t − wi,thi,t − pi,x,txi,t,
s.t. ci,t = (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t .
The cost minimisation problem is formulated as a static Lagrangian:
L = pi,tyi,t − wi,thi,t − pi,x,txi,t − oi,t
(
yi,t − (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t
)
, (B.30)
where the first order conditions are given by:
pi,x,t − (1− αi)oi,t
(
ci,t
xi,t
)
= 0, (B.31)
wi,t − αioi,t
(
ci,t
hi,t
)
= 0, (B.32)
ci,t − (ai,thi,t)αix1−αii,t = 0. (B.33)
It can be shown that the shadow price of technology oi,t corresponds to the consumer price
index. Substituting the first two first order conditions above into the expression of the total
real costs of production and taking a partial derivative with respect to retail output:
tci,t = (αi + 1− αi)oi,tci,t = oi,tci,t, ∂tci,t
∂ci,t
= oi,t = pi,t. (B.34)
In order to find the functional form of the retail price index, consider the unconditional
demand schedule for each of the factor inputs. They are obtained by firstly dividing the top
two first order conditions one by the other:
hi,t
xi,t
=
αi
1− αi
pi,x,t
wi,t
, (B.35)
and then substitute the above schedule for tradable goods bundle and labour, each in turn,
into the technological constraint:
xi,t = ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)−αi
, (B.36)
hi,t = ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
1− αi
)1−αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)αi−1
. (B.37)
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Then substitute the unconditional demand schedules into the expression for the total effective
real costs of production to obtain:
tci,t = ci,t
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
, (B.38)
∂tci,t
∂ci,t
= pi,t =
(
wi,t/ai,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
. (B.39)
Therefore, the first order conditions can be written as:
pi,x,txi,t = (1− αi)pi,tci,t, (B.40)
wi,thi,t =αipi,tci,t. (B.41)
B.3 Sticky Prices
The optimal price set by the ω’th import-export manufacturer of φ-type is derived by max-
imising the present discounted value of their real profits subject to a sequence of demand
schedules:
max
{Pin,t(ω,φ)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
λi,t,t+1
{
N∑
n=1
(1−∆in,t (ω, φ)) pin,t (ω, φ) yin,t (ω, φ)−mci,t (φ) yin,t (ω, φ)
}
s.t. ∆in,t(ω, φ) =
κi(φ)(p˙in,t (ω, φ)− p˙n)2
2
,
s.t. yin,t(ω, φ) = yin,t
[
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
]−ζ
,
s.t. yin,t = αin,txn,t
[
pin,t
pn,x,t
]−η
.
The first order condition is obtained using the product rule:
(1−∆in,t (ω, φ)) yin,t(ω, φ)
[
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
∂Pin,t(ω, φ)
+
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
∂Pin,t(ω, φ)
∂yin,t(ω, φ)
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t(ω, φ)
yin,t(ω, φ)
]
−∆′in,t(ω, φ)p˙in,t(ω, φ)yin,t(ω, φ)
(
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
∂Pin,t(ω, φ)
)
+mci,t(φ)
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
∂Pin,t(ω, φ)
∂yin,t(ω, φ)
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
+ Et
[
λi,t,t+1∆
′
in,t+1(ω, φ)p˙in,t+1(ω, φ)
2yin,t+1(ω, φ)
(
∂pin,t+1(ω, φ)
∂Pin,t+1(ω, φ)
)]
= 0.
Alternatively:
(1−∆in,t(ω, φ))pin,t(ω, φ)−
(
εin,t(ω, φ)
εin,t(ω, φ)− 1
)
mci,t(φ) +
(
∆′in,t(ω, φ)p˙in,t(ω, φ)
εin,t(ω, φ)− 1
)
pin,t(ω, φ)
− Et
[
yin,t+1(ω, φ)
yin,t(ω, φ)
∆′in,t+1(ω, φ)
εin,t(ω, φ)− 1
p˙in,t+1(ω, φ)
2
ri,t
]
pin,t(ω, φ) = 0,
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where
∂yin,t(ω, φ)
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
= − ζ yin,t(ω, φ)pin,t
pin,t(ω, φ)
{
1
p2in,t
(
pin,t − pin,t(ω, φ) ∂pin,t
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
)}
− ηyin,t(ω, φ)pn,x,t
pin,t
{
1
p2n,x,t
(
pn,x,t
∂pin,t
∂pin,t(ω, φ)
)}
,
∂ ln yin,t(ω, φ)
∂ ln pin,t(ω, φ)
= − ζ(1− sin,t(ω, φ))− ηsin,t(ω, φ) = −εin,t(ω, φ), (B.42)
sin,t(ω, φ) =
(
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
)1−ζ
=
pin,t(ω, φ)
pin,t
yin,t(ω, φ)
yin,t
≡ ∂ ln pin,t
∂ ln pin,t(ω, φ)
. (B.43)
Finally, solving for the optimal price in the symmetric equilibrium gives:
pin,t(φ) =
Θin,t(φ)mci,t(φ)
Φin,t(φ)
, (B.44)
Θin,t(φ) =
εin,t(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1 , (B.45)
εin,t(φ) = ζ(1− sin,t(φ)) + ηsin,t(φ), (B.46)
Φin,t(φ) = 1−∆in,t(φ) +
∆′in,t(φ)p˙in,t(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
yin,t+1(φ)
yin,t(φ)
∆′in,t+1(φ)
εin,t(φ)− 1
p˙in,t+1(φ)
2
p˙n,t+1
]
.
(B.47)
B.4 Sticky Wages
Competitive trade union maximises its real profits with respect to the hours of each service:
max
{hi,t(ω)}
wi,thi,t −
1∫
0
wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω)dω,
s.t.hi,t =
 1∫
0
hi,t(ω)
ζ−1
ζ dω

ζ
ζ−1
.
The first order condition gives rise to the following service-specific demand schedule:
hi,t(ω) = hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ζ
. (B.48)
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The optimal inter-temporal allocation of consumption, savings and optimal wage is derived
by solving the following dynamic stochastic optimisation problem:
max
{ci,t(ω),wi,t(ω),bi,t+1(ω)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti ln
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
s.t. ci,t(ω) + λi,t,t+1Et[bi,t+1(ω)] = bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t)wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + vi,t(ω),
s.t. hi,t(ω) = hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ζ
,
s.t. ∆i,w,t(ω) =
κi,w(w˙i,t(ω)− 1)
2
.
Re-writing the above in terms of the Current Value Lagrangian gives:
CVL =E0
∞∑
t=0
βti{ln
(
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω)
ai,t
)
−
(
ψi
1 + ϕi
)
hi,t(ω)
1+ϕi
+ ui,c,t(ω) [bi,t(ω) + (1−∆i,w,t(ω))wi,t(ω)hi,t(ω) + vi,t(ω)− ci,t(ω)− Et[λi,t,t+1bi,t+1(ω)]]}
+ui,h,t(ω)
[
hi,t
[
wi,t(ω)
wi,t
]−ζ
− hi,t(ω)
]
. (B.49)
Consider the first order conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings:
1
ci,t(ω)− ϑici,t−1(ω) − βiϑiEt
[
1
ci,t+1(ω)− ϑici,t(ω)
]
− ui,c,t(ω) = 0, (B.50)
ui,c,t(ω)Et[λi,t,t+1]− βiEt[ui,c,t+1(ω)] = 0. (B.51)
Alternatively, imposing preference homotheticity gives:
ui,c,t =
∂ui,t
∂ci,t
= Ψi,t − βiϑiEt[Ψi,t+1], (B.52)
Ψi,t =
1
ci,t − ϑici,t−1 , (B.53)
1 =βiEt
[
ui,c,t+1
λi,t,t+1ui,c,t
]
. (B.54)
The first order condition with respect to the optimal wage is given by:
(1−∆i,w,t(ω))(1− ζ)ui,c,t(ω)hi,t(ω)− ζ
(
ui,h,t(ω)hi,t(ω)
wi,t(ω)
)
−∆′i,w,t(ω)w˙i,t(ω)ui,c,t(ω)hi,t(ω),
+ βiEt
[
∆′i,w,t+1(ω)w˙i,t+1(ω)
2ui,c,t+1(ω)hi,t+1(ω)
]
= 0. (B.55)
Alternatively, under preference homotheticity, wi,t(ω) = wi,t ⇒ hi,t(ω) = hi,t, thus:
(1−∆i,w,t)wi,t +
(
ζ
ζ − 1
)
ui,h,t
ui,c,t
+
(
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ζ − 1
)
wi,t
−βiEt
[
ui,c,t+1
ui,c,t
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ζ − 1 wi,t
]
= 0, (B.56)
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or simply:
wi,t =
(
ζ
ζ − 1
)
mrsi,t
Ψi,t
, (B.57)
Ψi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ζ − 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ζ − 1
]
, (B.58)
where
w˙i,t = =
wi,t
wi,t−1
= a˙i,t
(
w˜i,t
w˜i,t−1
)
, (B.59)
mrsi,t = − ui,h,t
ui,c,t
, (B.60)
ui,h,t =
∂ui,t
∂hi,t
= − ψihϕii,t. (B.61)
B.5 Equilibrium Conditions
Consumption Smoothing:
qji,tu˜i,c,t =µiu˜j,c,tei,t, (B.62)
λi,t,t+1u˜i,c,tEt[a˙i,t+1] =βiEt [u˜i,c,t+1] , (B.63)
u˜i,c,t =
a˙i,t
a˙i,tc˜i,t − ϑic˜i,t−1 − βiϑiEt
[
a˙i,t+1
a˙i,t+1c˜i,t+1 − ϑic˜i,t
]
. (B.64)
Monetary Policy:
ri,tλi,t,t+1 =Et [p˙i,t+1] , (B.65)
ri,t = (ri,t−1)ρi,r(r∗i,t)
1−ρi,r , (B.66)
r∗i,t =
p˙i
β
(
p˙i,t
p˙i
)νi,p ( y˜i,t
y˜i
)νi,y
exp(σi,ri,r,t). (B.67)
Market Clearing Conditions:
y˜i,t = c˜i,t + n˜xi,t + ∆i,w,tw˜i,thi,t +
N∑
n=1
∑
φ
∆in,t(φ)pin,t(φ)y˜in,t(φ), (B.68)
n˜xi,t =
N−i∑
n=1
pin,tqni,ty˜in,t − pni,ty˜ni,t. (B.69)
Sector-Specific Market Shares
pin,t(φ)y˜in,t(φ) = sin,t(φ)pin,ty˜in,t, (B.70)
sin,t(φ) =χin(φ)
[
pin,t(φ)
pin,t
]1−ζ
, (B.71)∑
φ
sin,t(φ) = 1. (B.72)
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Country-Specific Trade Weights
pin,ty˜in,t = sin,tpn,x,tx˜n,t, (B.73)
sin,t =αin
[
pin,t
pn,x,t
]1−η
, (B.74)
N∑
n=1
sni,t = 1. (B.75)
Production Technology:
pi,x,tx˜i,t = (1− αi)c˜i,t, (B.76)
w˜i,thi,t =αic˜i,t, (B.77)
ξi(φ)y˜in,t(φ) = zi,tm˜in,t(φ), (B.78)
mci,t(φ)zi,t = ξi(φ)diqki,t. (B.79)
Price Adjustment Costs:
∆in,t(φ) =
κi(φ)(p˙in,t (φ)− p˙n)2
2
, (B.80)
∆′in,t(φ) =κi(φ)(p˙in,t (φ)− p˙n), (B.81)
∆′′in,t(φ) =κi(φ), (B.82)
p˙in,t(φ) =
p˙n,tpin,t(φ)
pin,t−1(φ)
. (B.83)
Producer Currency Pricing (i.e. if φ = pi):
pin,t(pi) = dn,tqin,tpii,t(pi), (B.84)
pii,t(pi) =
Θii,t(pi)mci,t(pi)
Φii,t(pi)
, (B.85)
Θii,t(pi) =
εii,t(pi)
εii,t(pi)− 1 , (B.86)
εii,t(pi) = ζ(1− sii,t(pi)) + ηsii,t(pi), (B.87)
Φii,t(pi) = 1−∆ii,t(pi) +
∆′ii,t(pi)p˙ii,t(pi)
εii,t(pi)− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
a˙i,t+1y˜ii,t+1(pi)
y˜ii,t(pi)
∆′ii,t+1(pi)
εii,t(pi)− 1
p˙ii,t+1(pi)
2
p˙i,t+1
]
.
(B.88)
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Local Currency Pricing (i.e. if φ = `):
pin,t(`) = dnqin,tδin,t(`)pii,t(`), (B.89)
pii,t(`) =
Θii,t(`)mci,t(`)
Φii,t(`)
, (B.90)
pin,t(`) =
Θin,t(`)mci,t(`)
Φin,t(`)
, (B.91)
Θin,t(`) =
εin,t(`)
εin,t(`)− 1 , (B.92)
εin,t(`) = ζ(1− sin,t(`)) + ηsin,t(`), (B.93)
Φin,t(`) = 1−∆in,t(`) +
∆′in,t(`)p˙in,t(`)
εin,t(`)− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
a˙i,t+1y˜in,t+1(`)
y˜in,t(`)
∆′in,t+1(`)
εin,t(`)− 1
p˙in,t+1(`)
2
p˙n,t+1
]
.
(B.94)
Major Currency Pricing (i.e. if φ = $):
qkn,t = qin,tδin,t($), (B.95)
pin,t($) = dnqkn,tpii,t($), (B.96)
pii,t($) =
Θii,t($)ξi($)
zi,tΦii,t($)
, (B.97)
Θii,t($) =
εii,t($)
εii,t($)− 1 , (B.98)
εii,t($) = ζ(1− sii,t($)) + ηsii,t($), (B.99)
Φii,t($) = 1−∆ii,t($) +
∆′ii,t($)p˙ii,t($)
εii,t($)− 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
a˙i,t+1y˜ii,t+1($)
y˜ii,t($)
∆′ii,t+1($)
εii,t($)− 1
p˙ii,t+1($)2
p˙i,t+1
]
.
(B.100)
Wage Adjustment Costs
∆i,w,t =
κi,w(w˙i,t − γi)
2
, (B.101)
∆′i,w,t =κi,w(w˙i,t − 1), (B.102)
w˙i,t = a˙i,t
(
w˜i,t
w˜i,t−1
)
. (B.103)
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Collective Bargaining
1 =
(
w˜i,t
αi
)αi ( pi,x,t
1− αi
)1−αi
, (B.104)
w˜i,t =
(
ζ
ζ − 1
)
m˜rsi,t
Ψi,t
, (B.105)
Ψi,t = 1−∆i,w,t +
∆′i,w,tw˙i,t
ζ − 1 − λi,t,t+1Et
[
hi,t+1
hi,t
∆′i,w,t+1w˙
2
i,t+1
ζ − 1
]
, (B.106)
m˜rsi,t = − u˜i,h,t
u˜i,c,t
, (B.107)
u˜i,h,t = − ψihϕii,t, (B.108)
(B.109)
Minor Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Downstream Import Prices:
erpti,t = (1− αi)
[
sii,terpt
k
ii,t +
N−i∑
n=1
sni,tsni,t(pi)
]
, (B.110)
erptni,t = 1− sni,t(`). (B.111)
Major Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Export Prices:
erptkii,t(φ) =
Γii,mc,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)
∑
−φ sii,t(−φ)erptkii,t(−φ)
1 + Γii,∆,t(φ) + Γii,Θ,t(φ)(1− sii,t(φ)) , (B.112)
Γii,Θ,t(φ) =
(ζ − 1)(ζ − η)
εii,t(φ)− 1
sii,t(φ)
εii,t(φ)
, (B.113)
Γii,∆,t(φ) = Ξii,t(φ) + λi,t,t+1Et
[
Ξii,t+1(φ)
(
a˙i,t+1y˜ii,t+1(φ)
y˜ii,t(φ)
Φii,t+1(φ)
Φii,t(φ)
p˙ii,t+1(φ)
p˙i,t+1
)]
,
(B.114)
Ξii,t(φ) =
p˙ii,t(φ)
[
p˙ii,t(φ)∆
′′
ii,t(φ) + (2− εii,t(φ))∆′ii,t(φ)
]
Φii,t(φ)(εii,t(φ)− 1) . (B.115)
Major Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Upstream Import Prices:
erptkin,t(pi) = erpt
k
ii,t(pi), (B.116)
erptkin,t($) = 1 + erpt
k
ii,t($), (B.117)
erptkin,t(`) =
Γin,mc,t(`) + Γin,Θ,t(`)
∑
−φ sin,t(−`)erptkin,t(−`)
1 + Γin,∆,t(`) + Γin,Θ,t(`)(1− sin,t(`)) , (B.118)
ptmkin,t(`) = erpt
k
in,t(`)− erptkii,t(`), (B.119)
Γii,mc,t(pi) = Γii,mc,t(`) = Γin,mc,t(`) = 1, (B.120)
Γii,mc,t($) = Γkk,mc,t(φ) = 0. (B.121)
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Major Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Downstream Import Prices:
erptki,t = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
sni,terpt
k
ni,t, (B.122)
erptkni,t =
∑
φ
sni,t(φ)erpt
k
ni,t(φ). (B.123)
Terms of Trade
Tni,t =
pii,t
pni,t
, (B.124)
τkni,t = erpt
k
ii,t − erptkni,t, (B.125)
B.6 Balanced Growth Path
Macroeconomic Fundamentals
The balanced growth path rate of inflation and labour productivity growth are strictly positive
and pre-determined:
p˙i > 1, (B.126)
a˙i = γi > 1. (B.127)
The nominal interest rate is pinned down by the Fisher equation:
ri =
p˙i
λi
, (B.128)
and the stochastic discount factor is pinned down by the Euler equation:
λi =
βi
γi
, (B.129)
which implies that the real interest rate is lower than the nominal interest rate in the balanced
growth path. Since the stochastic discount factors are not identical in all countries, the
nominal exchange rate is non-stationary, albeit the initial condition of the real exchange rate,
of which there are N , is set to it’s long-run mean, which is assumed to be known:
qni,0 = q
−1
in,0 = qni > 0, (B.130)
µi =
qjiu˜i,c
u˜j,c
, (B.131)
ei = 1. (B.132)
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Next, the menu costs and wage adjustment costs are equal to zero in the long-run, such that
the resource allocation is Pareto-efficient:
∆ii(φ) = ∆
′
ii(φ) = ∆i,w = ∆
′
i,w = 0, (B.133)
∆′′ii(φ) =κi(φ). (B.134)
The auxiliary variables associated with price and wage adjustment are therefore normalised:
Φin(φ) = Ψi = 1, (B.135)
p˙in(φ) = p˙n. (B.136)
For $-type or all firms domiciled in location i = k, the unit costs are mci(φ) = ξi(φ)di, while
for φ = {pi, `} in i 6= k, the unit costs are proportional to the major exchange rate:
mci(φ) = ξi(φ)diqki, (B.137)
since zi = 1. Suppose that the balanced growth path values of the market shares at home are
pre-determined, such that sii(pi) = 1 − sii(`) − sii($), where sii(`), and sii($) are known for
all i ∈ n. This implies that the φ-type elasticity of substitution is also known:
εii(φ) = ζ(1− sii(φ)) + ηsii(φ), (B.138)
which in turn determines the balanced growth path of the price mark-up:
Θii(φ) =
εii(φ)
εii(φ)− 1 , (B.139)
and relative prices of exports:
pii(φ) = Θii(φ)mci, (B.140)
In addition, the relative price of imports of pi- and $-type goods can also be obtained using
the symmetric equilibrium identity:
pin(pi) = dnqinpii(pi), (B.141)
pin($) = dnpii($), (B.142)
such that δin(pi) = 1, δin($) = qni. Suppose further that the balanced growth path values
of the market shares abroad are also pre-determined, such that sin(pi), sin(`), and sin($) are
known for all n 6= i. Then the elasticity of substitution and the price mark-up abroad (i.e.
εin(`) and Θin(`)) are also known. It follows that the relative price of `-type goods abroad
can also be determined:
pin(`) = Θin(`)mci(`). (B.143)
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The deviations from the law of one price for the `-type products can then be obtained as the
ratio of the import and export prices:
δin(`) =
pin(`)
dnqinpii(`)
=
Θin(`)
dnqinΘii(`)
. (B.144)
If the steady-state values of φ-specific market shares are calibrated, then the ‘change-of-
variable’ principle restricts the values of the associated φ-type market densities as follows:
χin(φ) = sin(φ)
(
pin(φ)
pin
)ζ−1
. (B.145)
Having determined all relative prices associated with import-export manufactured goods of
each type, the economy-wide price of manufactured goods are obtained as follows:
1 =
∑
φ
χin(φ),
1 =
∑
φ
sin(φ)
[
pin(φ)
pin
]ζ−1
,
pin =
∑
φ
sin(φ)pin(φ)
ζ−1
1/(ζ−1) , (B.146)
Suppose that the country-specific trade weights at home and abroad are pre-determined, such
that sni is known for all i ∈ n. Then pi,x can be obtained as follows:
1 =
N∑
n=1
αni,
1 =
N∑
n=1
sni
[
pni
pi,x
]η−1
,
pi,x =
[
N∑
n=1
snip
η−1
ni
]1/(η−1)
. (B.147)
It follows that the downstream import penetration ratio from each location i ∈ n is given by:
αni = sni
(
pni
pi,x
)η−1
. (B.148)
Combining the above results together pins down the demand for each φ-type products:
y˜in(φ) = sin(φ)
[
piny˜in
pin(φ)
]
, (B.149)
and the demand for imported intermediate goods
m˜in(φ) = ξi(φ)y˜in(φ), (B.150)
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but only if y˜in is known. The demand for home production would also be known:
y˜ni = sni
[
pi,xx˜i
pni
]
, (B.151)
but only if x˜i is known. Recall that the wage bill and the total cost of tradable goods are
proportional to the total consumption expenditure:
pi,xx˜i = (1− αi)pic˜i ⇒ x˜i = (1− αi)c˜i
pi,x
, (B.152)
w˜ihi = αipic˜i ⇒ c˜i = w˜ihi
αi
, (B.153)
where pi = 1. Therefore, if c˜i is known, then the balanced growth path is well-defined.
However, in order to determine consumption, one must first pin down the wage bill. The
hourly wages are obtained from the consumer price index identity:
1 =
(
w˜i
αi
)αi ( pi,x
1− αi
)1−αi
⇒ w˜i = αi
(
pi,x
1− αi
)1−1/αi
. (B.154)
Secondly, the hours of labour are pre-determined hi ∈ (0, 1), which puts a restriction on the
parameter controlling the relative disutility of labour:
w˜i =
ζ
ζ − 1m˜rsi,
=
ζ
ζ − 1
ψih
ϕi
i
u˜i,c
,
⇒ ψi = ζ − 1
ζ
w˜iu˜i,c
hϕii
, (B.155)
where
u˜i,c =
1− βiϑi
c˜i
(
γi
γi − ϑi
)
(B.156)
It follows that the balanced growth path values of endogenous variables derived above are
consistent with all structural equations of the model. Therefore, the aggregate output can be
obtained using the income-expenditure identity:
y˜i = c˜i + n˜xi,
n˜xi =
N−i∑
n=1
pinqniy˜in − pniy˜ni.
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Exchange Rate Pass-Through & Terms of Trade
Consider the auxiliary variables associated with exchange rate pass-through into the export
prices. If prices are flexible in the long-run, then:
Ξii(φ) =
κi(φ)p˙
2
i
εii(φ)− 1 , (B.157)
Γii,∆(φ) = Ξii(φ)
(
1 +
λiγip˙ii
p˙i
)
, (B.158)
Γii,Θ(φ) =
(ζ − 1)(ζ − η)
εii(φ)− 1
sii(φ)
εii(φ)
. (B.159)
Once the values of the auxiliary variables are determined, it is possible to solve for the mag-
nitude of exchange rate pass-through into the export prices of each φ-type firms using the
following expression:
erptkii(φ) =
Γii,mc(φ) + Γii,Θ(φ)
∑
−φ sii(−φ)erptkii(−φ)
1 + Γii,∆(φ) + Γii,Θ(φ)(1− sii(φ)) ,
= Λii,1(φ) + Λii,2(φ)
∑
−φ
sii(−φ)erptkii(−φ). (B.160)
Consider evaluating the above for each φ-types of firms as follows:
erptkii(pi) = Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)
∑
−pi
sii(−pi)erptkii(−pi),
= Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)
{
sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`) + sii($)erpt
k
ii($)
}
, (B.161)
erptkii(`) = Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)
∑
−`
sii(−`)erptkii(−`),
= Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)
{
sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) + sii($)erpt
k
ii($)
}
, (B.162)
erptkii($) = Λii,1($) + Λii,2($)
∑
−$
sii(−$)erptkii(−$),
= Λii,1($) + Λii,2($)
{
sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) + sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`)
}
. (B.163)
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Next, substitute the pass-through from $-type firms into that of the `-type firms and solve for
the latter:
erptkii(`) = Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) + Λii,2(`)sii($)erpt
k
ii($),
= Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi)
+ Λii,2(`)
{
sii($)
[
Λii,1($) + Λii,2($)sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) + Λii,2($)sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`)
]}
,
= Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)Λii,1($)sii($)
+ Λii,2(`)sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) (1 + Λii,2($)sii($))
+ Λii,2(`)sii(`)Λii,2($)sii($)erpt
k
ii(`),
=
Λii,1(`) + Λii,2(`)Λii,1($)sii($) + Λii,2(`)sii(pi)erptkii(pi) (1 + Λii,2($)sii($))
1− Λii,2(`)sii(`)Λii,2($)sii($) ,
= Ωii,1(`) + Ωii,2(`)erpt
k
ii(pi). (B.164)
Now substitute the pass-through from $-type and `-type firms into that of the pi-type firms
and solve for the latter:
erptkii(pi) = Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`) + Λii,2(pi)sii($)erpt
k
ii($),
= Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`)
+ Λii,2(pi)sii($)
{
Λii,1($) + Λii,2($)
{
sii(pi)erpt
k
ii(pi) + sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`)
}}
,
= Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)sii($)Λii,1($)
+ Λii,2(pi)sii(`)erpt
k
ii(`)(1 + Λii,2($)sii($))
+ Λii,2(pi)sii(pi)Λii,2($)sii($)erpt
k
ii(pi),
=
Λii,1(pi) + Λii,2(pi)sii($)Λii,1($) + Λii,2(pi)sii(`)erptkii(`)(1 + Λii,2($)sii($))
1− Λii,2(pi)sii(pi)Λii,2($)sii($) ,
= Ωii,1(pi) + Ωii,2(pi)erpt
k
ii(`), (B.165)
= Ωii,1(pi) + Ωii,2(pi)
{
Ωii,1(`) + Ωii,2(`)erpt
k
ii(pi)
}
,
=
Ωii,1(pi) + Ωii,2(pi)Ωii,1(`)
1− Ωii,2(pi)Ωii,2(`) . (B.166)
After the determination of export price pass-through, the properties of the import price pass-
through can be pinned down. Because the pi-type products are perfectly integrated around
the global markets, the import prices in the destination economy will absorb all of the major
exchange rate fluctuations in excess of the adjustments in the export prices:
ptmkin(pi) = 0, (B.167)
erptkin(pi) = erpt
k
ii(pi). (B.168)
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Similarly, the international market for $-type products is perfectly disintegrated, such that:
ptmin($) = 1, (B.169)
erptin($) = 1 + erpt
k
ii($). (B.170)
However, import prices of `-type products respond in a similar fashion to the export prices:
erptkin(`) = Λin,1(`) + Λin,2(`)
{
sin(pi)erpt
k
in(pi) + sin($)erpt
k
in($)
}
, (B.171)
such that
ptmkin(`) = erptin(`)− erptii(`) (B.172)
As for the downstream import prices and consumer prices, they are equal to the weighted
average of pass-through into import prices:
erptki = (1− αi)
N∑
n=1
snierpt
k
ni, (B.173)
erptkni =
∑
φ
sni(φ)erpt
k
ni(φ). (B.174)
The terms of trade and their elasticity with respect to the exchange rate are given by:
Tni =
pii
pni
, (B.175)
τkni = erpt
k
ii − erptkni. (B.176)
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List of Abbreviations
CIF Cost, Insurance, Freight
CPI Consumer Price Index
CONS Real Aggregate Consumption
DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
ERPT Exchange Rate Pass-Through
G7 Group of Seven
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBP British Pound Sterling
GMM Generalised Method of Moments
GVC Global Value Chains
LCP Local Currency Pricing
FOB Freight On Board
JP Japan
JPY Japanese Yen
KR South Korea
DCP Dominant Currency Pricing
NIR Nominal Interest Rate
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
PCP Producer Currency Pricing
PPI Producer Price Index
SKW South Korean Won
SMM Simulated Method of Moments
SVAR Structural Vector Autoregression
USD United States Dollar
VAR Vector Autoregression
UK United Kingdom
US United States
UVIM Unit Value Index of Imports
UVIX Unit Value Index of Exports
WTO World Trade Organisation
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